RUSSIA LEANS TO THE RIGHT AFTER GEORGIAN CONFLICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002791 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017 TAGS: ECON PGOV PHUM RS SOCI SUBJECT: RUSSIA LEANS TO THE RIGHT AFTER GEORGIAN CONFLICT REF: MOSCOW 02775 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Moscow's analytic community has embraced the idea that the Georgian conflict inaugurated a "new reality," not only for Russia's foreign policy, but also for Medvedev's domestic agenda. Our contacts, ranging from pro-Western to quasi-fascist, described a lurch towards a more authoritarian model, with an attendant "tightening of the screws" on political freedoms. Medvedev's increasingly militarized rhetoric (and Putin's continued bombastic pronouncements), the Duma's approval for increased military spending, pressure on Ekho Moskvy, and Kremlin ideologist Surkov's outright dismissal of a "thaw" provided them ample confirmation of the new reality. Whether this shift to the right is a temporary aberration -- as the more liberal members of the ruling party maintain -- or a permanent course adjustment will only become clear when the bills for the Georgian conflict and the new political direction come due, perhaps earlier than expected, given the war-enhanced pressures on Russia's economy. End Summary. Signs of the Times -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The idea that the Georgian conflict has "changed the world" reached to the top of the system. President Medvedev, addressing the State Soviet of regional leaders on September 6, warned that Russia had survived a "moment of truth" and now faced a different world. Medvedev has embraced the rhetoric of a "war president," placing new emphasis on strengthening national security -- on the military, industrial, and agricultural fronts. Again, on September 11, Medvedev set the re-fit of Russia's military forces as one of the highest priorities this year, justifying the expenditures by "Georgian aggression and its continuing militarization." Putting rhetoric into action, the Duma in a closed session on September 10 approved an increase in the defense budget for 2009 by approximately 1 percent of GDP, to a total of about $60 billion (or 3 percent of GDP). (Septel) ¶3. (SBU) Commentators point to the linkages between a strident foreign policy agenda and a "tightening of the screws" on the political system. Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov on September 10 warned a closed meeting of the United Russia leadership that there would be no "thaw" in Russia and he characterized the party as having a "conservative" orientation, according to press reports. Perhaps the most telling sign of the depth of this retrenchment is the pressure exerted on the flagship liberal voice, Ekho Moskvy, in which Putin's criticism compelled the station's management to pull two critical voices off the air. (reftel) Other changes in the media realm, including the sentencing of Nezavisimaya Gazeta's deputy editor for blackmail, and the canceling of two television political talk shows hosted by moderate commentators, add to concerns about the future of Russia's already constrained media freedom. ¶4. (SBU) The administration's tone and approach is both driving and being driven by overwhelming popular support for the Medvedev-Putin tandem and their conduct of the war. Eighty percent of respondents to a Levada Center polling among ten large urban areas approved of the decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia and considered it appropriate for Russia to keep peacekeepers in the region, despite the loss of mandate following Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS. Reactions from the Political Class -------------- ¶5. (C) Independent, pro-Western analysts like Moscow Carnegie Center's Lilya Shevtsova and Higher School of Economics professor Mark Urnov considered the Georgian war a catastrophe, with huge domestic repercussions. They predicted that the regime will abandon any pretense to even the moderate progressivism that was hoped for with Medvedev's ascension to power. Shevtsova has taken the hardest line, casting the Georgian conflict as a tool for the legitimization of the ruling structure and consolidating society in support of the regime through the demonization of the U.S. as a hostile power intent on humiliating Russia. Having discounted the veracity of external irritants in driving Russian policy (such as Kosovo, missile defense, or NATO enlargement),she saw the war providing an opportunity to create an "enemy complex" that has marginalized further the fragile progressive forces in the country. ¶6. (C) Urnov, who had previously voiced a tenuous optimism for Medvedev, described the war as tipping the scales against reform. He described the war as a result of the lingering Putin system, which resulted in a group-think mentality around the leader where opposite views are not considered. Urnov told us that Putin and Medvedev realize that they have lost their political credentials with the West, and are trying to stem the hemorrhaging of political and financial support by exploiting Medvedev's relations with European leaders. In the medium and longer term, Urnov lamented, resources would flow to the military from other parts of the Russian state budget. The decision to opt for guns over butter would warp the thinking of leaders, leading them further from developing a strategy for addressing domestic social ills or creating a modern, innovation-driven economy, and tempting them to either use force again or to squander