UNORTHODOX POLITICS CONTRIBUTE TO MOSCOW-KIEV

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002261

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RS UP CASC KIRF SOCI
SUBJECT: UNORTHODOX POLITICS CONTRIBUTE TO MOSCOW-KIEV
TENSION

Classified By: Charge Eric Rubin: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary. While newly arrived Ukrainian Amb
Konstyantyn Gryshchenko told Charge on August 1 that
relations with Russia were serious, MFA Director for the
Second Department of the CIS Countries (Belarus, Moldova, and
Ukraine) Sorokin told us on August 1 that Yushchenko was
responsible for ratcheting up political tensions, in a
bilateral relationship that enjoyed deep economic ballast.
Sorokin detailed Russian unhappiness with Ukraine's visa ban
on Duma deputy Zatulin, handling of the Black Sea Fleet's
disposition, and conduct of the 1020 celebration of
Orthodoxy, for which Gryshchenko was convoked on July 26.
Yushchenko's reception (or lack thereof) of Aleksey II has
generated negative public and official comment, although the
Russian Orthodox Church has pocketed the Constantinople
Patriarch's silence on Ukrainian Orthodox independence as a
"victory." We see no Russian inclination to step back from
its strategy of sharpening the political dividing lines with
the Yushchenko government. End Summary.
New Ukrainian Ambassador Underscores Serious Rift
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2. (C) In an August 1 meeting with the Charge, newly arrived
Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia Konstyantyn Gryshchenko,
accompanied by Political Counselor Myroslava Scherbatiuk,
described the situation between Ukraine and Russia as
&serious.8 Gryshchenko, who was convoked by First Deputy
Prime Minister Denisov on July 26 to hear Russian
dissatisfaction over the bilateral relationship, predicted
that autumn would see more strains, with the GOR perhaps
seeking to renegotiate the Big Treaty that frames the two
states, relations. Arguing that the U.S. was preoccupied
with the presidential elections and the EU distracted by the
Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, Gryshchenko concluded
that Ukraine would not get the support it needed when dealing
with Russia. In response to Charge,s affirmation of
unwavering U.S. support for Ukrainian sovereignty,
Gryshchenko acknowledged that Ukraine viewed the Big Treaty
as just an amalgamation of agreements and accepted
international law. Such rights as the inviolability of
borders, Gryshchenko said, were guaranteed by international
law, not the Big Treaty.


3. (C) Gryshchenko remarked that, after the Orange
Revolution, all levels of Russian government, from the
Presidential Administration to regional governors, were
concerned by Ukraine,s possible NATO membership and agreed
with Charge,s assessment that many ordinary Russians
remained concerned by the prospect as well. Gryshchenko said
many Russians still questioned the limits of Ukrainian
independence, and continued to use the outdated preposition
&na8 rather than &v8 when speaking about Ukraine, despite
the GOU,s requests. Before having to cut the meeting short
on emergency business, Gryshchenko argued that Kyiv would
have to determine whether or not it should actively pursue a
NATO MAP offer, and the Russian wrath that it incurred, at a
time when the Germans were adamant in their opposition.
Gryshchenko noted the propaganda coup that a German veto
presented, with Moscow able to argue that NATO does not
really want Ukraine, so Ukraine should therefore pursue close
ties with Russia.

MFA Blames Yushchenko for Artificial Crisis
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3. (C) In a separate August 1 meeting, Director of the
Second Department of the CIS Countries (Belarus, Moldova, and
Ukraine) Viktor Sorokin declined to characterize
Ukrainian-Russian relations as having worsened significantly,
but questioned the timing of Yushchenko's actions and his
strategy towards Russia. Sorokin repeatedly underscored the
breadth of the bilateral relationship, pointing to 30 billion
usd in trade that was expected to grow another 15 percent
this year. &Even if we wanted to,8 Sorokin stressed, &the
business community would not let us disrupt ties with
Ukraine.8 Sorokin dismissed a freeze in the relationship,
noting Tymoshenko,s July visit, her upcoming September
meeting with Putin, and the resumption of the
intergovernmental meetings in the fall. Noting that August
was dacha season, and not a time for subcommittee sessions,
Sorokin sidestepped a direct question over whether the five
Black Sea Fleet-related working groups were on hiatus, as a
result of Russian unhappiness over recent GOU pronouncements.
Instead, he reaffirmed a resumption of diplomatic engagement
in the fall.


