RUSSIA ON COUNCIL OF EUROPE REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000268 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018 TAGS: PREL COE RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON COUNCIL OF EUROPE REFORM REF: STRASBOURG 1 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. Summary. (C) The GOR told us Russia supported the January reforms to PACE's presidential election process, stressing that it did not perceive the resulting delay until 2010 of Federation Council Deputy Margelov's presidency as a slight against Russia, although recognizing that some member-states had spun this as a political decision. MFA officials maintained that GOR opposition to Saakashvili's speech in PACE had no connections to the reform process, but was prompted by worries his presence might inhibit debate on Georgia's December elections. During his January 17 visit to Moscow, outgoing PACE president Rene van der Linden in encouraging Russia to ratify the 6th Protocol on the Convention on Human Rights, dealing with the death penalty, and the 14th Protocol, dealing with reform of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),was unsuccessful. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a January 23 meeting, MFA PACE Section Head Alexander Kurmas affirmed Russia's strong relationship with PACE and the Council of Europe (CoE). Although there are differences -- Russia remains the only one of the 47 countries that has not ratified Protocols 6 and 14 of the Convention on Human Rights -- Kurmas stressed that Russia valued its membership and was willing to work with other members towards consensus on contentious issues, although it would continue to speak its mind. Media sources reported that new PACE president Luis de Puig of Spain emphasized publicly that Russia was a "full and important member" of the CoE. Dutch diplomats told us that van der Linden had commented during his Moscow visit that Russia seems more willing to accept criticism from the CoE than from the EU and the OSCE, although when van der Linden expressed his hope that Russia would avoid the defects in its parliamentary elections in the upcoming presidential campaign, Putin only "nodded politely." No Hard Feelings: Russia Supports PACE Leadership Reform -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Kurmas told us that Russia fully supports reforms to PACE's presidential election procedure adopted at a January 10 meeting in Paris of the leaders of PACE's five political groups. The new arrangement would allow for rotation among all five political groups, instead of the four that existed when the agreement originated. The first presidency of the new agreement was given to the largest group, the Socialists, headed by Spain's de Puig. ¶4. (C) Kurmas noted that it was only "by chance" that Chairman of the Federation Council International Affairs Committee Margelov happened to be next in line under the previous process when the reforms went into effect. According to Kurmas, most of the "horse-trading" that went into this deal was completed in December, well before the deal became public in mid-January, and he noted that the GOR never accused PACE of discrimination. He said it was "disappointing" that some member states had tried to paint this as a political decision and "play the Russia card." The GOR felt that the reforms were presented to the public in an "ugly and unacceptable way." The GOR continued to support Margelov for the PACE presidency in 2010, but Kurmas said it would wait for him to be invited by Europe -- it would not demand recognition. Dutch diplomats said that according to van der Linden, there was general support of parties and countries for Margelov in 2010. Saakashvili at PACE -------------- ¶5. (C) Saakashvili's invitation to speak at PACE on January 24 was not an issue in the December negotiations on leadership reform, Kurmas told us. He said that the GOR did not object to Saakashvili's invitation in principle, noting he had spoken there in 2000 and 2004, and stressed that Russia welcomed the chance to discuss human rights with Georgia whenever possible. However, Kurmas maintained the GOR had opposed Saakashvili's appearance in January because PACE would be discussing the Georgian elections, and the GOR worried his presence might "inhibit" an open discussion. The 6th Protocol: "The Public Isn't Ready" -------------- ¶6. (C) During his farewell visit to Moscow, Van der Linden entreated Putin to sign the 6th Protocol, which would abolish the death penalty in Russia. The death penalty was abolished three times, and reinstated four, in Russia in the 20th century, and is currently in moratorium. According to Dutch diplomats, Putin declined, citing a reopening of public discussion on the matter after the 2004 Beslan attack, which MOSCOW 00000268 002 OF 002 still infused public opinion. Putin said that the GOR would follow public opinion on the matter, which was not yet ready. He told van der Linden that it was "only a matter of time." The 14th Protocol: Lacking Trust in the ECHR -------------- ¶7. (C) Van der Linden also discussed Russian ratification of the 14th Protocol, which deals with reform of the European Court of Human Rights. (Note: The 14th Protocol was signed by Putin in 2006 and sent to the Duma, but the Duma did not ratify it -- the first time in post-USSR Russia an executive agreement was not authorized by the legislative, with the ruling party-dominated Duma clearly following instruction from the Kremlin.) Konstantin Kosachov, Chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee stated publicly that Russia doubted the court's "impartiality" and accused it of being a political tool. Kurmas claims that the GOR believes there are not enough "checks and balances" against "spurious" cases, citing the Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia case (reftel). He also complained about Baltic countries suing Russia for its "occupation" of their territories, which the GOR believes fell outside of the court's jurisdiction. He also noted the GOR's concern that the 14th Protocol, which would reduce chambers from three judges to one, invited more subjective decisions. However, he claimed that Russia still supported the court, pointing to the three million euros the GOR spent clearing backlogged cases during its Council of Ministers presidency, and a proposed "Protocol 15" with alternative reforms. He said Russia's willingness to move forward on court reform depended on the "integrity" of new judges, almost a third of whom were elected this year. ¶8. (C) With Russia winning only about 5% of its cases, and Russian citizens making up 26% of the court's workload in 2007, Dutch diplomats noted that Russian citizens favored the ECHR as an impartial alternative to their judicial system. They noted that when Russia lost, it paid restitution promptly, but reiterated the complaint that Russia tended to ignore the court's suggestions for systemic reform. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) While the MFA painted its relationship with the CoE in brighter tones than the corresponding relationship with the OSCE, it remains sensitive to Russia's disproportionate caseload in the CoE. Russian media were quick to draw a line between European unhappiness over Russia's human rights track record and Margelov's deferred candidacy. BURNS