RUSSIA ON NEW MONITORS, RELATIONS WITH WEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002761

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON NEW MONITORS, RELATIONS WITH WEST

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G.
Wells. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador pressed DFM Karasin on
September 12 to agree to the text authorizing the additional
OSCE monitors with access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Karasin blamed Georgia for holding up the mandate,
acknowledged eight OSCE monitors in the two zones were not
many, and indicated Russia might be open to discussing
enlarging the number at some point in the future. Karasin
justified Russia's intention to put 7,600 troops in the two
regions by claiming recognition had "changed the situation."
MFA Director Kelin told visiting Czech officials (protect)
that Russia expected Abkhazia would remain independent, but
that South Ossetia would most likely eventually be
incorporated into North Ossetia because its independence was
not economically viable. He said Russia would consider a
failure of the EU to get the 200 monitors in by October 1 a
breach of the agreement, which would free Russia of its
obligations. The only issue related to Abkhazia and South
Ossetia Russia would discuss at the October 15 conference was
return of IDP's. MFA officials told the Czechs that
September 11 phone calls between the Secretary and FM Lavrov
and NSA Hadley and Security Council Advisor Prikhodko
demonstrated that Washington "has decided to get over
Georgia," and downplayed the cost. End Summary.

Karasin on Monitors, Russian Troops
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2. (C) On the margins of the September 12 return of the
Harvard bells, Ambassador pressed DFM Karasin on Russia's
unwillingness to approve the mandate for the additional OSCE
observers for Georgia. Karasin said he believed the
Georgians were to blame, asking if they weren't the ones
being obstructionist. Finally, he said he "got" the
Ambassador's point. He acknowledged that eight OSCE monitors
was a small number, and indicated that Russia might be
willing to discuss enlarging the number in the future, but
not now. He rejected the Ambassador's argument that Russia's
stationing of 7,600 troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was
a clear violation of the cease-fire accord, claiming that
Russia's recognition of the two regions "changed the
situation" and justified deployment of the troops.

Czech's Give Insight on Troops, Status, Relations
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3. (C) Officials from the Czech Foreign Ministry and Embassy
(protect) reported to us on their meeting September 12 with
MFA Director for the Caucasus Kelin and MFA North AMERICA
Deputy Director Burmistrov. Kelin told them that there was
no need for Russian "peacekeepers;" the 7600 Russian forces
would be there "at the invitation" of the two regions'
leaders. When questioned how this met the August 8
cease-fire plan, Kelin said the plan was still valid but he
reiterated Karasin's comment that the situation had changed
with recognition. The conflict was now resolved, and Tbilisi
"had lost because they were stupid." The EU monitors'
mission was to ensure that Georgia did not attack again.
Russia expected Abkhazia would remain independent and have an
association with Russia like that with Belarus, but that
South Ossetia would most likely eventually be incorporated
into North Ossetia because its independence was not
economically viable. In response to the Czechs' position
that they would not recognize the two regions and it would
lead to a Cyprus-like model, Kelin said Russia was fine with
that. The only issue related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia
that Russia would discuss at the October 15 conference was
the return of IDP's; discussion of security and stabilization
would be limited to the areas surrounding the two
territories.


4. (C) The Czechs told us Kelin said if the EU was unable to
get 200 monitors into the region by October 1, Russia would
consider it a breach of the agreement and would no longer be
bound by any of the agreement's terms. The Czechs said they
believed Kelin was confident the EU would not meet the
deadline.


5. (C) The Czechs also told us that mid-level MFA officials
told them Russia interpreted the September 11 phone calls
between the Secretary and FM Lavrov and NSA Hadley and
Security Council Advisor Prikhodko as demonstrating that
Washington "has decided to get over Georgia." The Czechs
were told that the cost to Russia was "perceived as zero
since the 123 Agreement would not have made it through
Congress this year anyway." Washington could only blame
itself for supporting "mad Saakashvili." While Russia "hated
NATO," it also hated that the EU and U.S. felt they could do
things together, without Russian participation. The Czech
delegation maintained that they were warned that if MAP
remained on the table for Ukraine, Russia was "ready to take
action."

Comment
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6. (C) While the Czechs received a full does of Russian
bombast, Russia is clearly trying to show the EU that
relations, including with the U.S., are returning "to
normal," and to press the EU to hasten the process.
BEYRLE