more money in an attempt to show the west (and China) that Russia was able (and ready) to defend its interests. ¶7. (C) The "establishment liberals" likewise saw a change in Russia's political vector, but held a somewhat less dire view of events. Perhaps typical of this group, Nezavisimaya Gazeta owner-editor Konstatin Remchukov argued that nobody in the administration wants to reestablish the Soviet empire, but at the same time they do not want "to have to listen to America." He described the leadership as pragmatic and Putin as among the "most liberal" in the ruling circle. Nevertheless, Remchukov admitted that recognizing the two separatist regions was a mistake and he characterized the conflict as a victory for conservative forces. He expected military budgets to increase and the strength of the silovik forces to rise and with them entrenched distrust of the U.S. on issues like missile defense. ¶8. (C) Others still expressed hope that Russia would right itself over time and return to the reform agenda. Nikolay Svanidze, noted tele-journalist and author of a recent book of interviews with Medvedev, told us on September 9 that Putin has become "anti-Western" (and he blamed US policies for contributing to this change in view) but held hope that Medvedev had not yet abandoned his European orientation. Svanidze argued that the war had strengthened Medvedev, whose efforts to negotiate an end to the war bolstered his authority. Likewise, Moskovskiy Komsomolets editor Pavel Gusev asserted that Medvedev's agenda remains a "reform agenda" and underscored that the President's pre-war conclave with leading editors focused on issues like direct election of governors, court reform, and economic modernization without a mention of any foreign policy to recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia. The pendulum would swing back to reform, Gusev argued, because the economy was fragile and modernization required. ¶9. (C) In stark contrast to the liberal's blue funk, Russia's nationalists have taken particular glee at the turn of events. Editor of the far-right Zavtra newspaper Aleksandr Prokhanov told us that the Georgian war had been beneficial for Russia because it restored Russia's place in the greater Caucasus region and burnished Russia's imperial qualities, initiated by Putin during his presidency. Most importantly, the war weakened the role of the "pro-Western Russian elite," which he claimed represented the most dangerous threat to Russian national interests. Prokhanov thought that a new Cold War would benefit Russia, separate it from the U.S. once and for all, and bring Russian money back from abroad. Former head of MoD's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, General Leonid Ivashov, argued to us that Russia was past due in re-establishing its sphere of influence. Medvedev's mistake, he maintained, was preventing the military from marching to Tblisi. Ruling Party "Liberals" Deny Ideological Setback -------------- --- ¶10. (SBU) The architects for the ruling party's liberal Duma faction (the "November 4 Club") maintain that the reform agenda remains a priority for the Medvedev administration. Duma Chairman of the Constitutional Committee Vladimir Pligin acknowledged to us that some Russian officials sought a "black and white world," inconsistent with Russian integration into European and international organizations. But, he insisted that "the same values remain" at the top, with Medvedev committed to reform. A firm support of the decision to invade Georgia ("there was no other choice"), Pligin ticked off the unresolved liberal agenda awaiting the Kremlin: a moribund media; a military budget that needed to be driven by clear strategic goals; a commitment to private property that was being chipped away by encroaching state ownership and control; and Russian isolation from its European and U.S. partners. When the passions of war had subsided, Pligin's ideological sidekick, Ekpert magazine editor Valeriy Fadeyev, told us the reform agenda will triumph because the mounting economic crisis will force decisionmakers to "return to the basics." What the leadership cannot afford, he noted, was social protest, and that required a coherent strategy to combat the stagnation. Patriotic slogans aside, he maintained, the Russian social fabric remained weak and Russia dependent on the West for ideas and technology critical to its modernization. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) At the present time, with the Medvedev-Putin tandem enjoying stratospheric popularity and a palpable mood of euphoric patriotism, it is easy to see why many here saw the Georgian war as a critical turning point. The administration has been feeling its oats domestically and is driving a new, more militaristic agenda that included increased funding for weapons, financial support for rebuilding South Ossetia, and clamping down on liberal voices like Ekho Moskvy. Yet, Russia has to square this political euphoria with the increasingly dismal economic developments, which have been exacerbated by the strategic miscalculation of recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We will be looking ahead to critical moments, such as Medvedev's address to the Federal Assembly this fall, the Finance Ministry's response to an expenditure-weighted budget, and the public's reaction when the bill for a more robust military (as well as the costs of rebuilding South Ossetia) comes due to see whether this shift to the right becomes a more permanent policy orientation, backed by budget resources. End Comment. BEYRLE