RUSSIA LEANS TO THE RIGHT AFTER GEORGIAN CONFLICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002791

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: ECON PGOV PHUM RS SOCI
SUBJECT: RUSSIA LEANS TO THE RIGHT AFTER GEORGIAN CONFLICT

REF: MOSCOW 02775

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary. Moscow's analytic community has embraced the
idea that the Georgian conflict inaugurated a "new reality,"
not only for Russia's foreign policy, but also for Medvedev's
domestic agenda. Our contacts, ranging from pro-Western to
quasi-fascist, described a lurch towards a more authoritarian
model, with an attendant "tightening of the screws" on
political freedoms. Medvedev's increasingly militarized
rhetoric (and Putin's continued bombastic pronouncements),
the Duma's approval for increased military spending, pressure
on Ekho Moskvy, and Kremlin ideologist Surkov's outright
dismissal of a "thaw" provided them ample confirmation of the
new reality. Whether this shift to the right is a temporary
aberration -- as the more liberal members of the ruling party
maintain -- or a permanent course adjustment will only become
clear when the bills for the Georgian conflict and the new
political direction come due, perhaps earlier than expected,
given the war-enhanced pressures on Russia's economy. End
Summary.

Signs of the Times
--------------


2. (SBU) The idea that the Georgian conflict has "changed the
world" reached to the top of the system. President Medvedev,
addressing the State Soviet of regional leaders on September
6, warned that Russia had survived a "moment of truth" and
now faced a different world. Medvedev has embraced the
rhetoric of a "war president," placing new emphasis on
strengthening national security -- on the military,
industrial, and agricultural fronts. Again, on September 11,
Medvedev set the re-fit of Russia's military forces as one of
the highest priorities this year, justifying the expenditures
by "Georgian aggression and its continuing militarization."
Putting rhetoric into action, the Duma in a closed session on
September 10 approved an increase in the defense budget for
2009 by approximately 1 percent of GDP, to a total of about
$60 billion (or 3 percent of GDP). (Septel)


3. (SBU) Commentators point to the linkages between a
strident foreign policy agenda and a "tightening of the
screws" on the political system. Kremlin ideologist
Vladislav Surkov on September 10 warned a closed meeting of
the United Russia leadership that there would be no "thaw" in
Russia and he characterized the party as having a
"conservative" orientation, according to press reports.
Perhaps the most telling sign of the depth of this
retrenchment is the pressure exerted on the flagship liberal
voice, Ekho Moskvy, in which Putin's criticism compelled the
station's management to pull two critical voices off the air.
(reftel) Other changes in the media realm, including the
sentencing of Nezavisimaya Gazeta's deputy editor for
blackmail, and the canceling of two television political talk
shows hosted by moderate commentators, add to concerns about
the future of Russia's already constrained media freedom.


4. (SBU) The administration's tone and approach is both
driving and being driven by overwhelming popular support for
the Medvedev-Putin tandem and their conduct of the war.
Eighty percent of respondents to a Levada Center polling
among ten large urban areas approved of the decision to
recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia and considered it
appropriate for Russia to keep peacekeepers in the region,
despite the loss of mandate following Georgia's withdrawal
from the CIS.
Reactions from the Political Class
--------------


5. (C) Independent, pro-Western analysts like Moscow Carnegie
Center's Lilya Shevtsova and Higher School of Economics
professor Mark Urnov considered the Georgian war a
catastrophe, with huge domestic repercussions. They predicted
that the regime will abandon any pretense to even the
moderate progressivism that was hoped for with Medvedev's
ascension to power. Shevtsova has taken the hardest line,
casting the Georgian conflict as a tool for the
legitimization of the ruling structure and consolidating
society in support of the regime through the demonization of
the U.S. as a hostile power intent on humiliating Russia.
Having discounted the veracity of external irritants in
driving Russian policy (such as Kosovo, missile defense, or
NATO enlargement),she saw the war providing an opportunity
to create an "enemy complex" that has marginalized further
the fragile progressive forces in the country.


6. (C) Urnov, who had previously voiced a tenuous optimism
for Medvedev, described the war as tipping the scales against
reform. He described the war as a result of the lingering
Putin system, which resulted in a group-think mentality
around the leader where opposite views are not considered.
Urnov told us that Putin and Medvedev realize that they have
lost their political credentials with the West, and are
trying to stem the hemorrhaging of political and financial
support by exploiting Medvedev's relations with European
leaders. In the medium and longer term, Urnov lamented,
resources would flow to the military from other parts of the
Russian state budget. The decision to opt for guns over
butter would warp the thinking of leaders, leading them
further from developing a strategy for addressing domestic
social ills or creating a modern, innovation-driven economy,
and tempting them to either use force again or to squander
more money in an attempt to show the west (and China) that
Russia was able (and ready) to defend its interests.


