Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW264
2008-02-01 14:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA COMPLAINS AFGHANS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL MASS AF RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7291
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHMO #0264 0321419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011419Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6367
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000264 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS AF RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA COMPLAINS AFGHANS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO
MILITARY AID OFFER

REF: A. 07 MOSCOW 4929


B. 07 MOSCOW 5098

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000264

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS AF RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA COMPLAINS AFGHANS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO
MILITARY AID OFFER

REF: A. 07 MOSCOW 4929


B. 07 MOSCOW 5098

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Russia is concerned by Afghanistan's failure to
respond to its offer of military assistance, which the GOR
believes is indicative of larger problems in the Karzai
Government. MFA Afghanistan Desk Chief Yuriy Khokhlov told
us on January 30 that the GOR invited Afghan Defense Minister
Wardak to Moscow in December to discuss the Russian offer to
provide hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons and
military supplies to the Afghan National Army (refs). The
GOR planned to develop with the DefMin a list of material
Russia could provide and discuss delivery. The GOR was told,
however, that the DefMin was traveling outside of Afghanistan
for over a month and was not available. When asked if the
GOR had more recently approached the Afghans about the DefMin
coming to Moscow, Khokhlov responded that Russia "does not go
knocking on doors."


2. (C) Khokhlov expressed exasperation with the Afghan
Government, and asked how a country fighting an active
insurgency could have its DefMin missing for such a long
period? Furthermore, if strengthening the Army and improving
security was an Afghan priority, why would it ignore Russia's
offer? Khokhlov said that this situation raised serious
questions about the capabilities of the Afghan Government,
which he accused of "passivity" in the face of increasing
insurgent attacks. The GOR remained concerned by the
government's inability to expand central authority and carry
out reconstruction and development projects. Khokhlov
pointed, for example, to the Solong Tunnel, which remained
heavily damaged and of limited use despite a Russian
company's offer to reconstruct it using the original Soviet
plans. Khokhlov counseled the U.S. to "reconsider" its
support for certain Afghan officials and get more effective
people into the government.


3. (C) Khokhlov reiterated that the GOR supported the U.S.
and NATO roles in Afghanistan. He stressed that the GOR had
"no agenda" to re-establish influence in Afghanistan or
undermine the U.S. "Russia has had enough of Afghanistan,"
according to Khokhlov. He explained that there were
divisions within the GOR over the level of support for the
U.S. and NATO, with the Defense Ministry and intelligence
services suspicious of American intentions. During a recent
inter-ministerial meeting on granting NATO transit rights
through Russia and Central Asia to Afghanistan, Khokhlov said
that objections from other ministries led the MFA to remind
them that Putin had made the decision to "fully support" the
U.S. and NATO.


4. (C) Finally, Khokhlov advised that Afghanistan was an area
in which the U.S. and Russia could cooperate more
extensively. It could be a "bright spot in our
relationship," he added. In a meeting with the Ambassador on
February 1, Putin's foreign policy advisor Sergey Prihodko
reiterated that Russia was open to expanded cooperation, but
would not do so as an "appendage" of NATO, and suggested
again that the U.S. look at working with CSTO.
BURNS