RUSSIA CONTINUES TO RESIST KOSOVO CDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000235

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC KV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONTINUES TO RESIST KOSOVO CDI

REF: MOSCOW 149

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons
1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary. Russia claims that it has developed a
"roadmap" in its continuing efforts to forestall a CDI by
Kosovo, and to tempt wavering EU states away from
recognition. However, the GOR has also prepared an "action
plan" in anticipation of a CDI in coordination with Belgrade.
Consistent with its "principled" opposition to Kosovo's
unilateral independence, the MFA recently issued a statement
condemning U.S. "sideline preparations" for an EUDP in Kosovo
and status resolution outside of the UNSC. In response to
Saakashvili's press interview, the MFA issued another
statement clarifying that Lavrov never said that Russia would
not recognize Abkhazia in the event of a Kosovo CDI -- only
that there would be no "immediate" recognition and that a
precedent would be created for all unresolved conflicts.
During the visits of Serbian leaders, the GOR reassured
Serbia of its unwavering support on Kosovo, signed an
important economic deal (septel) and enumerated specific
actions it would take on its behalf, including a demand for
referendums in Serbian enclaves on their status. End Summary.

Russia Claims the High Ground
--------------


2. (SBU) According to press reports, during a January 29
Duma session on Kosovo, Special Envoy for the Balkans
Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated that negotiations and
a mutually agreeable solution are the only solution for
resolving the future status of Kosovo. He accused the U.S.
of exerting "blatant pressure" on the UNSYG and EU leaders.
The MFA's January 29 statement reinforced the GOR's
insistence that the UNSC must be the decision-making body on
Kosovo, arguing that the deployment of an EUDP mission to
Kosovo -- or anything that would "change the structure or
operating plan of the international civil presence in Kosovo"
-- demanded the agreement of the UNSC. He stressed that any
U.S. "end run" around the Council would "require a
commensurate reaction."

Roadmap to Final Status
--------------


3. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko told the Duma that the GOR would
continue to push for a negotiated settlement "until the very
end," and noted that Russia would continue its efforts to
rally opposition to recognizing Kosovo's independence in the
EU, although he noted Russia was aware there were "slim
prospects for success." He reiterated the idea of a
"roadmap" for Kosovo in lieu of a CDI, which Italian
diplomats who met with Botsan-Kharchenko on January 29 told
us began with Serbia accepting an EUDP mission in Kosovo.
This would be followed by further negotiations between
Belgrade and Pristina, and Kosovo's final status would be
determined by a referendum in Kosovo -- after Serbia has
acceded into the EU. Lavrov hoped to discuss the roadmap
further at a February meeting with the EU troika.

Post-CDI Action Plan
--------------


4. (C) In the event of a CDI, Botsan-Kharchenko said that
Russia has prepared a "series of measures." The plan
includes "political and diplomatic measures" and "envisioned
close coordination with Belgrade." Italian diplomats told us
that the plan would involve immediately convening the UNSC to
declare the declaration of independence illegal, followed by
a request for UNMIK and KFOR not to recognize. The GOR would
also veto Kosovo's membership in the UN and the OSCE.


5. (C) Russia continues to foster ambiguity on whether it
would ultimately recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia after
Kosovo becomes independent. Following Georgian president
Saakashvili's press statement that he received assurances
from Lavrov in Tbilisi that Russia would not recognize
Abkhazia, the MFA "clarified" that Russia had never declared
that it would "immediately" recognize Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. Instead, the statement stressed Lavrov's warning
that a precedent would be created for all unresolved
conflicts, "whether we want it or not."

Serbian Leadership in Moscow
--------------


6. (C) The primary purpose of Serbian President Tadic and PM
Kostunica's January 25 visit to Moscow (septel) was the
signing of an inter-governmental energy cooperation agreement
that included Gazprom's purchase of 51% of Serbia's oil and
gas monopoly and an agreement to route the Southstream gas

MOSCOW 00000235 002 OF 002


pipeline through Serbia. However, the GOR used the visits to
present the roadmap; Tadic was enthusiastic, but Kostunica,
who dislikes the EUDP, was more hesitant. Kosovo was also
discussed in more depth during a meeting between Serbian FM
Jeremic and Lavrov on January 24. Lavrov told Jeremic that
Russia:

--would insist in international fora upon the observation of
the human rights of Kosovar Serbs;

--maintained that the EUDP must be authorized by the UNSC;

--would demand a referendum in Serb enclaves to decide
whether they wished to be part of Serbia or Kosovo.

Radical Party candidate Nikolic was also in Moscow on January
29 at the invitation of Just Russia leader Mironov. Serbian
diplomats told us that he was to meet with Medvedev, but it
was unconfirmed if the meeting took place. The Serbian
Ambassador demarched the GOR for meeting with a candidate in
the presidential race less than a week before the run-off.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Russia will fight Kosovo's CDI to the end, in an
effort to erode EU consensus, raise the stakes for the SYG,
and keep Georgia off-balance over its intentions in the
Caucasus.
BURNS