7. (C) The "establishment liberals" likewise saw a change in
Russia's political vector, but held a somewhat less dire view
of events. Perhaps typical of this group, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
owner-editor Konstatin Remchukov argued that nobody in the
administration wants to reestablish the Soviet empire, but at
the same time they do not want "to have to listen to
America." He described the leadership as pragmatic and Putin
as among the "most liberal" in the ruling circle.
Nevertheless, Remchukov admitted that recognizing the two
separatist regions was a mistake and he characterized the
conflict as a victory for conservative forces. He expected
military budgets to increase and the strength of the silovik
forces to rise and with them entrenched distrust of the U.S.
on issues like missile defense.


8. (C) Others still expressed hope that Russia would right
itself over time and return to the reform agenda. Nikolay
Svanidze, noted tele-journalist and author of a recent book
of interviews with Medvedev, told us on September 9 that
Putin has become "anti-Western" (and he blamed US policies
for contributing to this change in view) but held hope that
Medvedev had not yet abandoned his European orientation.
Svanidze argued that the war had strengthened Medvedev, whose
efforts to negotiate an end to the war bolstered his
authority. Likewise, Moskovskiy Komsomolets editor Pavel
Gusev asserted that Medvedev's agenda remains a "reform
agenda" and underscored that the President's pre-war conclave
with leading editors focused on issues like direct election
of governors, court reform, and economic modernization
without a mention of any foreign policy to recognize South
Ossetia or Abkhazia. The pendulum would swing back to reform,
Gusev argued, because the economy was fragile and
modernization required.


9. (C) In stark contrast to the liberal's blue funk, Russia's
nationalists have taken particular glee at the turn of
events. Editor of the far-right Zavtra newspaper Aleksandr
Prokhanov told us that the Georgian war had been beneficial
for Russia because it restored Russia's place in the greater
Caucasus region and burnished Russia's imperial qualities,
initiated by Putin during his presidency. Most importantly,
the war weakened the role of the "pro-Western Russian elite,"
which he claimed represented the most dangerous threat to
Russian national interests. Prokhanov thought that a new
Cold War would benefit Russia, separate it from the U.S. once
and for all, and bring Russian money back from abroad. Former
head of MoD's Main Directorate for International Military
Cooperation, General Leonid Ivashov, argued to us that Russia
was past due in re-establishing its sphere of influence.
Medvedev's mistake, he maintained, was preventing the
military from marching to Tblisi.

Ruling Party "Liberals" Deny Ideological Setback
-------------- ---


10. (SBU) The architects for the ruling party's liberal Duma
faction (the "November 4 Club") maintain that the reform
agenda remains a priority for the Medvedev administration.
Duma Chairman of the Constitutional Committee Vladimir Pligin
acknowledged to us that some Russian officials sought a
"black and white world," inconsistent with Russian
integration into European and international organizations.
But, he insisted that "the same values remain" at the top,
with Medvedev committed to reform. A firm support of the
decision to invade Georgia ("there was no other choice"),
Pligin ticked off the unresolved liberal agenda awaiting the
Kremlin: a moribund media; a military budget that needed to
be driven by clear strategic goals; a commitment to private
property that was being chipped away by encroaching state
ownership and control; and Russian isolation from its
European and U.S. partners. When the passions of war had
subsided, Pligin's ideological sidekick, Ekpert magazine
editor Valeriy Fadeyev, told us the reform agenda will
triumph because the mounting economic crisis will force
decisionmakers to "return to the basics." What the
leadership cannot afford, he noted, was social protest, and
that required a coherent strategy to combat the stagnation.
Patriotic slogans aside, he maintained, the Russian social
fabric remained weak and Russia dependent on the West for
ideas and technology critical to its modernization.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) At the present time, with the Medvedev-Putin tandem
enjoying stratospheric popularity and a palpable mood of
euphoric patriotism, it is easy to see why many here saw the
Georgian war as a critical turning point. The administration
has been feeling its oats domestically and is driving a new,
more militaristic agenda that included increased funding for
weapons, financial support for rebuilding South Ossetia, and
clamping down on liberal voices like Ekho Moskvy. Yet,
Russia has to square this political euphoria with the
increasingly dismal economic developments, which have been
exacerbated by the strategic miscalculation of recognizing
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We will be looking ahead to
critical moments, such as Medvedev's address to the Federal
Assembly this fall, the Finance Ministry's response to an
expenditure-weighted budget, and the public's reaction when
the bill for a more robust military (as well as the costs of
rebuilding South Ossetia) comes due to see whether this shift
to the right becomes a more permanent policy orientation,
backed by budget resources. End Comment.
BEYRLE