4. (C) Praising Gryshchenko ) a Soviet-era colleague of
Sorokin,s ) as a &serious professional8 and &skilled
diplomat,8 Sorokin laid the blame for the recent sharpening
of rhetoric on Yushchenko,s actions, with Gryshchenko,s

July 26 convocation driven by Russian unhappiness over the
prohibition against Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on
CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots Konstantin
Zatulin's entry into Ukraine for one year, Ukraine,s posture
on the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet, and the handling
of the 1020 celebration of Orthodoxy.

Zatulin,s Expulsion Inappropriate
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5. (C) Sorokin said there was real irritation over
Ukraine,s continued reliance on blacklists, noting that
Zatulin had been in Kyiv for a conference, before suddenly
being expelled as a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. (Note:
This is the third time Zatulin has been PNG'd.) Coupled with
Ukraine's previous PNG designation for Moscow Mayor Yuriy
Luzhkov, Kiev was only creating barriers to future
cooperation. Sorokin reiterated that the blame for these
actions rested with Ukraine, since Moscow does not maintain
black lists, which were in contradiction of a past agreement
with Ukraine to annul diplomatic bans. Noting Moscow's
previous warnings to the GOU not to exacerbate the bilateral
situation, Sorokin argued that that Zatulin,s comments,
however odious to Kyiv, were protected speech and did not
reflect Russian official positions.

Black Sea Fleet Pronouncements Premature
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6. (C) Sorokin reiterated that the disposition of the Black
Sea Fleet was secure through 2017 and that Yushchenko's
decision to announcement deliberations over its withdrawal
now could only be interpreted as a deliberate diplomatic
provocation. Whether or not the Black Sea Fleet was
withdrawn, it would not be a decision negotiated now by
Yushchenko, particularly since the Treaty was structured in a
way that presumed automatic extension. Russia,s position,
Sorokin commented, was to reaffirm publicly that it would not
negotiate in 2008 the modalities of 2017, particularly with a
Ukrainian government that was in a state of continual
political collapse. (Note: The Russian MFA previously
expressed its opposition to the base falling into NATO
hands.)

Yushchenko Mixing Politics with Religion
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7. (C) Sorokin criticized Yushchenko and the GOU for
manipulating the July 25-27 religious celebrations in Kiev as
an opportunity to create a political rift with Russia and to
engineer an artificial schism between Ukrainian and Russian
Orthodox believers. In a secular state, Sorokin argued, it
was awkward to discuss religion and as a routine matter the
MFA did not seek to utilize the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)
nor religious celebrations for political purposes. (Note: FM
Lavrov has highlighted the unity of the MFA and ROC in
promoting Russian culture and ties to a broader Orthodox
diaspora.) Sorokin, drawing from conversations with ROC
leaders, told us that the ROC did not oppose a united
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) in principle; however, any
united Ukrainian church must agree canonically with the ROC.
Ukraine's lack of respect for Moscow, demonstrated by the
absence of discussion with Russia's political and religious
leadership over a potential split, complicated any
unification efforts. "We cannot conduct meetings on church
matters under the current conditions, and Ukraine's
politicization of the religious festival did not facilitate
discussion," Sorokin explained.


