CUBA: RUSSIA NOT INCREASING MILITARY COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002275

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG EAIR RS CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: RUSSIA NOT INCREASING MILITARY COOPERATION

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Minister-Counselor Alice
Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Russian officials insist that Russia is not
interested in military cooperation with Cuba and deny any
interest in establishing a Russian missile defense site in
Cuba. The July 30-31 trip to Cuba by Deputy Prime Minister
Igor Sechin and high-level economic and security advisors
focused on economic cooperation, but produced only a few
agreements to sell passenger jets, set up a truck assembly
plant, and explore possibilities for increased cooperation in
energy, tourism, and banking. Putin's pledge to strengthen
Cuba links, stated during his weekly Presidium meeting,
contains few concrete measures and energy sector sources are
not enthusiastic about investment opportunities in Cuba. End
summary.

Another Cuban Missile Crisis?
--------------


2. (C) Ministry of Defense spokesperson Ilshat Baichurin
officially denied press reports that Russia may send
long-range bombers to Cuba in response to U.S. missile
defense in Eastern Europe, calling them "disinformation and
another media hoax." MFA Cuba section chief Viktor Koronelli
also confirmed that the bomber reports were unfounded, and
insisted that there was no truth behind subsequent media
reports that said Russia was interested in missile defense
for Cuba. He stressed that Russian-Cuban cooperation was
strictly in the sphere of economic cooperation.


3. (C) It was a July 21 Izvestia story about Russia sending
long-range bombers to Cuba in response to U.S. missile
defense in Eastern Europe that created a flurry of
speculation, with Russian politicians and analysts taking the
opportunity to comment on possible benefits of enhanced
military cooperation with Cuba. Deputy Chairman of the State
Duma's Committee on International Affairs Andrei Klimov told
RIA-Novosti that "If America installs antiballistic missile
(ABM) systems next to the Russian border, Russia too may
deploy its systems in those states that will agree to take
them." He explained that these ABM systems would not target
the US, but instead would be directed against a "hypothetical
aggressor in the region." Leonid Ivashov, head of the
Academy of Geopolitical Problems, told RIA-Novosti that the
West was creating a "buffer zone" around Russia and that in
response, Russia might expand its military presence in Cuba
or other places.


Sechin's Trip Yields Little Result
--------------


4. While Prime Minister Putin called for Russia to rebuild
(its) positions in Cuba and other countries during an August
4 Presidium meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Sechin's July
30-31 trip to Cuba produced few agreements. Cuba agreed to
purchase Russian An-148-200 and Tu-204 planes from Russia;
Russia agreed to build an assembly plant for KAMAZ trucks in
Cuba; and several economic Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)
were signed, with Russian Energy Minister Shmatko agreeing to
set up working groups to explore Cuba's petroleum
possibilities.


5. (C) In an August 6 private conversation with Ekho Moskvy
Editor Aleksey Venediktov, Sechin denied any Russian interest
in establishing Cold War military ties, and acknowledged
Cuban disenchantment with Russia's jettisoning of its
strategic partnership in the 1990's. The proof that
economics drove the visit, Sechin argued, was in his
delegation. Traveling to Cuba as co-president of the
Russian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission on Trade,
Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Sechin was
accompanied by Energy Minister Sergey Shmatko, Communications
and IT Minister Igor Shchegolev, Education and Science
Minister Andrey Fursenko, Security Council head Nikolay
Patrushev, and several representatives from the energy
sector. While Sechin publicly reiterated that the two sides
would discuss oil production, tourism, healthcare, nickel
production, telecommunications and nanotechnology,
Patrushev's participation in the trip--which Kommersant
reported was a last-minute addition--fueled media speculation
that Russia was also interested in penning security or
military deals. Sechin told Venediktov that he hadn't
counted on a meeting with Raul Castro, although it
materialized in the end. Fidel played no role.


6. (C) Among the economic heavyweights traveling with Sechin
were Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev and German Khan,
one of the billionaire shareholders of TNK-BP. While the
energy sector was specifically highlighted as an area of
cooperation, a Gazprom contact told us the company had no
interest in Cuba. On August 1, Ivan Zolotov, Gazprom's
Director of International Relations, described the
Inter-Governmental Economic Cooperation Commission as a relic
of the Soviet days that has lost purpose in the modernized
Russian economy. He said Sechin had to go and insisted that
Medvedev join him to "add weight to the delegation." Zolotov
said Gazprom has no interest in doing business in Cuba and
that the trip had "absolutely no economic merit" but was
politically mandated. Tim Summers (strictly protect),Chief
Operating Officer of TNK-BP, told us July 31 that Khan's
participation was unlikely to result in any substantive
agreement for participation in Cuba's oil and gas sector on
the part of TNK-BP. He described Cuba's potential deposits
as small with complicated geology. Summers said even Khan
was not very interested in going and he doubted any other
Russian oil company would be interested either.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The scarcity of deals coming out of the Sechin trip,
the lack of enthusiasm from Russian energy companies to do
business in Cuba, and the categorical denials of military
cooperation indicate that there is likely to be little change
in the status-quo of Russia-Cuba relations in the near
future, Putin's remarks notwithstanding.
RUBIN