DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH GENERAL BUZHINSKIY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002297 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO KCFE GG RS SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH GENERAL BUZHINSKIY Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Ministry of Defense Lt. General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy told visiting EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza August 1 that Russia shared the U.S.'s desire to avoid an armed conflict in Abkhazia. If there were such a conflict, Russia would likely not become directly involved, he said, but the GOR would be unable to prevent floods of "volunteers" from the North Caucasus from going to the region to help the Abkhaz. Noting that he was not responsible for monitoring Caucasus issues within the Ministry of Defense, he agreed to pass on the proposal to pull back the CIS peacekeeping forces near Abkhazia's Gali District to the Kodori River. He expressed doubts over the feasibility of major IDP return. He questioned why the U.S. pressed for NATO membership for Georgia, noting that it could lead to a Russia-NATO military confrontation, and said the GOR wanted an acknowledgment that there was no "base" at Gudauta; it was merely a "logistic installation." End summary. ¶2. (C) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza discussed the situation in Abkhazia with First Deputy Chief of the MOD's Main Directorate for International Cooperation Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy August 1. Bryza expressed the concern that as the tension in the region increased, the ability of the parties to make good decisions would lessen. He urged Russia to consider a proposal to have the CIS peacekeeping forces in the Kodori Valley pull back to the Kodori river. This would make the Abkhaz feel more secure by positioning the PKF at the end of the Kodori Valley, thereby mitigating the perceived threat of Georgia launching an attack from the Upper Kodori Valley. Repositioning behind the Kodori River would also be a more efficient line to defend in comparison with the current deployment of the PKF on both sides of the Enguri River, maintaining the integrity of the defensive line, while opening up the possibility of lessening the Georgian presence. Such a move could prove crucial in eliciting a Georgian non-use-of-force pledge. It might then be possible to reach an intermediate deal and lower the potential for an explosive incident. He emphasized that the U.S. and Russia needed to use our respective influence to move the parties away from an armed conflict. ¶3. (C) Bryza said he had discussed four types of security Georgia needed to ensure to make the Abkhaz feel secure: 1) military, specifically a non-use of force agreement, which would be part of an overall package; 2) economic, including CBMs, and opening up trade with the EU, Turkey, but most importantly, with Georgia; 3) political; and 4) cultural. These last two reflect Abkhaz worries that if a large number of Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned, Abkhaz' political rights and cultural identity could be threatened. Still, to get Georgia to the negotiating table, we needed to give them enough on IDP return and security to start the process, and then seek to lock them into the negotiations. ¶4. (C) Russia putting railroad troops in Abkhazia had undone efforts to calm the tensions, Bryza stressed. The action had come the day after Georgia had de-escalated by announcing it was ending its UAV flights over Abkhazia and asked Russia to consult prior to any new actions in Abkhazia. Instead, Russia had sent in the railroad troops with no warning and no consultation. This had rattled the Georgians and strengthened the hand of those who foolishly favored a military "solution" in Abkhazia. Bryza stressed how bluntly U.S. officials warned the Georgians at the highest level that there was no military solution in Abkhazia; but these sorts of Russian moves made it harder for such U.S. arguments to maintain traction in Tbilisi. ¶5. (C) Buzhinskiy noted initially that he did not have responsibility for Georgian-Abkhaz issues in the MOD, and said he would pass on the proposal to pull back the peacekeepers to the Kodori river. He stated that the forces' high mobility and the small area of Abkhazia's territory made this a minor issue militarily, and agreed that it was important to try to prevent a conflict in the region. He said if there were, he doubted that there would be direct Russian involvement, but noted that the GOR would be unable to stop "volunteers" from other parts of the Northern Caucasus from flocking to help the Abkhaz. He stressed that the decision on increasing the numbers of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia was a political one, not an MOD decision. ¶6. (C) Buzhinskiy said that negotiations should be initiated and economic deals should be strengthened, but expressed doubts about the feasibility of IDP return, especially to Central Abkhazia. German FM Steinmeier's package proposal had been okay, but the withdrawal of peacekeepers was not the principal issue; it was the return of refugees. But Buzhinskiy commented that he did not see how Bagapsh could ever agree. He noted that 3 1/2 percent of the Abkhaz population had died in the conflict, as compared to 1 percent in Kosovo, where refugee and IDP return was still a difficult issue. Picking up on Bryza's reference to the conflict in Cyprus, Buzhinskiy said just as the Turkish Cypriots had worried that a deal to allow the Greek Cypriots to buy land in the North, over the long term would lead to the Greek side owning most of the property in the North, the Abkhaz were similarly concerned. If large numbers of IDPs were allowed to return, although the situation might be fine for 5-10 years with UN or Western guarantees, eventually with 100,000 Abkhaz and 400,000 Georgians, the dynamic would change. ¶7. (C) Buzhinskiy confirmed that all of Russia's railroad troops would be withdrawn from the region by August 4. He said the reconstruction of the railroad may have been partially motivated by the desire to have infrastructure in place for the Sochi Olympics, but stressed that Russia had made clear from the beginning that the troops were only there for a limited purpose and a limited time. They were rebuilding the railbed, the bridges and the tunnels, and when their work was completed, they left. They had never posed a threat to Georgia. Perhaps for Georgia, he said, it would be better for Abkhazia to be in economic ruin, but Russia was interested in Abkhazia's economic revival. Gudauta, CFE and NATO Enlargement -------------- ¶8. (C) Buzhinskiy opined Georgia did not want a compromise on the Gudauta base. Russia was willing to facilitate an inspection, but did not want a repeat of the experience with the French inspectors in 2004, when Russia had showed them that there was no base in Gudauta, but the French had then told the Joint Consultative Group they had no mandate to report that there was no base. The GOR wanted it recognized that there was no "military base" at Gudauta within the understanding of the 1999 Istanbul commitments, that it was merely a "logistical installation with peacekeepers." ¶9. (C) Buzhinskiy asked why the U.S. was pressing for Georgian membership in NATO, expressing his concern that it could bring Russia and NATO into direct military confrontation. This was the last thing he wanted, Buzhinskiy said. Bryza replied that we believed NATO membership would help stabilize the entire region, including Russia's southern border, and advance political and economic freedom. ¶10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable. RUBIN