TFGG01: MEDVEDEV'S LETTER ON RECOGNITION; AID AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002565

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV OPDC GG RS
SUBJECT: TFGG01: MEDVEDEV'S LETTER ON RECOGNITION; AID AND
AKHALGORI

REF: A. MOSCOW 2564

B. MOSCOW 2556

Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary. Convoking the DCM on August 26 to convey
Medvedev's letter informing President Bush of Russia's
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, DFM Karasin said
Russia had tried for many years to find a peaceful solution
to the conflict territories, and was deeply disappointed by
the harsh Western reactions to Russia's use of force. He
described Medvedev's decision to recognize the regions'
independence as one of the most difficult subjects he had
ever had to talk about, and asked for U.S. understanding of
Russia's position. The DCM separately underscored our
concern over GOR criticism of U.S. humanitarian assistance
and the situation in Akhalgori. End Summary

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Russia hopes for understanding
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2. (C/NF) Convoking the DCM on August 26 to convey President
Medvedev's letter to President Bush regarding Russia's
recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence
(reftels),DFM Karasin told DCM that the GOR wanted the U.S.
to be informed as early as possible. Referencing the
proceedings in the Duma and Federation Council, along with
Russian public opinion that supported South Ossetian and
Abkhaz independence, Karasin stressed that Russia had tried
for many years to find a peaceful resolution that
acknowledged one Georgian territory to the conflicts in
Georgia.


3. (C/NF) Karasin then voiced "hurt and disappointment" with
regard to the sharp reactions from the world after Russia's
"neutralization efforts" to stop the violence in Georgia. He
said Russian authorities had realized they must take strong
action.


4. (C/NF) Calling this one of the most difficult things he
had had to speak about in his three years in the MFA, Karasin
repeated the GOR's surprise at the harsh U.S./Western
reactions after August 8, and acknowledged that there would
remain many problems to overcome. Karasin called the letter
he handed over "self-explanatory," but underscored that it
contained the thoughts of President Medvedev in the context
of recent developments. Karasin expressed hope that the U.S.
would understand the GOR's position, noting the Russian
Charge in Washington would also receive instructions
regarding the letter.

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Humanitarian assistance, Akhalgori
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5. (C) DCM noted the ongoing supply of U.S. humanitarian
assistance and urged Russia to avoid conflating the provision
of humanitarian assistance with military resupplies. He
promised the U.S. would continue to keep the GOR informed
about deliveries, with future ship visits notified as always
in accordance with the Montreux Convention. Karasin agreed
that the need for transparency was paramount, particularly
since U.S. warships were the means of delivery. He called
for official Navy contacts to communicate about aid
deliveries, with diplomatic channels (on the Russian side the
Fourth (CIS) Department of the MFA) "duplicating" these
efforts, to avert problems.


6. (C) DCM also expressed U.S. concerns about the situation
in Akhalgori, noting our ongoing dialogue with the OSCE and
GOG over tensions generated by the attempted South Ossetian
takeover of a Georgian village. He urged the GOR to take
steps to avoid clashes. Karasin echoed the U.S. concerns and
said he had just spoken with the head of the Russian General
Staff, as well as de-facto South Ossetian President Kokoity.
He confirmed Russian troops had strict orders to prevent
aggression "from any side," but was unwilling to conclude
that the Georgian side would not attempt to use force.
BEYRLE