MFA SAYS "FOREIGN ADVISORS" IN AFGHANISTAN SEEK TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002853 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR SNAR NATO AF RS SUBJECT: MFA SAYS "FOREIGN ADVISORS" IN AFGHANISTAN SEEK TO THWART RUSSIA-NATO COOPERATION REF: A. MOSCOW 884 ¶B. MOSCOW 1868 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) MFA Afghan Desk Chief Yuri Kholkhov told us on September 23 that the MFA did not believe it was official U.S. policy to tell the Afghan government not to send law enforcement officials to counter-narcotics training in Russia, but suspected U.S. military officials in Kabul had persuaded the Afghans not to take part. The GOR expected the arrival of 18 Afghans at Moscow's Domodedova training center on September 15, until the Russian Embassy in Kabul was informed that the Afghan government had opted not to send anyone. This appeared to have been such a last minute decision that two of the Afghans unexpectedly arrived in Moscow and are being trained at Domodedova. ¶2. (C) Kholkhov said that the MFA's September 15 statement on the matter reflected GOR displeasure at what appeared to be an apparent effort to thwart Russia-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan. The statement expressed concern over an Afghan government decision that was "inconsistent" with the nation's need to combat narcotics trafficking, suggesting the influence of "foreign advisors" who hoped to "torpedo" Russia-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan. The MFA called for the Afghan government to display greater "autonomy" in making "critical decisions." ¶3. (C) Kholkhov claimed that the MFA statement was "diplomatic" considering Moscow's anger over the issue. The reference to "foreign advisors" was purposely chosen to avoid suggesting that this was the policy of a specific country. Kholkhov explained that whereas he and other MFA officials involved in the Afghan account did not think that official U.S. policy was to discourage the Afghans from attending the Domodedova program, they suspected that the decision was yet another result of ongoing efforts by U.S. military officials in Kabul to convince the Afghans not to work with Russia. The GOR had reliable evidence that this was occurring, and went beyond simply frustrating Russian attempts to provide military aid to the Afghan National Army (ref A). ¶4. (C) Kholkhov reiterated that Russia wanted to work with the U.S. and NATO to stabilize Afghanistan, a policy that was forcefully supported by MFA. He warned, however, that there were "blockheads, hard-liners" in other parts of the GOR, who believed the U.S. wanted to shut Russia out of Afghanistan entirely. Unfortunately, they could point to Domodedova and the difficulty the GOR has had in providing military aid to the Afghans as evidence. Kholkhov recommended moving forward with discussions on Moscow's proposed military aid program to help dispel Russian suspicions of U.S. intentions (ref B). BEYRLE