CUBA: RUSSIA NOT INCREASING MILITARY COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002275 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG EAIR RS CU SUBJECT: CUBA: RUSSIA NOT INCREASING MILITARY COOPERATION Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Minister-Counselor Alice Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Russian officials insist that Russia is not interested in military cooperation with Cuba and deny any interest in establishing a Russian missile defense site in Cuba. The July 30-31 trip to Cuba by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and high-level economic and security advisors focused on economic cooperation, but produced only a few agreements to sell passenger jets, set up a truck assembly plant, and explore possibilities for increased cooperation in energy, tourism, and banking. Putin's pledge to strengthen Cuba links, stated during his weekly Presidium meeting, contains few concrete measures and energy sector sources are not enthusiastic about investment opportunities in Cuba. End summary. Another Cuban Missile Crisis? -------------- ¶2. (C) Ministry of Defense spokesperson Ilshat Baichurin officially denied press reports that Russia may send long-range bombers to Cuba in response to U.S. missile defense in Eastern Europe, calling them "disinformation and another media hoax." MFA Cuba section chief Viktor Koronelli also confirmed that the bomber reports were unfounded, and insisted that there was no truth behind subsequent media reports that said Russia was interested in missile defense for Cuba. He stressed that Russian-Cuban cooperation was strictly in the sphere of economic cooperation. ¶3. (C) It was a July 21 Izvestia story about Russia sending long-range bombers to Cuba in response to U.S. missile defense in Eastern Europe that created a flurry of speculation, with Russian politicians and analysts taking the opportunity to comment on possible benefits of enhanced military cooperation with Cuba. Deputy Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on International Affairs Andrei Klimov told RIA-Novosti that "If America installs antiballistic missile (ABM) systems next to the Russian border, Russia too may deploy its systems in those states that will agree to take them." He explained that these ABM systems would not target the US, but instead would be directed against a "hypothetical aggressor in the region." Leonid Ivashov, head of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, told RIA-Novosti that the West was creating a "buffer zone" around Russia and that in response, Russia might expand its military presence in Cuba or other places. Sechin's Trip Yields Little Result -------------- ¶4. While Prime Minister Putin called for Russia to rebuild (its) positions in Cuba and other countries during an August 4 Presidium meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Sechin's July 30-31 trip to Cuba produced few agreements. Cuba agreed to purchase Russian An-148-200 and Tu-204 planes from Russia; Russia agreed to build an assembly plant for KAMAZ trucks in Cuba; and several economic Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) were signed, with Russian Energy Minister Shmatko agreeing to set up working groups to explore Cuba's petroleum possibilities. ¶5. (C) In an August 6 private conversation with Ekho Moskvy Editor Aleksey Venediktov, Sechin denied any Russian interest in establishing Cold War military ties, and acknowledged Cuban disenchantment with Russia's jettisoning of its strategic partnership in the 1990's. The proof that economics drove the visit, Sechin argued, was in his delegation. Traveling to Cuba as co-president of the Russian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Sechin was accompanied by Energy Minister Sergey Shmatko, Communications and IT Minister Igor Shchegolev, Education and Science Minister Andrey Fursenko, Security Council head Nikolay Patrushev, and several representatives from the energy sector. While Sechin publicly reiterated that the two sides would discuss oil production, tourism, healthcare, nickel production, telecommunications and nanotechnology, Patrushev's participation in the trip--which Kommersant reported was a last-minute addition--fueled media speculation that Russia was also interested in penning security or military deals. Sechin told Venediktov that he hadn't counted on a meeting with Raul Castro, although it materialized in the end. Fidel played no role. ¶6. (C) Among the economic heavyweights traveling with Sechin were Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev and German Khan, one of the billionaire shareholders of TNK-BP. While the energy sector was specifically highlighted as an area of cooperation, a Gazprom contact told us the company had no interest in Cuba. On August 1, Ivan Zolotov, Gazprom's Director of International Relations, described the Inter-Governmental Economic Cooperation Commission as a relic of the Soviet days that has lost purpose in the modernized Russian economy. He said Sechin had to go and insisted that Medvedev join him to "add weight to the delegation." Zolotov said Gazprom has no interest in doing business in Cuba and that the trip had "absolutely no economic merit" but was politically mandated. Tim Summers (strictly protect),Chief Operating Officer of TNK-BP, told us July 31 that Khan's participation was unlikely to result in any substantive agreement for participation in Cuba's oil and gas sector on the part of TNK-BP. He described Cuba's potential deposits as small with complicated geology. Summers said even Khan was not very interested in going and he doubted any other Russian oil company would be interested either. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The scarcity of deals coming out of the Sechin trip, the lack of enthusiasm from Russian energy companies to do business in Cuba, and the categorical denials of military cooperation indicate that there is likely to be little change in the status-quo of Russia-Cuba relations in the near future, Putin's remarks notwithstanding. RUBIN