Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW2490
2008-08-20 16:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

TFGG01: NORTHERN CAUCASUS REPUBLICS SUPPORT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PREF PHUM PINR RS GG 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2490/01 2331603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201603Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9602
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002490 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM PINR RS GG
SUBJECT: TFGG01: NORTHERN CAUCASUS REPUBLICS SUPPORT
RUSSIA'S ACTIONS IN SOUTH OSSETIA

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells; reason 1.4
(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002490 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM PINR RS GG SUBJECT: TFGG01: NORTHERN CAUCASUS REPUBLICS SUPPORT RUSSIA'S ACTIONS IN SOUTH OSSETIA Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells; reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Russia's northern Caucasus republics have supported Moscow's intervention in South Ossetia by offering to take in refugees from the conflict, donating humanitarian assistance and sending volunteer fighters. An internet-based news service, however, has picked up discontent from nearby Ingushetiya, where unflattering comparisons have been made by some residents between Russia's rush to assist the South Ossetians and its refrained reaction to casualties stemming from the October 1992 flare-up between North Ossetians and Ingush over the contested Prigorodniy region. Likewise, Russia's own military operations during its two wars in Chechnya have raised questions over current efforts to label events in Tskhinvali a "genocide." Given the interlocking nature of the clans and ethnic groups of the Caucasus, observers predict further political repercussions from this latest Caucasus war. End Summary. Russia's North Caucasus Republics Answer the Call -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Russia's northern Caucasus republics quickly offered to take in evacuees from the conflict in South Ossetia during the first week of fighting. The internet-based Caucasian Knot reported August 14 that the neighboring regions in southern Russia accepted 1,300 refugees/internally-displaced persons during the five-day conflict. On August 13, 220 evacuees arrived in Kabardino-Balkariya, and 170 were received in Karachayevo-Cherkesiya and according to information published August 14, the nearby Volgograd and Stavropol regions each accepted 250 women and children from South Ossetia. An additional 400 arrived in Dagestan on August 19, according to a report on Caucasian Knot's website. Adygeya's president Aslan Thakushinov said on August 9 that the northern Caucasus republic was prepared to receive 500 refugees from the conflict. Caucasian Knot reported that despite the Russian government's claim that it had registered over 17,000 refugees from South Ossetia in the Southern District alone, on August 14 there were only 595 evacuees from South Ossetia -- mainly women and children -- left in the tented camps set up by the Russian Federation's Ministry for Emergency Situations. Russian television also showed that most of the residents of South Oss
etia had begun to return to South Ossetia shortly after Russian troops had secured the city of Tskhinvali. ¶3. (SBU) The region also responded to the call for humanitarian assistance for evacuees. Caucasian Knot officials told us that citizens and local governments in Russia's Southern Federal Region provided around 600 tons of humanitarian assistance. On August 18, two ten-person teams of specialists from the local "Kabbalkenegro" power company in Kabardino-Balkariya went to South Ossetia to repair its damaged electricity grid. Representatives from the Russian Ministry of Energy said August 20 that electricity service had been restored to important facilities such as bakeries and hospitals in Tskhinvali. Twelve emergency workers left Dagestan August 10 to provide assistance in South Ossetia. According to Caucasian Knot, on August 8, thousands of people demonstrated in support of South Ossetia in the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt. Two non-governmental organizations in Adygeya, the Cherkess Congress and Adygeya Khase, also categorically rejected Georgia's military action and stated that the conflict could only be resolved through negotiation. ¶4. (SBU) There were reports of irregular militias from North Ossetia and the neighboring republics joining the fight against the Georgian army. The head of International Rescue Committee's (IRC) North Caucasus operation based in Vladikavkaz, said that on August 9 there were booths on the main street there stoking tempers against Georgia and trying to enlist those able-bodied men in North Ossetia who were not members of the reserves to join. According to Caucasian Knot, during the first days of the fighting 7,000 "volunteers" from North Ossetia went to fight in South Ossetia. Caucasian Knot also reported that 1,500 members of Dagestan's irregular militia, most of whom defended against the invasion of Dagestan in 1999 