RUSSIA-SOUTH OSSETIA SITREP AUGUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002317

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-SOUTH OSSETIA SITREP AUGUST

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Alice G. Wells. Reasons
1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The MFA claims Russia's principal goal in
taking military action in South Ossetia is to stop the
bloodshed. Blaming the current crisis on Georgia, alluding
to (but not confirming) the dispatch of Russian military to
South Ossetia, accusing Tbilisi of "ethnic cleansing" in
South Ossetian villages, and insisting Russia must protect
its citizens, wherever they are, the GOR maintained its
actions were necessary to prevent more violence. They denied
knowledge of any volunteers going to the region, and said DFM
Karasin had urged Abkhaz leader Bagapsh to show restraint
about sending Abkhaz troops to join South Ossetian fighters.
President Medvedev issued a statement following an emergency
meeting of the security council saying Russia would not allow
the deaths of its citizens to go unpunished, a statement the
MFA downplayed. EU colleagues reiterated our message of
restraint, disengagement, and a return to the political
process, with little effect. With Putin setting a hard line,
and a chorus of high level officials denouncing Georgian
actions, Medvedev has been thrust into the limelight, with
most experts concluding that any appearance of weakness will
be politically fatal. End summary.

MFA: Russia's Top Priority to Stop the Bloodshed
-------------- ---


2. (C) In an August 8 meeting, MFA 4th CIS Deputy Director
Semyon Grigoriev told us Karasin had spoken twice to DFM
Vashadze on August 7. He had urged Georgia to stop
hostilities, saying the GOG should put aside the question of
who started the provocations. But despite all of the
messages from the U.S., UN, NATO, etc., the Georgians had
continued their military operations. Russia agreed that
military action would not solve the conflict in South
Ossetia, but Russia's immediate task was to stop the
bloodshed, and Russian actions needed to be understood in
this context. Grigoriev said the MFA did not have full
information on Russian military movements, but referred to
reports that Russian troops had entered South Ossetia and
were moving toward Tskhinvali, with Russian aviation
controlling South Ossetian airspace (note: the MOD later
confirmed in a statement that Russian tanks had moved into
South Ossetia). If this "forced measure" stopped the
bloodshed, then it was good, Grigoriev said. Afterwards, the
international community could meet in many formats (UN, OSCE,
etc.) and assess the situation, but now Russia's "measure"
was necessary. Russia would continue discussing the issue
with the U.S. and Europe, and if the situation calmed down in
the near future, it would not be necessary to keep the
additional Russian forces in the area.


3. (C) In response to our message of de-escalation and strong
expression of concern over the MFA's implicit recognition of
Russian violation of Georgian territorial integrity,
Grigoriev characterized Georgia's actions as "genocide" and
"ethnic cleansing." Grigoriev told us Russia's first task, as
President Medvedev had said, was to defend Russian citizens,
"wherever they are." The second priority was to return
Georgian forces to where they had been prior to the recent
actions. Grigoriev stressed that Russia's decision-making
was continuing, and it was too soon to predict what its
priorities would be tomorrow or next week. The problem, he
said, was that the recent developments had "changed the
situation drastically." It was difficult to say when
negotiations would restart or in what format, but it would be
very difficult to go back to the situation of a month ago,
since there had been a lot of blood shed since then.


4. (C) In response to A/DCM's expression of concern over
Medvedev's statement about needing to "punish" those
responsible for the deaths of Russian citizens, Grigoriev
urged us to view the term "punish" in its juridical sense,
noting that Medvedev was a lawyer. He said we needed to
understand that South Ossetia was not a "foreign policy"
issue for Russia. South Ossetia and Georgia were part of the
"greater Caucasus," some of which was the Russian Caucasus.
Medvedev had to take into account the feelings of the people
of the area, and indeed of all Russians. Grigoriev did not
react to our statement that Russia had committed itself to
respecting Georgian territorial integrity.


