RUSSIA FIGHTS BACK AGAINST ISOLATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002843

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO GG UP XH RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA FIGHTS BACK AGAINST ISOLATION

REF: A. MOSCOW 2787

B. MOSCOW 2789

C. MOSCOW 2814

D. MOSCOW 1904

E. MOSCOW 2804

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. While reactions to the Secretary's September
18 speech have been fairly muted, with the exception of the
customary harangue from the MFA, the Russian leadership is at
pains to show that Russia is not isolated following the
events in Georgia. Moscow is seeking to push back on claims
that its actions risk making it irrelevant by classic
wedge-driving, reaching out to Europe and arguing that "a new
world balance" is needed. The GOR's insistence that it wants
to work with the U.S. on key challenges is targeted at the
Europeans, with most experts seeing the underlying message as
"don't touch Ukraine, which is in Russia's sphere of
interest." While the news focus on Georgia here has been
overshadowed by Russia's financial crisis, Moscow continues
to argue for Medvedev's proposal for a new European security
architecture as a way to counter U.S. "unipolarism," and to
restore investment confidence. We should continue to ensure
that there is no daylight between us and our allies. End
summary.

Reaction Muted
--------------


2. (SBU) Initial media reaction to the Secretary's September
18 speech was fairly muted (possibly due to focus on the
financial crisis),with some outlets highlighting the
Secretary's comments that Russia would become increasingly
isolated and irrelevant, while others noted U.S.
acknowledgment of Georgia's initial attacks and the killing
of Russian peacekeepers. In a speech to representatives of
public organizations September 19, Medvedev said Russia's
priorities were unchanged by the events in Georgia and Russia
would not allow pressure from outside to affect its course.
He reiterated his call for a "pan-European security treaty"
and blamed NATO for provoking the conflict in Georgia. He
rejected those who, he said, were pushing Russia toward "an
autonomous development behind...an iron curtain," saying
Russia was not interested in returning to the past. Citing
the financial crisis, he noted that the world was "open and
global, politically and economically." He questioned
American support for Russian judges, saying if the U.S. was
referring to joint programs, such programs "were usually
carried out with countries that share a similar vision of the
main processes underway in the world." He ended, saying
Russia wanted others to listen to its arguments and to
understand the difficult choice it made, and would continue
to work on this "regardless of the various foolish words we
hear from different quarters."


3. (SBU) The MFA, typically, posted a sharp response, saying
this was not the first time the events in Georgia had been
"grossly distorted" by U.S. officials, and the speech was not
"surprising in view of Washington's commitment to support the
bankrupt regime in Tbilisi." It commented that
Russian-American relations were at a turning point, but said
Russia would not become involved in a confrontation, but
would "lobby for a positive, unifying agenda...."

Russian Diplomatic Offensive
--------------


4. (C) In the past couple of weeks, Russian leaders have
engaged in a flurry of diplomatic and public relations
activity aimed at conveying the message that, contrary to the
U.S.'s claims, Russia is not isolated, and that things are
getting "back to normal" with the international community.
In Lavrov's trips to Poland (ref A) and Ireland, DPM Sechin's
trip to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (ref B),DFMs
Saltanov's and Titov's visits to the Middle East and Central
Europe respectively, and visits to Russia by the Azerbaijani
(ref C) and Vietnamese Presidents, and French Prime Minister,
the Russian leadership has sought to show that Russia is
going about its diplomatic business as usual. They have
endeavored to explain their actions in Georgia, while seeking
to play up economic and energy prospects and cooperation, in
an effort to restore investor confidence. The tone has
mostly been positive and friendly (witness Lavrov's
unexpectedly upbeat and conciliatory message in Warsaw, ref
A).


5. (C) Similarly, albeit in a harsher voice, the leadership
has reached out to the European press with Putin's September
13 interview in France's Le Figaro and Lavrov's September 15
letter to Germany's Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. These

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efforts have been aimed at persuading a European audience
that Russia's actions were justified and that although Russia
wanted to continue its cooperation with the U.S., the U.S. is
to blame for "spoiling the relationship" (as claimed by Putin
in his interview).

