TFGG01: RUSSIAN MODERATES' VIEWS ON THE CONFLICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002486 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/RUS; NSC FOR MWARLICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018 TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: TFGG01: RUSSIAN MODERATES' VIEWS ON THE CONFLICT AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR RUSSIA AND U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate meetings August 19 with the Ambassador, former PM Yegor Gaidar and Igor Yurgens, Director of a think tank closely tied to President Medvedev, argued that a reform-oriented Medvedev presidency, with its promise of a freer Russia, could be a victim of the conflict over South Ossetia and heightened tensions with the U.S. The two prominent moderates, while stressing that Russia's people supported the war, saw Georgian President Saakashvili as largely to blame. They both insisted it was in Russia's interest to avoid a rupture in relations with the West and specifically with the U.S. End Summary. -------------- Medvedev's Presidency -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador told both Gaidar and Yurgens that we had viewed Medvedev's ascension to the presidency and his interest in global integration as hopeful signs. However, there was increasing concern in the U.S. about his ability to effect change. Medvedev's core agenda seemed to include three items: stepped up anti-corruption efforts, the modernization of the Russian economy, and new European security architecture. The last two would be impossible without Western support and the first would be more difficult. At the same time, the GOR, especially Foreign Minister Lavrov, seemed intent on ratcheting up the anti-U.S. and anti-Western rhetoric. ¶3. (C) Gaidar reflected on the difficulties when a superior has taken a subordinate position; "even if they are friends, there are difficulties and challenges...there are problems." In conversations with his friends, Gaidar reported that there was no clear understanding of how this relationship would work in the future. It was clear to him that Medvedev wanted to be included as a member of the club of international powers, but that if he was pushed into a corner and away from engagement, "it will be dangerous." ¶4. (C) Yurgens was even more frank. He acknowledged that Medvedev's agenda needed Western support. However, Medvedev's position was difficult. He was in effect caught between the war and the siloviki. Medvedev was well aware that much of the senior leadership of the military and the power ministries had backed his rival for the presidency, Sergey Ivanov. Yurgens said there had been plans to replace many of these corrupt individuals, who would have been targeted in anti-corruption drives. However, those plans were now on hold. While the siloviki may not have engineered the conflict, they were profiting from it by buttressing their positions within the government. ¶5. (C) Yurgens added that Medvedev had won over Russia's liberals with his speech in Krasnoyarsk and especially with one sentence: "freedom is better than non-freedom." The demise of a reform-oriented Medvedev presidency would be the end of the liberal project in Russia. -------------- -- Views on Georgian Conflict, Bilateral Relations -------------- -- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador also stressed in both meetings that the U.S-Russia relationship was crucial for global stability and our own national interests. We needed to maintain a dialogue. However, our relations were in a difficult moment. The U.S. believed Russia had crossed a red line by invading Georgia proper. Russia's immediate withdrawal from Georgia was essential to avoid further damage to the relationship and to Russia's reputation and place in the world. He told both of his interlocutors that the world could not see that the withdrawal had begun, despite Medvedev's public pronouncements. ¶7. (C) Gaidar agreed that the U.S. and Russia needed to avoid a rupture. However, he blamed Saakashvili for misunderstanding U.S. support and for believing he could resolve the situation through military confrontation. The Ambassador cautioned against Russian attempts to personalize the conflict. The former PM then called the situation with Georgia and in the Caucasus "a nightmare" that needed quick de-escalation. However, he argued that the next move was up to the U.S., "Russia has an educated population and an educated population needs friends," but it would not be dictated to. ¶8. (C) Yurgens told the Ambassador that the popular support for the war was strong right now but that a different Georgian leader would elicit a far more sympathetic response from the Russian public, which he added historically tired quickly of wars. Yurgens said his August 20-22 trip to Washington was his own idea but had been coordinated with senior GOR officials, who had assured him that a withdrawal was underway. Eventual withdrawal, along with French President Sarkozy's mediation efforts, gave Yurgens hope that a broader, deeper confrontation with the West could be avoided. He hoped to return with ideas, which he would share with senior GOR officials and use as the basis for a paper for Medvedev. -------------- --- Economic and Diplomatic Ramifications for Russia -------------- --- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted in both meetings that the war and its aftermath could hurt Russia both politically and economically. Yurgens responded that he had written an op-ed the day before for Rossiskaya Gazeta that had outlined an optimistic and pessimistic view of the conflict's effects on Russia if relations with the West deteriorated further. The optimistic view was that Russia's commodity-driven economy was immune to western pressure and Russia would simply reorient itself economically and politically toward China. ¶10. (C) Yurgens said the pessimistic view was that without Western capital, managerial expertise, and technology Russia would be unable to modernize its economy. Moreover, China would be an uncomfortable and expensive ally. The Ambassador agreed, noting that Russia and the West needed to work together to manage the rise of China and ensure that it played by the rules. Yurgens said he believed the Russian economy would recover from its current jitters, including rising inflation and a steep decline in its stock markets, but that longer-term Russia needed modernization, and therefore the West, to achieve its economic goals. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The meetings with these influential moderates underscored their fears that Western and U.S. efforts to isolate and punish Russia will play into the hands of the siloviki and other forces that oppose a more open and integrated Russia. BEYRLE