RUSSIA CONTINUES TO RESIST KOSOVO CDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000235 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC KV RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONTINUES TO RESIST KOSOVO CDI REF: MOSCOW 149 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Russia claims that it has developed a "roadmap" in its continuing efforts to forestall a CDI by Kosovo, and to tempt wavering EU states away from recognition. However, the GOR has also prepared an "action plan" in anticipation of a CDI in coordination with Belgrade. Consistent with its "principled" opposition to Kosovo's unilateral independence, the MFA recently issued a statement condemning U.S. "sideline preparations" for an EUDP in Kosovo and status resolution outside of the UNSC. In response to Saakashvili's press interview, the MFA issued another statement clarifying that Lavrov never said that Russia would not recognize Abkhazia in the event of a Kosovo CDI -- only that there would be no "immediate" recognition and that a precedent would be created for all unresolved conflicts. During the visits of Serbian leaders, the GOR reassured Serbia of its unwavering support on Kosovo, signed an important economic deal (septel) and enumerated specific actions it would take on its behalf, including a demand for referendums in Serbian enclaves on their status. End Summary. Russia Claims the High Ground -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to press reports, during a January 29 Duma session on Kosovo, Special Envoy for the Balkans Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated that negotiations and a mutually agreeable solution are the only solution for resolving the future status of Kosovo. He accused the U.S. of exerting "blatant pressure" on the UNSYG and EU leaders. The MFA's January 29 statement reinforced the GOR's insistence that the UNSC must be the decision-making body on Kosovo, arguing that the deployment of an EUDP mission to Kosovo -- or anything that would "change the structure or operating plan of the international civil presence in Kosovo" -- demanded the agreement of the UNSC. He stressed that any U.S. "end run" around the Council would "require a commensurate reaction." Roadmap to Final Status -------------- ¶3. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko told the Duma that the GOR would continue to push for a negotiated settlement "until the very end," and noted that Russia would continue its efforts to rally opposition to recognizing Kosovo's independence in the EU, although he noted Russia was aware there were "slim prospects for success." He reiterated the idea of a "roadmap" for Kosovo in lieu of a CDI, which Italian diplomats who met with Botsan-Kharchenko on January 29 told us began with Serbia accepting an EUDP mission in Kosovo. This would be followed by further negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, and Kosovo's final status would be determined by a referendum in Kosovo -- after Serbia has acceded into the EU. Lavrov hoped to discuss the roadmap further at a February meeting with the EU troika. Post-CDI Action Plan -------------- ¶4. (C) In the event of a CDI, Botsan-Kharchenko said that Russia has prepared a "series of measures." The plan includes "political and diplomatic measures" and "envisioned close coordination with Belgrade." Italian diplomats told us that the plan would involve immediately convening the UNSC to declare the declaration of independence illegal, followed by a request for UNMIK and KFOR not to recognize. The GOR would also veto Kosovo's membership in the UN and the OSCE. ¶5. (C) Russia continues to foster ambiguity on whether it would ultimately recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Kosovo becomes independent. Following Georgian president Saakashvili's press statement that he received assurances from Lavrov in Tbilisi that Russia would not recognize Abkhazia, the MFA "clarified" that Russia had never declared that it would "immediately" recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Instead, the statement stressed Lavrov's warning that a precedent would be created for all unresolved conflicts, "whether we want it or not." Serbian Leadership in Moscow -------------- ¶6. (C) The primary purpose of Serbian President Tadic and PM Kostunica's January 25 visit to Moscow (septel) was the signing of an inter-governmental energy cooperation agreement that included Gazprom's purchase of 51% of Serbia's oil and gas monopoly and an agreement to route the Southstream gas MOSCOW 00000235 002 OF 002 pipeline through Serbia. However, the GOR used the visits to present the roadmap; Tadic was enthusiastic, but Kostunica, who dislikes the EUDP, was more hesitant. Kosovo was also discussed in more depth during a meeting between Serbian FM Jeremic and Lavrov on January 24. Lavrov told Jeremic that Russia: --would insist in international fora upon the observation of the human rights of Kosovar Serbs; --maintained that the EUDP must be authorized by the UNSC; --would demand a referendum in Serb enclaves to decide whether they wished to be part of Serbia or Kosovo. Radical Party candidate Nikolic was also in Moscow on January 29 at the invitation of Just Russia leader Mironov. Serbian diplomats told us that he was to meet with Medvedev, but it was unconfirmed if the meeting took place. The Serbian Ambassador demarched the GOR for meeting with a candidate in the presidential race less than a week before the run-off. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Russia will fight Kosovo's CDI to the end, in an effort to erode EU consensus, raise the stakes for the SYG, and keep Georgia off-balance over its intentions in the Caucasus. BURNS