"Russia is not Irrelevant"
--------------


6. (SBU) The Russian leadership is also pressing its argument
that Georgia highlighted the need for a "multilateral world."
In almost all his public remarks, including in response to
the Secretary's speech and to the Valdai Club in early
September, Medvedev has said that existing security
structures were "defunct" and has reiterated his call for a
new European security architecture. In a September 15
article entitled "The World in Search of a New Balance,"
Lavrov argued it was possible to build a "positive agenda"
with the U.S., but America should "recognize the reality of
the post-American world and begin adapting to it." He said
Russia would conduct business with "any America," and would
continue to speak with Washington while there was "the
slightest hope to understand each other and reach agreement,"
but only on the basis of "strict reciprocity and honesty."
Russia would not allow itself to become involved in any
confrontations, but, Lavrov cautioned, Russia would operate
independently if necessary to protect its national interests.

"The Target is Europe...
--------------


7. (C) Experts agree that the Russian leadership's target is
Europe. Ekho Moskvy Editor-in-Chief Aleksey Venediktov
(protect) told us Putin and Medvedev truly believed that the
U.S. was behind the Georgian decision to attack Tskhinvali
and were heavily influenced by the "red folders" prepared by
the security services alleging U.S. complicity in everything
from fighting Russian forces to re-arming Georgia with
offensive weapons. Moscow had interpreted the removal of
the 123 agreement from the legislative agenda as a
"sanction," according to Venediktov's read-out of his meeting
with DFM Ryabkov, and Ryabkov told him Russia would thwart
the U.S. on additional sanctions against Iran in response.
With a renewed emphasis on creating a new European security
architecture, Russia was looking at the Kazakh chairmanship
of the OSCE as an opportunity to move towards a "Helsinki 2."
While conservative talk show host Aleksey Pushkov maintained
that there was "no passion in this hate affair" with the
U.S., he stressed that Moscow was focused on a battle for
Europe, with the Russian leadership eager to underscore that
Saakashvili precipitated the conflict, leaving Russia no
choice but to strike back. Pushkov emphasized that there was
little criticism of Europe presented by the leadership during
the Valdai discussion group.

...but Stay Away from Ukraine"
--------------


8. (C) The underlying message, our contacts say, is that
Russia will act when its core interests are threatened, and
Ukraine is the center. On September 20, Lavrov lashed out
again at Ukraine, saying Ukrainian membership in NATO would
"produce a great crisis and impact European security "in the
most negative way." Referring to Putin's 2007 speech in
Munich, Aleksandr Belkin of the Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy told us: "Munich was the turning point" where
Russia was saying "no more; you must listen to us." Masha
Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Center agreed, adding that
Munich was the message, while Georgia put the words into
action. Pushkov suggested that Georgia had overtaken the
foreign policy concept authored by Medvedev at the outset of
his administration, which he dismissed as being too focused
on consensual relations in foreign affairs. Instead, "the
rules will be written to reflect the fact that Russia is
ready for combat" when its core interests are challenged.
The expansion of NATO to Russian borders could not be
interpreted by the Russian leadership as anything other than
a "brazen assault" on Russian influence in its neighborhood,
he argued. Aleksandr Golts of the Daily Journal warned that
if the West continued to press NATO membership for Ukraine,
"the level of rage will be unbelievable." Moscow, he
cautioned, would do everything it could to split Ukraine into
two or three parts, and after events in Georgia, the
international community needed to take Moscow's threats
seriously.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The Europeans appear to the Russians to be predictably
split on the degree to which they are willing to isolate or

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curtail cooperation with Russia, and Russia can be expected
to continue to seek ways to get back to "business as usual"
with them. Moscow believes that there are few consequences
that the U.S. or West can impose that will seriously hurt the
country, although the financial crisis (which Medvedev
acknowledged last week was partially due to the war in
Georgia) has shaken the leadership (ref E) and increased its
need to seek ways to restore investor confidence, not just in
Russia's economy but in its political environment as well.
We can expect Russia to continue to reach out to the
international community, possibly with concessions (such as
offers to buy Azeri gas at Western prices, or increased
economic and energy cooperation with Latin America) to
prevent becoming "isolated and irrelevant." At the same
time, Moscow will continue to send a strong message on NATO
membership for Ukraine, and to drive wedges as much as
possible between the U.S. and our allies. We should continue
to do everything possible to frustrate that agenda.
BEYRLE