by Chechen separatists, had signed a list of volunteers to assist the people of South Ossetia. ¶5. (SBU) Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov told Russian media on August 9 that, as a part of the Russian Federation, Chechnya could "stop the bloodshed in the conflict zone with a minimum of casualties." Members of Chechnya's Eastern and Western battalions who report to the Russian Ministry of Defense reportedly took part in the fighting in South Ossetia. Russian media reported that Sulim Yamadayev, the commander of the Eastern battalion who sought safe haven in Moscow after a recent brush-up with forces loyal to Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov and who is a wanted man in Chechnya, may have even led the Eastern battalion forces. Caucasian Knot reported August 15 that both battalions may have suffered casualties in the fighting. The Kommersant daily reported August 16 that as soon as the fighting ended, armed looters from South Ossetia rushed to Georgian villages and residents who fled from those villages said their property was looted, houses set on fire and neighbors and relatives beaten or killed. Other numerous eyewitness accounts appeared on Russian internet blogs pointing to a paramilitary campaign of revenge attacks against Georgians in South Ossetia. Some in North Caucasus Recall Their Own Conflicts -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Few pundits have begun to consider the possible ramifications of Russia's actions on the rest of the North Caucasus. Aleksey Arbatov, Director of the Russian Academy of Science's Center for International Security, predicted in an August 12 interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta that if Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and North Ossetia, Georgia would consider it an act of annexation. Eventually, he continued, Georgia would provide comprehensive support for "terrorists, separatists and extremists in the North Caucasus." ¶7. (SBU) Officials from the internet-based Caucasian Knot reviewed for us the reaction to the Russian-Georgian conflict in Ingushetiya and Chechnya. In an August 16 posting on its website, a contributor from Ingushetiya noted that unlike other North Caucasus republics, there was no outpouring of sympathy or support from Ingushetiya due to the republic's own 1992 conflict with North Ossetia over the Prigorodniy region on their shared border. According to Caucasian Knot, unlike other regions of Russia's Southern Federal District, there were no reports of refugees arriving in Ingushetiya. According to the article, people in Ingushetiya have also questioned the number of civilian casualties reported in the Russian media. Others have noted that while Russia was quick to intervene in the case of Tskhinvali, it did nothing when ethnic Ingush were killed and expelled from the Prigorodniy region in October 1992. One ethnic Ingush displaced from Prigorodniy with whom the reporter spoke flatly declared "I have no sympathy for South Ossetia." ¶8. (SBU) Residents in both Ingushetiya and Chechnya compared Georgia's actions in South Ossetia to Russia's in Chechnya, but pointed out that the civilian casualties from Russia's bombardment of Grozniy were greater. Magomed Mutsolgov, head of the Ingushetiya human rights organization Mashr, noted that Russia was guilty of a double-standard of issuing Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia and intervening to protect them while forgetting about the welfare of its own 500 citizens killed in or 70,000 displaced from the Prigorodniy region or the several hundred thousand people -- including 40,000 children -- killed in Chechnya. He also repeated the suggestion by several Moscow-based human rights organizations that an international tribunal is needed to try those people guilty of atrocities in Chechnya and disappearances in Ingushetiya. ¶9. (SBU) Unlike Kadyrov, at the outset of Russia's actions against Georgia, some residents of Chechnya were unenthusiastic about entering the fray and called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Others later expressed anger at Putin's portrayal of his deep concern over the loss of life in Tskhinvali. Aslambek Apayev, a North Caucasus expert for the Moscow Helsinki Group, also faulted Russia for its double-standard in referring to Georgia's actions in South Ossetia as "genocide" without recalling Russia's own atrocities in Chechnya. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Other than the pointed references on the Caucasian Knot website, there has been little public indication of how Russia's military actions against Georgia is playing in the North Caucasus. While there is certainly no love lost between the Ingush and the Ossetians, the other predominantly Muslim republics, Chechnya and Dagestan, have towed Moscow's line, with both Kadyrov and his main rival Yamadayev tripping over each other to prove their loyalty. Given the network of clan and ethnic rivalries throughout the region, it is difficult to imagine that the conflict in South Ossetia will not have political repercussions in Russia's neighboring republics. BEYRLE

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