CSTO SUMMIT HAILED AS VICTORY FOR RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002719 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS PNAT MARR MOPS GG RS SUBJECT: CSTO SUMMIT HAILED AS VICTORY FOR RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY REF: MOSCOW 2618 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In what many here perceive to be a diplomatic victory for Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) issued a statement at the end of its September 5 summit that blamed Georgia for recent events in South Ossetia. The organization also expressed its support for an active Russian role in maintaining peace and security in the region. The September 4 CSTO Foreign Ministers meeting produced a similar document. CSTO member states, however, stopped short of recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Medvedev seemed unfazed by this, saying it was "absolutely correct" for states to act in their own interest. The experts argue that Russia got all it could have reasonably expected out of the summit. The GOR, they said, would content itself with playing the waiting game to see if other countries recognize the independence of the breakaway regions. A local editorial also endorsed CSTO Chair Nikolay Borduzha's idea that South Ossetia and Abkhazia may one day join the CSTO. End Summary. -------------- CSTO Statements Harsh Toward Georgia -------------- ¶2. (U) In a statement released September 5, the CSTO Heads of State expressed concern about Georgia's actions in South Ossetia, which they said "resulted in numerous victims among the civilian population and peacekeepers." CSTO Heads also expressed their support for Russia's peacekeeping operations in the region. In a September 4 statement the CSTO Foreign Ministers went even further and argued that the events in South Ossetia showed the "dangers inherent in the policy of double standards in international relations." Taking aim at the U.S., the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers expressed concern for the build up of "military potential" in the region. The Heads of State also called for close cooperation of the foreign policies of CSTO member states, and, despite harsh words for the West, called on the CSTO and NATO to cooperate in rebuilding Afghanistan. -------------- Russian Officials Express Satisfaction -------------- ¶3. (U) In a press conference after the meeting of CSTO Heads of State, a seemingly pleased Medvedev praised the "very productive discussion" and said that, as the statement of the Heads of State reads, Russia "did not choose confrontation" in South Ossetia. Lavrov said of the Foreign Ministers' statement that "it gets the facts straight and contains all the necessary statements." He also said the statement "gives clear-cut answers" to any possible outstanding questions. Medvedev also downplayed the fact that no CSTO member state has recognized Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, saying it was "absolutely correct" for countries to act according to their national interests. -------------- Experts, Media Hail Victory -------------- ¶4. (U) Local media has largely hailed the CSTO Summit as a diplomatic victory for Russia. In an article entitled, "CSTO Rallies Around Russia," RIA Novosti commentator Nikita Petrov said that "Moscow can count the results of the summit as an absolute victory." The CSTO, he argued, had given Russia its complete support. Other news outlets carried this theme, although some pointed to the failure of CSTO member states to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a minor diplomatic setback. ¶5. (C) Deputy Editor-In-Chief of the Independent Military Overview Viktor Litovkin gave us a positive assessment of last week's CSTO summit, pointing to the condemnation of Georgian violence in South Ossetia and the approval of Russia's role in the resolution of the conflict. Other experts agreed, arguing that this is the most Russia could have reasonably expected. They also argued that the CSTO issued a somewhat stronger statement than the one issued by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (reftel) because China, which is not a member of the CSTO, feared that its own restive regions might become emboldened by the South Ossetian and Abkhaz example. -------------- -------------- Russia Awaits Further Recognition of Independent Republics -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Well-connected editors told us that the Russian leadership remained content with the "Cyprus" model in batting away questions as to why other states had not jumped on the recognition bandwagon for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Having participated in Putin's convocation of editors in Sochi on August 29, both Nezavisimaya Gazeta's Konstantin Remchukov and Moskovskiy Komsomolets' Pavel Gusev separately told us September 8 that the Prime Minister made it clear that Russia did not expect much company in recognizing the disputed territories. The near-term goal, which Gusev argued the CSTO satisfied, was ensuring recognition of Georgian responsibility in precipitating the war. Both Gusev and Remchukov noted the timeline presented by Putin, with Russian efforts from 11 p.m. onwards on August 7 to seek Georgian clarification of its intentions rebuffed, with the Georgian leadership refusing to take a call from Medvedev. While Russia was suprised by the level of Western criticism -- and even offended by the degree to which Western states sought to protect Saakashvili from his actions -- Putin told the editors that the "tonality" of European leaders was changing and Russia understood the need of most countries to "balance" its relations with the West and avoid secessionist problems at home. ¶7. (C) Despite the fact that they did not endorse South Ossetia and Abkhazia's independence, the experts told us CSTO member states could eventually do so, although it would be a "slow process." Belarus was ready but was most likely planning to use recognition as a bargaining chip in future energy negotiations with Russia. Kazakhstan did not want to upset its "multi-vector diplomacy" with the U.S. and China, and so would most likely not recognize the breakaway regions anytime soon. The same was true with Kyrgyzstan because it hosts the Manas Air Base, the experts argued. -------------- CSTO Membership For Breakaway Regions? -------------- ¶8. (C) On September 5, the weekly Independent Military Overview featured an editorial supporting CSTO Chair Nikolay Borduzha's idea that South Ossetia and Abkhazia might join the CSTO one day. MFA First CIS Counselor Sergey Kayukov, however, told us that this idea was not discussed during the CSTO Summit. He argued such a scenario would be unlikely in the foreseeable future because all CSTO member states would have to agree to admit the breakaway regions, and this would not be possible until the member states recognized their independence. Litovkin agreed, adding that Abkhazia and South Ossetia would not even be able to initiate any formal relations with the CSTO until member states recognized their independence. He thought that the organization could nevertheless deploy peacekeeping forces to the republics, per their request. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Although portrayed as a victory for Russia, the CSTO statement -- and failure of the other CSTO member states to recognize Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence -- underscores the delicate balancing act that the countries of the region are playing. Despite GOR insistence that this was all Russia expected, the Russian government could not have missed the message that support from the neighborhood is lukewarm. BEYRLE