GOR SILENCE ON KIM JONG IL'S HEALTH SIGN OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002856

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018
TAGS: PREL RS CH KS KN
SUBJECT: GOR SILENCE ON KIM JONG IL'S HEALTH SIGN OF
DECLINING INFLUENCE AND INTEREST IN NORTH KOREA

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice Wells, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Moscow has had little to say about the
reported illness of North Korean leader Kim Jong IL. Russian
experts believe this is due to the fact that Russia no longer
has real influence over or interest in the DPRK beyond the
six-party talks. North Korea watchers here are divided on
how to deal with the DPRK regime, urging contingency planning
for a post-Kim transition and caution over Pyongyang's
efforts to sell - again and again - its disarmament
cooperation. End Summary.


2. (C) In the two weeks since reports surfaced that North
Korean leader Kim Jong Il may be gravely ill, the Russian
government has maintained an almost deafening silence.
Foreign Minister Lavrov, when asked to comment on the news
during a September 10 joint press conference with visiting
South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, simply said that
he did not have any information. In private, Russian Foreign
Ministry officials have maintained the same line. The South
Korean Embassy told us that Lavrov's comment to the press was
a repeat of what he said to FM Yu during their lunch earlier,
while MFA's First Asia Department has declined to provide an
assessment of how Kim's possible incapacitation or death
would affect the Korean Peninsula. Our Japanese Embassy
colleagues have also had no luck in gleaning Russian thinking
on this issue, and indicated to us that Tokyo was troubled by
the Russian silence.

Russia No Longer Has Influence, but Maybe CHINA Does
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Russian academics see this silence as confirmation
that, despite GOR interests in nuclear non-proliferation on
the Korean Peninsula and participation in the Six Party
talks, Russia no longer maintains influence over North Korea
the way the Soviet Union did. Executive Director of the
Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center) Anton
Khlopkov asserted that Russia lost its influence on North
Korea in the early 1990s. Although there was a brief attempt
to recover lost ground in the late 1990s that culminated in
Putin's 2000 visit to Pyongyang, the DPRK's subsequent
backtracking on a promise to Putin to abandon its nuclear
program in exchange for economic carrots "made a fool" out of
the Russian government. Since then, Khlopkov argued, the GOR
has not made further meaningful attempts to regain influence
over North Korea. In his view, Moscow is not interested in
spending more money to buy over a regime just because it is
anti-U.S., especially given North Korea's existing $8 billion
Soviet-era debt to Russia. Vasiliy Mikheev, Director of the
China and Japan Studies Center at the Institute for World
Economy and International Relations, stated to us flatly that
Russia had done no planning for a post-Kim North Korea, and
was not likely to give this issue careful consideration given
more pressing issues elsewhere.


4. (C) Mikheev asserted that according to his sources in
the Chinese academic and diplomatic communities, Beijing has
a contingency plan for Kim's death and may want to preview it
with the U.S. before discussing with South Korea and other
Six Party partners. (NB. The Chinese Embassy here has not
made such indications to us.) He indicated that it was
imperative for the U.S., Russia, and CHINA to coordinate
approaches. In his view, the Georgia crisis had again
demonstrated that small countries can become the source of
conflict between bigger world powers. North Korea post-Kim
Jong Il has the potential to become another such flashpoint
without prior consultation between the stakeholders. Both
Mikheev and Khlopkov said that should Kim die, an intense
power struggle will occur, and North Korea is likely to cut
off all communications to the outside until a new leader
emerges. Khlopkov sees the military as the eventual victor,
which will then take a hard line on the negotiations.

How Do You Solve a Problem Like North Korea?
--------------


5. (C) Amidst the anxiety about DPRK's future, North Korea
watchers in Moscow are divided on how to advance the Six
Party Talks. Khlopkov said that buying North Korean nuclear
capabilities was the only viable way to achieve gradual
disarmament. Mikheev, on the other hand, asserted that the
parties were wasting their time at the negotiating table
without concurrent efforts to encourage more systemic reforms
in North Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear program was the only
"good" it has worth trading with the outside world. It
therefore would never completely give up its nuclear
ambitions and would want to sell this "good" over and over to
get maximum economic benefit. Chinese Embassy Political
Counselor Gui Congyou likens North Korea to a misbehaving
child who requires chocolates and patience to induce positive
behavior. In this regard, he asserted that U.S. demands on
the verification protocol may be too bitter for the North
Koreans to swallow.
BEYRLE