RUSSIANS REACT TO RECOGNITION: CRITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002590

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIANS REACT TO RECOGNITION: CRITICS
OUTNUMBERED, BUT NOT SILENT

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Public and elite opinion in Russia is split
into two, unequal camps over the decision to recognize the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The overwhelming
majority of the population considers recognition unavoidable
(87 percent),given the Georgian "aggression" and the
reaction of the international community. Within this group,
many see Medvedev's action as an answer to a long list of
perceived U.S. slights since the breakup of the Soviet Union
and discount the costs Russia will ultimately pay for its
actions. On the other end of the spectrum, more "liberal"
intellectuals and political activists see the action as
illegitimate and short-sighted. These critics argue that
recognition was a setback to U.S.-Russia relations, a
catalyst for problems in the North Caucasus, and a cause for
international isolation. To date, these voices of dissent
cannot compete with the patriotic rallying around Russian
foreign policy, but as the consequences of Russian actions
become clearer this dynamic could change. End Summary.

Public supports Recognition
--------------


2. (U) Medvedev's decision to recognize the two separatist
regions met broad public support, according to initial
polling surveys. In a poll published on August 27 by VTsIOM,
data collected from August 16-17 indicated that 71 percent of
Russians surveyed expressed support for Russia's recognition
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent nations.
However, only 63 percent supported the incorporation of the
two regions into the Russian Federation. Most of the
population appears to accept the administration's
justifications for its actions; an August 27 Levada Center
poll showed that 87 percent believed Russia acted correctly
in its response to the conflict. Indeed, polling shows that
the population has accepted the administration's logic for
taking action. When asked about the reasons for Russian
military engagement in South Ossetia, those surveyed echoed
the administration's own case for military intervention.
Respondents listed the following reasons for action --
establishment of peace (44 percent),defense of the Ossetian
population (43 percent),and defense of Russian peacekeeping
force (33 percent). Only a small number, 27 percent, gave a
more "cynical" assessment that the combat provided a warning
to NATO.


3. (SBU) Polling also suggests that the broad population is
more or less ambivalent about the possible costs of war. In
an August 15-18 Levada Center poll, 94 percent of respondents
considered relations with Georgia to be "cool" or worse, and
84 percent responded similarly when asked about Russia-U.S.
relations. Moreover, 48 percent of respondents believed
relations will normalize relatively soon, versus 35 percent
who saw the conflict as a new turn in the "Cold War."

Kremlin Bandwagon
--------------


4. (U) Almost immediately after Medvedev's announcement,
supporters of the Kremlin hastened to commend Medvedev's
recognition decree. Putin's party "United Russia" predictably
lauded Medvedev's decision as opening a new page in the
history of Russia. Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council
Svetlana Orlova praised Medvedev's action as "a courageous
step," showing "true democracy" in protecting a "peaceful
population." Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma
Committee for International Affairs, echoed the pervasive
stance that Russia "had been forced to recognize the
breakaway republics." He maintained that relations with NATO
and the EU were important only if they were beneficial to
Russia, but were unnecessary if they did not serve Russian
national interests and help solve Russia's problems.
Kosachev saw value in these relations, if the West stopped
defending Tbilisi's actions.


5. (U) Ostensibly "opposition parties" with ties to the
Kremlin also rallied around the flag. Gennadiy Zyuganov of
the Communist Party considered Medvedev's decision overdue,
the only possible solution that took the South Ossetian and
Abkhaz peoples' will into account, and a sign of Russia's
return to the international arena. The Agrarian Party of
Russia described Medvedev's decision as "reasonable," while
Aleksandr Ryavkin of the Civil Force Party explained
Medvedev's action as the only possible solution under the
circumstances, and a "profoundly moral act" in defense of the
Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples.


6. (U) Beyond the political parties, nationalist
organizations, Kremlin-supporters, and even representatives

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from the Russian Orthodox Church rallied behind the
recognition decision. Russian-based youth groups Nashi,
Mestnii, Molodaya Gvardia, and Young Russia all posted
website comments supporting Medvedev's recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The groups did not promote additional
protests or anti-American or anti-Georgian activity. Deputy
head of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External
Church Relations Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin told Interfax on
August 27 that "any unprejudiced person" clearly understood
Georgia to be at fault in the conflict.


7. (SBU) Some commentators resorted to inflammatory language.
Reactionary General-Major (ret.) Leonid Ivashov compared the
situation today to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, accused
"Western forces" of organizing the conflict, and called on
Russia to seek new allies in the South and East. Aleksandr
Lugin of the International Eurasian Movement saw the world
bordering on a sustained nuclear war. He said Russia had
broken the pattern where countries were "impertinent to their
fathers" (the U.S.),but always subordinated themselves in
the end. Now, he said, there were two fathers, who had to
delineate their spheres of influence -- Russia had just
challenged the U.S. to see who is stronger. However, Lugin
noted that Russia had only won a battle, not the war.

