MFA: UNSC RESOLUTION DEMONSTRATED UNITY ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002905

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR UNSC IAEA IR RS
SUBJECT: MFA: UNSC RESOLUTION DEMONSTRATED UNITY ON IRAN

REF: MOSCOW 2824

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) MFA Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs
Iran specialist Alexander Trofimov told us on September 30
that the passage of UNSCR 1835 demonstrated P5 1 unity on
Iran and should dispel fears that tension over Georgia has
diminished the ability of the U.S. and Russia to cooperate on
issues of mutual concern. The GOR was pleased with the
resolution, which reflected the idea put forward by Moscow to
reach a compromise that would reaffirm the intention of the
P5 1 to press Iran to comply with the will of the
international community, while avoiding "untimely" new
sanctions. The fact that a spokesman for Iran's Parliament
was quick to complain about UNSCR 1835 demonstrated that it
was not a meaningless gesture.


2. (C) Trofimov admitted that Lavrov's decision not to
participate in a P5 1 Ministerial was partly influenced by
Russian irritation over canceling the G8 Foreign Ministers'
meeting, although he claimed that the GOR's primary concern
was that the agenda for the meeting was too narrowly focused
on placing new sanctions on Iran. This ran counter to
Russia's preference for negotiations over punitive measures
to induce Tehran to comply with existing UNSC and IAEA
resolutions. The GOR was also worried that holding a P5 1
Ministerial under extraordinary media attention at the
conclusion of a "tense month" would not be conducive to a
favorable outcome.


3. (C) Trofimov reiterated that the Georgian crisis had not
altered Russian views on the Iranian nuclear program, nor
would it lead Moscow to change its bilateral relationship
with Tehran. Trofimov agreed that Iran hoped there would be
a split within the P5 1, but said that Lavrov made clear to
FM Mottaki that "nothing had changed" in Russia's position
during their September 12 meeting in Moscow (reftel).


4. (C) Trofimov explained that Russia would look to EU
Solana's meetings with Iranian nuclear negotiator Jalili as
the primary avenue to advance the P5 1's "freeze-for freeze"
proposal. The GOR believed that Iran was seriously
considering the offer, as it had asked numerous questions
about details of the proposal during bilateral meetings
between DFM Ryabkov and one of Jalili's deputies. Tehran
wanted assurances that if it agreed to abide by the
requirements of "freeze-for-freeze" it would not face the
prospect of being hit with unilateral sanctions by one of the
P5 1.


5. (C) Trofimov downplayed comments by Russian analysts who
warned that Iran was the "main beneficiary" of the dispute
between Russia and the U.S. over Georgia, which gave Tehran
more time to develop its nuclear weapons program, without
fear of new sanctions. Trofimov argued that many of these
analysts made their conclusions after the P5 1 Ministerial
was canceled, but before the success demonstrated by passage
of UNSCR 1835. Vladimir Evseev of the Russian Academy of
Sciences told us, however, that while the unanimity
demonstrated by the UNSC was a good sign, he was concerned
that tensions between the U.S. and Russia could complicate
efforts to negotiate with Iran, especially if either
Washington or Moscow took any new, provocative actions in the
Caucasus or Eastern Europe.
BEYRLE