RUSSIA WORKING THE EU TO INFLUENCE THE U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002935 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN COE RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA WORKING THE EU TO INFLUENCE THE U.S. REF: A. BRATISLAVA 418 ¶B. MOSCOW 2787 ¶C. ANKARA 1478 ¶D. MOSCOW 2843 ¶E. MOSCOW 2670 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On October 1, MFA European Cooperation Director Voronkov sketched a Russian strategy to improve relations with the U.S. by working through Europe. Russia's "pragmatic cooperation" with German Chancellor Merkel, Spanish PM Zapatero, Italian PM Berlusconi, and the French leadership - all being hosted in Moscow this October - would help create a "healthier dialogue." Russian experts underscore Moscow's success in packing its diplomatic calendar with a wide range of European consultations and PCA negotiations to undercut the notion of its diplomatic isolation. As part of a Europe-oriented strategy, Russian officials continue to call for a new European security treaty, not premised on "scape-goating" Russia. Moscow's confidence in its approach was reflected at PACE, where Russian officials reaffirmed their willingness to walk away from any institution not prepared to engage. End summary. The European Route, Path to Normal Relations with the U.S? -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 1 meeting, MFA Director for General European Cooperation Vladimir Voronkov outlined Russia's strategy to re-engage with Europe, indirectly rebuilding relations with the U.S. He considered it a good sign that the EU and Russia were able to hammer out an agreement over so sensitive a topic as the Georgia war. Russia would continue to seek "pragmatic cooperation" with Europe and "because we have a good knowledge of U.S. ties with Europe ... we hope we can develop a healthier dialogue with the U.S." through Europe. Rejecting the notion that Russia was isolated in the wake of its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Voronkov pointed to the October 1 visit of Spanish PM Zapatero, the October 2 visit of German Chancellor Merkel, the upcoming visit of Italian PM Berlusconi, and the mid-October French intergovernmental consultations as part of an active European agenda. ¶3. (SBU) Russian analysts underscore that Moscow has successfully used Europe's instinct to engage to minimize the perception of diplomatic isolation. Not including meetings on the sidelines of UNGA, notable visits included: -9/22 Visit of FM Lavrov to Ireland to meet with FM Martin -9/20 Visit of French PM Fillon, including a meeting with PM Putin -9/15-17 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) meeting (Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Council of European Community) -9/15-16 Visit of DFM Titov to Slovakia to meet with FM Kubis and MFA State Secretary Strofova (Ref A) -9/12 Visit of FM Lavrov to meet FM Sikorskiy in Poland (Ref B) -9/10 Visit of Deputy Premier Sechin to Slovakia to meet PM Fico -9/9 Visit of Austrian FM Plassnik to meet with FM Lavrov -9/4 Visit of Italian FM Frattini to meet with FM Lavrov -9/2 Visit of Belgian FM de Gucht to meet with FM Lavrov -9/2 Visit of FM Lavrov to Turkey to meet with FM Babacan -9/1 Visit of Bundestag delegation to meet with DFM Karasin -8/15 Visit of German Chancellor Merkel to Sochi to meet with President Medvedev -8/13 Visit of PM Erdogan and FM Babacan to Moscow to meet with President Medvedev, PM Putin, and FM Lavrov (Ref C) ¶4. (SBU) Additional upcoming visits include an October 28 Ministerial meeting of the Northern Dimension Partnership in St. Petersburg (participants: Russia, EU, Iceland, Norway); the October 22-23 visit of Latvian FM Riekstin; and a tentative visit by Medvedev to Paris. Some of these visits were efforts to reinvigorate languishing bilateral and multilateral dialogues: the Northern Dimension Partnership has not met since 2006 and the Slovakian-Russian intergovernmental dialogue has idled since 2004. EU-Russia PCA Negotiations -------------- ¶5. (C) Voronkov painted an equally upbeat picture of Russian-EU relations, commenting that PCA negotiations were proceeding on pace: the Permanent Council's meeting on energy cooperation will take place in Paris on October 8, a meeting on judicial issues will take place on October 15, and a ministerial meeting will take place on October 18 in St. Petersburg to discuss the PCA framework. While acknowledging MOSCOW 00002935 002 OF 002 a conflict remained between Russia and newer EU member states, he stated that it was the role of the EU to address these concerns and present a united position. Further, "the economic crisis may reduce these states' concerns in favor of cooperation." While Voronkov did not discuss the EU's and President Sarkozy's threat to end PCA negotiations if Russian forces failed to withdraw from Georgia, the expectation - reinforced by Medvedev on October 1 - is that Russian forces will withdraw from Georgia proper on schedule by October 10. Locked in the "Legacy of the Cold War" -------------- ¶6. (C) As part of its European-oriented strategy, Medvedev, Putin, and Lavrov continued to call for a European security treaty to redress the balance of Cold war institutions. When asked to explain the Russian concept, Voronkov called it a "new philosophy" in relations with the U.S. and Europe. As FM Lavrov had outlined it, "there was a need to look at and set a new rules-based organization, based on the Helsinki final acts." Voronkov conceded that Russia did not have a concrete proposal, arguing that initial discussions should be open-ended to solicit a range of new points on how to reflect institutionally the post-Cold War order. He reiterated that the Russian concept was for a transatlantic agreement to supplement, but not eliminate NATO, and repeated Lavrov's call for a Helsinki-2 process. He assessed that the present systems in Europe provided room for diplomats to talk but provided no space for "local peoples" and analysts. He welcomed a Finnish proposal to include points of common understanding and points of contradiction in future OSCE declarations, as it allowed for a clear understanding of implications and problems "from the beginning of the negotiating process." ¶7. (C) According to Voronkov, driving this initiative was a Russian view that the existing institutions in Europe were a legacy of the Cold War, where "Russia was the scapegoat and blamed for everything." The Russian "people will not take it anymore." Comparing the situation to an apartment that had not changed in twenty years, he said that the situation needed a fresh look that was not held hostage to old thinking. "We cannot slow integration," despite voices in Russia and the U.S. that call for isolation. PACE an Uncomfortable Venue -------------- ¶8. (C) Russian confidence in its European approach was reflected at PACE. While positive on long-term cooperation with Europe, Voronkov was less sanguine about the PACE discussions in Strasbourg. He expressed Russia's wish that the deliberations would be constructive and take into consideration Russia's concerns and right to speak, but "the only truth in the language (before PACE) is the statement that Georgia launched an attack in the middle of the night on Tskhinvali." If Russia's interests were not fairly considered, he underlined that the response by the Russian leadership would be strong and could include the removal of the delegation. Voronkov said that it was not good for either side to not cooperate on this issue, and he noted that the PACE was "the only place" continuing to use harsh language against Russia. The task, as he saw it, was for Russia to build "a better understanding" within PACE. In a discussion with Ambassador Beyrle September 26, Duma International Affairs Committee chair (and PACE vice-president) Konstantin Kosachev confidently predicted that while some of the interventions would be sharp, PACE would not strip Russia of its voting rights. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) As seen from here, Russia has been adept in exploiting European fears over estranging Moscow to fill a diplomatic dance card with Western partners that seems to undermine the portryal of Russian isolation post-Georgia. Europe has not been alone, with Asian partners - including South Korea, China, and Vietnam - also weighing in with senior level visitors. That Germany and France have scaled back the scope of their annual intergovernmental commissions has been obscured by the fact of the sessions themselves. BEYRLE