Moderates Shift to the Right
--------------


8. (C) Even traditionally "moderate" analysts have added
their voices in support of the administration's decisions.
For example, Vitaliy Naumkin, ordinarily a thoughtful critic,
asserted that Medvedev's decision was the result of a long
history of U.S. policy blunders. He listed the perceived
lack of U.S. support for Russia during the 1990's; the
missile defense (MD) program, which he stated was obviously
aimed at Russia (the timing of the U.S.-Poland agreement on
MD was proof, he said); the U.S. failure to freeze Georgia's
NATO aspirations while tensions were high; and U.S. disregard
of Georgian President Saakashvili's authoritarian and
anti-democratic sides. Now Russia had restored the old
balance in international relations, Naumkin contended.
Naumkin told us August 27 that Russia could easily live
without NATO relations, or WTO membership. He said Russia
could assure a worried Europe of its good intentions by now
pushing for a peaceful and equitable resolution of the
Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabach conflicts. He could not
foresee any negative consequences for the situation in the
North Caucuses -- in fact, he postulated that the regions in
southern Russia would be happy to have buffer states between
them and Georgia.


8. (C) Yevgeniy Satanovskiy, President of the Institute for
Middle East Studies, warned that Western attempts to punish
Russia for recognizing Abkhazian and South Ossetian
independence would only strengthen the "national consensus"
in support of the Kremlin and increase anti-American
sentiment. This would further propel the GOR along the
course of pursuing Russian interests at any cost.
Satanovskiy said that Russians believed American ambitions
had become "too big" and were fed up with the U.S. desire to
have a role in every part of the world, even those where it
was unclear what the U.S. interest really was. This appeared
to blind the U.S. to recognizing Russian warnings that it
would pursue its interests in Georgia; Satanovskiy hoped the
U.S. would not misread the Kremlin's determination to do so
in Ukraine.

Critical Voices Emerge
--------------


9. (C) Amidst the "party" atmosphere of patriotic enthusiasm
for the Kremlin and its policies, there are those who opposed
the administration's decision to recognize the two separatist
regions and warned of the coming "hangover" of economic,
political, and diplomatic consequences. As expected, the more
Western-oriented liberal parties opposed both the war and the
decision to recognize the two separatist regions. People's
Democratic Union leader Mikhail Kasyanov and the Union of
Right Forces (SPS) consider Medvedev's decision to be
erroneous, leading Russia into international isolation.
Moreover, the more "independent" think-tankers and foreign
relations experts, who enjoy funding or support from beyond
Kremlin coffers, expressed concern that the war and then
recognition of the two regions would accelerate negative
trends in Russian society.


10. (C) Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs,
lamented to RIA Novosti that Russian recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia would not help either to "break out" of
their current international isolation and both could end up

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like Northern Cyprus, which only Turkey has recognized for 34
years. He observed that the situation was unlikely to follow
the Kosovo model, in which the U.S. was able to persuade
influential countries to recognize the Serbian province's
independence; Russia's current international isolation denied
it similar influence. Lukyanov concluded that rather than
pursue the difficult diplomatic efforts necessary to settle
the Georgian crisis in a manner that could actually benefit
the breakaway regions, the Kremlin opted to appeal to a
domestic audience and demonstrate that Russia was unconcerned
by further isolation or damage to its image. Similarly,
Eurasia Foundation's Andrey Kortunov speculated to us that
Medvedev's decision was "guided by emotions, not by
cold-blooded calculations of political gains and losses."
Kortunov expressed regret at the decision, noting that even
policymakers and analysts loyal to the Kremlin questioned the
rush to decide. While it would be difficult to oppose
openly, Kortunov noted, many of the "politically enlightened
class" remained concerned about its implications, including
the economic costs.

Impact on Russia's Development
--------------


11. (C) Critics of the decision to recognize the two
separatist regions also worry about the longer term impact on
Russia's development. Dmitry Danilov, Head of the Department
of European Security Studies at the Russian Academy of
Sciences, said that the decision to recognize Abkhazia and
South Ossetia demonstrated the Kremlin's willingness to
increase Russian isolation. He warned that Russia, alone in
a corner, could have disastrous effects. Danilov was most
concerned with the domestic impact, explaining that the
harsh, even crude rhetoric coming from the Kremlin during the
Georgian crisis played to Russia's revanchist tendencies,
which, if further enflamed, could lead Russia away from
whatever progress it had made towards democracy.


12. (C) Political commentator Dmitriy Oreshkin similarly
worried about the continued slide into "Soviet-think" and the
penchant for a mobilization economic plan and increased
discrepancy between reality and the constitution -- a
contradiction that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Engelhardt acknowledged that it would be impossible
for President Medvedev to return to a liberal path", and
added Medvedev "has lost to Putin's crowd." Engelhardt sees
the tensions in the North Caucasus becoming worse, and
predicted that over the next couple months North Ossetia and
Ingushetia may attempt to redefine their borders.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) The Georgian conflict stokes all the national fires
of Russian patriotism, stirring a self-righteous indignation
among the population. For a society relentlessly reminded of
the sacrifices made to stop the "madman" Hitler in the Second
World War, the administration's message of Saakashvili's
"irrational behavior" and the relentless coverage of crying
women and children because of Georgian aggression resonates
and rallies in a purely emotional way. Recognition, to most
of Russian society, is the only possible outcome - a
punishment to Georgia (and its ostensible patron, the U.S.)
for violence against the innocents. The more sober-minded
members of the educated elite predict that the truth will out
and a more rational assessment of the causes, conduct, and
consequences of the war are sure to follow. But we are not
there yet.
BEYRLE