TFGG01: RUSSIA MAINTAINING HARD LINE, FOCUSING ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002387 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GG RS SUBJECT: TFGG01: RUSSIA MAINTAINING HARD LINE, FOCUSING ON HUMANITARIAN SITUATION Classified By: Acting DCM Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Russian officials continued their hard line towards Georgia August 13, repeating demands for a legally-binding non-use of force agreement between Georgia and the two zones of conflict, reiterating that Georgian peacekeepers could not be allowed to return to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and insisting that Georgia be made to pay for the rebuilding of South Ossetia. MOD said that Georgia was continuing to fire on Russian forces and denied reports that Russian tanks were still in Gori. They released Russian casualty figures, claiming 74 Russian peacekeepers killed, 171 wounded, and 19 missing. Public support remained strong, with Public Chamber members denouncing Saakashvili but calling for resumption of contacts and dialogue between the Russian and Georgian people. Much attention was focused on humanitarian assistance, though some began to question the scale of force used by Russia. End summary. MFA, MOD Maintain Hard Line -------------- ¶2. (U) FM Lavrov, in a press conference August 13, reiterated Moscow's insistence on a legally-binding non-use of force agreement between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, and made clear Russian "peacekeepers" would stay in the two conflict zones, insisting that Georgian peacekeepers could not return. He demanded that Georgia pay for the rebuilding of South Ossetia, while highlighting that Russia would appropriate 10 billion rubles (approx. USD475 million) for reconstruction aid in 2009. ¶3. (U) An MFA Statement reiterated legal justifications for the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia, citing 1994, 1995 and 2003 CIS agreements, and said Georgia's demands to end the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia, "looked like nothing other than an attempt to create the foundation for a new armed escapade, this time against Abkhazia." ¶4. (U) At a RIA Novosti press conference August 13, Russian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Anatoliy Nogovitsyn claimed that although Georgian forces had begun to withdraw its troops out of South Ossetia towards Tbilisi, Georgian aggression continued on numerous fronts. In South Ossetia, he accused Georgian snipers of continuing to fire on Russian peacekeeping forces. Off the coast of Abkhazia, Nogovitsyn alleged that late August 12 Georgian patrol boats attacked a Russian Black Sea Fleet warship; in response, the Russian ship fired a warning shot and the Georgians returned to the port of Poti. As for the situation in Gori, Novogitsyn called it a "mystery." He affirmed that Georgian troops were no longer in the city, but neither were Russian tanks, as the Georgians allege. Russia also claimed that Georgia had planned to launch a massive invasion of Abkhazia ("Tskhinvali two, but a much more serious kind"),having amassed one and a half brigades in the direction of the Gali District and four battalions in the direction of Sukhumi. In the end, the actions of the Black Sea Fleet ships and an increase in Russian peacekeeping contingents helped to disrupt Tbilisi's plans and "cool down the hotheads in the Georgian government." Moreover, in the Kodori Valley Georgian troops voluntarily turned over more than 700 weapons, the majority of which were foreign made. ¶5. (U) According to Nogovitsyn, 74 Russian peacekeepers were killed, 171 wounded, and 19 missing. He said Russia had proposed that Moscow and Tbilisi exchange a list of dead and captured soldiers and peacekeepers. Public Chamber Denounces Saakashvili, Calls for Dialogue -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) Government officials, prominent commentators, pundits, and the public, continued to say that the GOR could not have watched and done nothing as Georgia "attacked South Ossetia" and "destroyed Tskhinvali." At a meeting of the Public Chamber called ostensibly to report to DFM Karasin (who did not show up),members condemned the Georgian leadership. Public Chamber Secretary Leonid Roshal said he had just returned from the region and he had reported to President Medvedev and PM Putin that he could "confirm acts of genocide." Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov echoed the GOR's call to condemn and investigate the "criminal actions perpetrated by Saakashvili." Interestingly, legal expert MOSCOW 00002387 002 OF 002 Anatoliy Kucherena said Moscow could not refer Saakashvili to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, because Russia had not ratified the international agreements on it and therefore could not appeal to the Court. ¶7. (U) While calling for punishment of Saakashvili, most members also called for a resumption of contacts and dialogue between the Russian and Georgian people. Duma Deputy Sergey Markov said there were over 1,000,000 ethnic Georgians living in Russia and it was essential to restore contacts with Georgian public society. Alleging that Georgian leaders had cut off Russian news programs and internet sites in Georgia, Russia needed to find another way to communicate. ¶8. (U) Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of the Politica Foundation, laid out the elements he would prepare for the Chamber to present to the Russian leadership: -- Condemning Georgia's "criminal deeds," which had led to terrible consequences; -- Calling for a day of mourning in all affected countries; -- Placing a high value on the activities of Russian servicemen; -- Providing humanitarian assistance to all victims; -- Getting Russian society to condemn the military crimes; -- Establishing a Public Chamber commission to travel to the conflict zone to provide aid to servicemen and victims; and -- Maintaining a dialogue with Georgian citizens, including those living in Russia. "Cracks in Support?" -------------- ¶9. (C) While the majority of the public continues to support the GOR's actions, some are beginning to question the amount of force used by Russia. A Levada poll showed that while over 50 percent of respondents supported Russian troops' actions in South Ossetia, 36 percent were against. Anatoliy Tsyganok, a military expert for the Center for Military Prognosis and a member of the Civilian Council, an advisory board for the Ministry of Defense, told us he could not understand why the Russian Army had to be dragged into such a widespread conflict in the first place. Although Tsyganok on prior occasions had condemned Georgia's aggression, he implied that the massive mobilization of the Russian Armed Forces was unnecessary. In fact, Russian peacekeepers should have been able to manage the crisis in South Ossetia themselves. He also decried Russia's use of heavy bombers in massive air campaigns against Georgian targets. Using these planes was a sign of Russia's deplorable military technology, and Tsyganok refuted Russian officials' claims that they were used for intelligence purposes. RUBIN