5. (C) A/DCM urged Russia to undertake measures to prevent
volunteers from entering South Ossetia from Russia or from
Abkhazia. Grigoriev said the MFA had no information on
volunteers beyond what the media was reporting, but said
Karasin had done his best to persuade Abkhaz leader Bagapsh
to show restraint after Bagapsh had called Karasin to tell
him Abkhaz troops were ready to move. He also told us South
Ossetian leader Kokoity had met North Ossetian president
Mamsurov in Tskhinvali, but he was not aware of any contacts
between the leadership in Moscow and North Ossetian
officials. Russian special envoy Popov had returned to
Tbilisi and would remain there under instructions from the FM.


6. (C) Grigoriev downplayed prospects that DFM Vashadze would
still travel to Moscow August 10; while Karasin had not
canceled the session, he had not reconfirmed it.

Medvedev: Russia Will Protect its Citizens
--------------


7. (SBU) After an inconclusive morning security session held
by Medvedev, the President called an emergency meeting of the
Russian security council in the afternoon, after which he
issued a statement saying that Russia had been present on the
territory of Georgia on fully legal grounds as it fulfilled
its peacekeeping mission in accordance with international
agreements. In comments more in keeping with those uttered
by Putin in Beijing, Medvedev asserted that Russia
historically was and remained the guarantor of security for
the people in the Caucasus. He said the Georgian military
had committed an act of aggression against Russian
peacekeepers and peaceful residents. The actions of the
Georgian side had led to casualties, including among the
Russian peacekeepers. Innocent men, women and children were
dying in South Ossetia, the majority of whom were Russian
citizens. Medvedev continued that it was his duty as Russian
president to safeguard the lives and dignity of Russian
citizens, wherever they were, which was the logic behind the
steps Russia was taking. Russia would not allow the deaths
of its citizens to go unpunished. Those guilty would receive
due punishment.

FM Lavrov Accuses Georgia of Ethnic Cleansing
--------------


8. (U) FM Lavrov issued a statement late August 8 saying
Georgia's actions "call into question its maturity as a state
and a responsible member of the international community." He
accused Georgian peacekeepers acting within the joint
peacekeeping forces of firing at their Russian counterparts.
He said Georgia was using force against its own people, and
claimed there was evidence of "ethnic cleansing in South
Ossetian villages." (Russian media has focused attention on
reports of widespread civilian casualties in Tskhinvali,
citing over a thousand dead).


9. (U) Earlier in the day, the Russian MFA posted a statement
accusing Georgia of a "treacherous" assault on Tskhinvali,
saying the GOG was opting for a military solution to the
frozen conflict, regardless of the diplomatic efforts that
were in the works between Moscow, Tbilisi, Tskhinvali,
Washington, and others. The MFA concluded that Georgia had
been completely discredited as a responsible negotiating
partner and it was clear why Georgia had refused to sign a
non-use of force pledge. The statement said it was not too
late to prevent "massive bloodshed" and new casualties,
particularly among the civilian population, with the MFA
expressing concern over the fate of Russia peacekeepers. MFA
urged Georgia to return to a "civilized path," and said
foreign partners should not remain non-participants. Russia
urged joint action to halt the violence which was fraught
with the most serious consequences for regional and
international security. Russia would continue its efforts to
halt further bloodshed and to return South Ossetia to a
peaceful course.

PM Putin, Government Officials, Denounce Georgian Actions
-------------- --------------


10. (U) PM Putin, from China, was the first senior GOR
official to characterize the night's events, expressing
regret at Georgian "aggressive actions," and calling for
actions within the CIS to halt Georgian military operations.
He said there were lots of volunteers in the region and it
was very hard to "withhold them from taking part." "A real
war is going on," he said. Duma Speaker Gryzlov said Russia
would take all necessary measures to protect its citizens in
South Ossetia, and would continue its "patient" search for a
solution to the conflict. Gryzlov blamed Georgia for
resorting to military action, at a time when the
international community was trying to find a diplomatic
solution. Duma International Relations Chairman Konstantin
Kosachev said Georgia would be left internationally isolated,
and called upon the EU and U.S. to change its policy toward
Tbilisi. North Ossetian President Mamsurov announced that a
convoy of "humanitarian assistance" had been bombed by the
GOG.


