TFGG01: RUSSIAN CENTRAL BANK ON GEORGIA, INVESTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002437 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/IFD TREASURY FOR TORGERSON DOC FOR 4231/MAC/EUR/JBROUGHER NSC FOR WARLICK E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018 TAGS: EFIN ECON RS SUBJECT: TFGG01: RUSSIAN CENTRAL BANK ON GEORGIA, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND ENGINEERING A "SOFT LANDING" Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During an August 14 meeting with the Charge and ECMIN, Central Bank (CBR) First Deputy Chairman Aleksey Ulyukaev expressed hope that the conflict with Georgia would be short-lived, thus helping restore battered investor confidence. He said controlling inflation was the country's top economic priority. He claimed inflation was beginning to fall thanks to the CBR's exchange rate policy and other factors. The Finance Ministry and CBR were working to achieve a "soft landing" leading to sustainable, moderate growth with low inflation. This was the "right" prescription for Russia, in contrast with plans, like the Economic Development Ministry's long-term strategy, that focused only on the growth side of the equation. He said the GOR had made some shifts in its dollar reserve holdings but expressed confidence in the ability of the U.S. economy to rebound. End Summary. -------------- The Markets and Georgia -------------- ¶2. (C) Ulyukaev said the volatility that had seized the country's stock markets in recent weeks was due to uncertainty about global developments affecting emerging markets. Investors were moving away from risk. However, he acknowledged that it was also the result of concerns regarding the "authorities' influence over the economy" -- a reference to the recent TNK-BP dispute and the Mechel incident. ¶3. (C) Ulyukaev also acknowledged that the conflict with Georgia was affecting the markets, and through them the real economy. He added that the outbreak of military action had also sparked a sharp depreciation in the value of the ruble, the first in a very long time, and that the CBR had been obliged to sell USD 5.5 billion to support the ruble. He expressed hope that the conflict would be short-lived. -------------- Fighting Inflation is Job 1 -------------- ¶4. (C) Ulyukaev told the Charge that Russia had remained generally stable in the midst of the global financial crisis. He expected Russia would remain financially stable as policy makers focused on the less urgent but equally important task �0A;of recalibrating the country's inflation-fighting orientation. He said that in an effort to mitigate the domestic factors behind higher prices, Finance Minister Kudrin had announced a shift away from ruble exchange rate targeting toward inflation targeting. ¶5. (C) Ulyukaev emphasized that controlling inflation was now the CBR's highest priority. He said economic overheating began in earnest in mid-2007, as the money supply (M2) registered 60-percent growth and budget expenditures reached 20 percent of GDP, compared to 16 percent of GDP a year earlier. Aggregate demand had also continued to rise since as salary increases (20 percent) outpaced productivity gains (8.5 percent). Higher salaries had driven banking sector growth, particularly retail lending, which had prompted 120-percent growth in mortgages and raised banks' consumer loan portfolios to more than half of the banking sector's assets. ¶6. (C) According to Ulyukaev, inflation peaked in May at 15.1 percent. It was, however, negligible in June and July. Slowing inflation was the result of tighter money supply, itself largely the result of lower capital in-flows, which totaled only $13 billion so far in 2008, as opposed to $60 billion at this point in 2007. Ulyukaev said that falling domestic food prices, the result of Russia's best modern harvest and summer seasonal drops in demand had also helped to lower inflation. Ulyukaev was optimistic that inflation for the year would be just over 11 percent, compared to 11.9 percent at the end of 2007. ¶7. (C) Ulyukaev said he did not share the view that the bulk of Russia's inflation was "imported," internal imbalances were the main culprits. That said, the global economic slowdown could help cool Russia's economy. The benchmark price for Urals oil had, for instance, dropped from $127 to $108 in recent weeks. Global food prices had also stabilized. These trends would be beneficial for Russia since they would slow the growth of the money supply and would help keep price indices stable. ¶8. (C) Ulyukaev explained that the CBR's role in the transition to inflation targeting centered on easing the ruble's managed exchange rate. Previously, the CBR adjusted its currency interventions when the value of the ruble reached certain pre-determined limits. Over time, speculators began predicting the upper and lower limits of the exchange rate at which the CBR would act, causing added volatility. Ulyukaev's description of the CBR's new approach was that the exchange rate limits were "no longer a lane, but rather a pool, only the swimmers don't know where the edges are, only we do." He said this would curtail speculation and reduce volatility. ¶9. (C) Ulyukaev resisted the characterization of this approach as a managed exchange rate, calling it a "quasi-managed exchange rate." He said this transition, which would be completed in 2011, was the optimal route toward a free-floating exchange rate. The gradual approach, which assumed that a free-floating ruble would be relatively stronger than suggested by today's exchange rates, would allow domestic producers to adjust to the greater efficiency that a stronger ruble would demand, since imports would be relatively less expensive. A floating exchange rate would also enhance monetary policy effectiveness since it would temper capital inflows seeking to exploit what had in practice been a one-way bet on ruble appreciation. -------------- -- Conservatives vs. Progressives: Right and Wrong -------------- -- ¶10. (C) Agreeing with the ECMIN's portrayal of the Finance Ministry-CBR camp as advocates of a conservative growth model, Ulyukaev said "we are on the right side" of the debate on economic policy, trying to engineer a "soft landing" as the economy cooled and inflation was brought under control. The "right" option for Russia, according to Ulyukaev, would be to provide moderate growth and moderate inflation. He predicted disagreements over the best mix of incentives between the Finance Ministry and MED during the budget discussions scheduled for August 21. ¶11. (C) Ulyukaev called the Ministry of Economic Development's (MED) advocacy of "pro-growth" policies flawed. As a case in point, he cited the MED's long-term economic plan, which proposed reducing VAT as a means of encouraging the private sector toward more innovation-oriented production. Ulyukaev said that the country's taxes were not burdensome and that reducing VAT would be inflationary, without delivering a direct stimulus to the business community, which was more affected by corporate taxes. VAT, he said, "should be the GOR's last priority" since it would only fuel higher consumption when the economy needed to cool down. -------------- The Dancing Elephant--the U.S. Economy -------------- ¶12. (C) In response to the Charge's questions about whether U.S. economic developments presented concerns for Russia's economic policy, Ulyukaev admitted that the CBR had reduced its holdings of dollar assets "a little." Without specifying amounts, he explained that T-Bills, GSE obligations, and bank deposits still constituted a sizable share of the CBR's reserves. He conceded that the change -- a reduced volume of bank deposits -- had been a response to political pressures that emerged when media reports lamented the CBR's investments in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He also noted that the U.S. presidential election cycle had heightened this sensitivity. All that said, Ulyukaev called the "flexible" U.S. economy an "elephant that can dance" and said the GOR was confident that it would rebound soon. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Initially nervous at meeting with American officials, Ulyukaev relaxed as he talked about the details of Russian economic policy with a surprising degree of openness and a great deal of technical expertise. Moreover, on Georgia, Ulyukaev came across as voice of moderation who understands the larger issues at play with respect to Russia's economic future. BEYRLE