8. (C) Sorokin expressed dismay at Ukraine,s reception of
ROC Patriarch Aleksey II. MFA intervention, he maintained,
had helped secure a GOU delegation headed by Rada Speaker
Volodomyr Lytvyn to the airport to greet Aleksey II, after
Yushchenko, former president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, and
Ukrainian Defense Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov had done the
tarmac honors for Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople.
(Note: According to press reports, Yushchenko initially
approached Aleksey II to arrange a joint reception for him
and Patriarch Bartholomew in Kiev in the run-up to the
anniversary of the baptism. Aleksey II declined the offer.
Circumventing established practice, Yushchenko invited
Patriarch Bartholomew to Kiev without the Moscow Patriarch's
permission and made personal pleas to Bartholomew for the
Constantinople Patriarchate (CP) to recognize a united
Ukrainian Orthodox Church. On June 23, Russian media
reported that Ukrainian officials banned all posters and
billboards with Aleksey II's picture in Kiev, threatening to
cancel advertising licenses for agencies that did not follow
orders. Conversely, Russian media reported that
advertisements and signs supporting Bartholomew appeared two
weeks before the celebration throughout Kiev.)



9. (C) Sorokin pointed to the disparity in treatment of the
Patriarchs, as well as Yushchenko,s public bid for UOC
independence, as another conscious strategy to sour relations
between the Russian and Ukrainian people. Just as a majority
of Ukrainians did not support NATO membership, a majority of
Ukrainian Orthodox did not support Yushchenko,s
ecclesiastical efforts. Sorokin cited statistics, indicating
the ROC has attracted the most followers in Ukraine with
11,233 parishes and 9,217 priests. In comparison, the KP
boasted 2,963 parishes and 2,940 priests while the UAOC had
1,178 parishes and 661 priests. Shrugging his shoulders at
the disrespect of Aleksey II and political maneuvering of
Yushchenko, Sorokin stressed that "Bartholomew has little
influence in Russia and Ukraine."

ROC: Bloodied but Victorious?
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10. (C) The perceived politicization of religious events in
Kiev has stoked the ire of Russian Orthodox leaders and press
channels alike. "Rossiya" news, pointing to Yushchenko's
personal reception of Patriarch Bartholomew at the Kiev
airport, called the lack of reception for Patriarch Aleksey
II "indignant." Bartholomew,s attendance with Yushchenko at
a service held for the victims of the 1930s famine in Ukraine
also raised hackles, with Aleksey II,s decision to boycott
consistent with previous ROC objections to politicizing
historical events. Russian press even bristled at the fact
that Ukrainian officials housed Bartholomew in one of
Yushchenko's presidential estates, while placing Aleksey in a
three-star hotel named "Rus." Metropolitan Kirill, Head of
External Relations for the ROC, played up the politicization
of Yushchenko's invitation of Patriarch Bartholomew I of
Constantinople in a July 30 press conference. Noting that
&a split has been created under the influence of political
forces, and it continues to remain a weapon, a club in the
hands of political forces,8 Kirill expressed confidence that
&politically motivated events in Kyiv8 would not undermine
the Church, which had persevered on its own for over 2,000
years, despite numerous cataclysms, without a change in its
canonical status.


11. (C) Russian ROC officials and the media have scored
Bartholomew,s careful comments and silence on the question
of Constantinople serving as a jurisdictional umbrella for
Ukraine as a victory for the Moscow Patriarchate. Kirill
characterized the events in Kiev as a triumph of Orthodoxy
during his press conference, stating that "nothing dangerous
and terrible for the religious life of Ukraine and for the
integrity for our Church has happened." While the ROC and
Constantinople Patriarchate (CP) had discussed the issue of
Ukraine's jurisdiction and would continue working on an
agreed agenda for future discussions, Kirill argued that any
accommodation in the canonical foundation for a schism was
impossible. He warned, however, that forces wishing to
undermine the ROC exist, and anything could happen to the ROC
when religion is as politicized as it was in Kiev. Kirill
lauded ROC supporters for their attendance at a liturgy and
rock concert in Kiev during the celebrations, adding that the
people proclaimed they have only one leader, Patriarch
Aleksey II.

Comment
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12. (C) We can expect Russia to keep sharpening the lines of
political division with a Ukrainian government that has
anchored its political agenda to NATO membership. Political
commentators and politicians with access to the Kremlin tell
us that Russia is winning a public relations war in Ukraine.
While their conclusions may be fanciful, we do not sense any
fundamental recalculation of Russian strategy towards Kyiv
over the near-term.
RUBIN