11. (U) In a press conference, Russian presidential envoy for
South Ossetia Dmitriy Medoyev focused on civilian casualties
and other damage inflicted by attacks from Georgia. He
decried Georgia's use of multiple-launch missile systems
against the civilian population. He said South Ossetian
authorities had prevented thousands of civilians being killed
by evacuating residents of villages likely to come under
Georgian fire. He claimed five South Ossetian settlements
had been wiped out along the border with Georgia. He accused
the Georgian leadership of using "scorched earth" tactics and
"seeking an ethnic cleansing" of South Ossetia. He praised
Abkhazia's decision to send volunteers to South Ossetia. He
said he expected Russia to increase its peacekeeping
contingent, noting that the mandate permitted such an
increase.

Georgian Embassy Says No Contact with MFA
--------------


12. (C) The Georgian Charge told us he had had no contact
with the MFA today. He said it was unclear if DFM Vashadze's
visit to Moscow on Sunday, August 10, would proceed.

Other Embassies, Russian Experts Comment
--------------


13. (C) The EU Commission, along with the French Embassy met
with the MFA Acting Director for CIS Affairs who argued that
Russia and the international community had been betrayed by
Saakashvili's assaults, and reiterated the GOR public lines.
The UK was considering a call by the Political Director to
Karasin. The MFA told the Germans that the only question was
whether Georgia would consolidate its control over Tskhinvali
today. The MFA warned, however, that violence and
instability in the region would spread, with a return to the
"1991 scenario."


14. (C) Russian political observers said Georgia's effort to
"return to the constitutional order" was proof that Georgia
was intent on a military solution to end the frozen conflict
in South Ossetia now. They said it would be difficult for
Georgia to prove that it had not been the aggressor, and
stressed that Russia would likely use this to try to show the
West that the Georgian leadership, particularly Saakashvili,
was not reasonable. Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia in
Global Affairs, said Georgia had clearly decided to solve its
territorial problem by force, and believed it had a win-win
situation: Georgia would either succeed in taking South
Ossetia, or Russia would get involved in war with Georgia,
and the West would have no choice but to support Georgia. In
either event, politically, Russia could not sit by; it would
need to intervene militarily because most of the people were
Russian citizens, regardless of how they got their
citizenship. It was also clear that North Ossetia would
support South Ossetia and volunteers would flow in.


15. (C) Some experts believed that Russia wanted to keep
South Ossetia and Abkhazia unstable so as to prevent Georgia
from receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan in December, but
they did not think Russia wanted a full-scale war. Ivan
Safranchuk of the World Security Institute posited that
Saakashvili was serious about winning back South Ossetia and
wanted to strike now so that the military situation could
calm down prior to the December NATO summit. He could show
the West that Russia was not a threat, and undercut his
domestic opponents who had criticized him for not taking more
decisive action to win back the break-away regions.
Safranchuk added Saakashvili had to make a choice: he could
either push for NATO MAP and surrender away the break-away
regions, or he could move quickly while a MAP offer was still
pending and have a free hand to strike.


16. (C) Several experts also criticized the West for
providing weapons and military equipment to Georgia
(reinforcing the difficult optic of the U.S. support for the
return of Georgian troops from Iraq). Anatoliy Tsyganok,
Director of the Center for Military Prognosis, told us that
Eastern European NATO members, in particular Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, were providing Saakashvili
military technology. He contended the U.S. was to blame for
allowing Georgia to make such an egregious mistake, and for
providing military assistance (i.e. helicopters) to Tbilisi.

Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons
--------------


17. (C) UNHCR told us that as of Thursday, August 7,
approximately 2,000 civilians, mostly women and children, had
entered North Ossetia and remained. They expected more to
arrive today.

Putin-Medvedev Dynamic
--------------


18. (C) This is Medvedev's first major foreign policy
challenge, and many commentators believe it will be decisive
in determining his ability to successfully occupy the Kremlin
seat vacated by Putin. With Putin in Beijing, but setting a
stiff tone, Medvedev is thrust center stage. While some
commentators say Russia's reaction to the crisis in South
Ossetia shows that Putin's more hawk-like followers continue
to make the decisions on critical issues, most reinforce the
foreign policy consensus here that Georgia cannot get away
with a military solution to the South Ossetian conflict. The
consensus is that Medvedev cannot appear weak or indecisive
in the face of an assault on Russia's South Ossetian
"citizens."
RUBIN