RUSSIAN OPPOSITION: UNITE OR SEEK KREMLIN COVER?

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002181 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OPPOSITION: UNITE OR SEEK KREMLIN COVER? Classified By: Acting DCM Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: While an informal convocation of opposition leaders, engineered by former PM Kasyanov, fueled rumors of a united opposition movement, recent conversations suggest that Russia's mainstream liberal parties seek accommodation or "constructive" relations with the Kremlin. Following informal "feelers," delivered by Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Surkov, and back-to-back Medvedev and Putin meetings with SPS leader Chubais, SPS is considering whether to position itself as the loyal opposition, with potential access to the Rosnanotech trough of administrative resources. With Yabloko's change in leadership and titular ascendance of the pragmatic Mitrokhin, new possibilities for cooperation with SPS have emerged, but financial realities and apathy among liberals continue to make "constructive engagement" with the Kremlin a preferred strategy for some national leaders. One of the few points of agreement between the SPS and Yabloko leadership is dislike of Garry Kasparov and his Other Russia movement. The threat of political extinction leaves many opposition leaders looking for a way to woo the Medvedev administration away from reliance on the ruling party's liberal wing. It is not clear that a younger generation of more radical leaders will be satisfied with Kremlin cooptation. End Summary The Opposition Postures -------------- ¶2. (C) In a July 25 meeting, Moscow Helsinki Group Chair Lyudmilla Alekseyeva dispelled rumors, fanned in the media, that her July 14 hosting of opposition leaders was aimed at unifying Russia's liberal opposition forces. According to Alekseyeva, the event was a favor to former PM Kasyanov, as head of the Russian People's Democratic Union (RPDU),who sought a "neutral party" to host a conversation between him and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) leader Nikita Belykh, Yabloko party chairman Sergei Mitrokhin, and the leader of the unregistered Republican Party, Vladimir Ryzhkov. Alekseyeva described the meeting as friendly, despite the fact that the respective party heads had butted heads over the past year. Alekseyeva told the press that she invited only "the brightest orators" that had attended her 80th birthday last year, thereby justifying the exclusion of Other Russia's Garry Kasparov, with whom both Alekseyeva and Kasyanov have had public falling outs. ¶3. (C) While Kasyanov used the RPDU's July 13 Third Congress, convened one day before Alekseyeva's dinner, to argue for exploring the possibility of another joint opposition movement, this one focused on SPS, Yabloko and the ex-Republican Party, we see no evidence that the initiative has gained public or private traction. SPS leader Leonid Gozman told us that party leaders were puzzled by the Alekseyeva gathering, but attended as part of their on-going effort to "love Lyudmilla." He described Kasyanov's public statements as "public posturing," stressing that there was little point in the opposition uniting after the election season had concluded. Likewise, Yabloko Chief Mitrokhin insisted to us that Kasyanov remained politically irrelevant. The real question, he underscored, was whether SPS and Yabloko could find common ground at the national level, as they had earlier done in the Moscow City Duma. Interestingly, during a July 11 visit to the Embassy for visa processing, Kasyanov opted not to mention the upcoming dinner with Alekseyeva when asked about next steps in liberal opposition politics. SPS Weighs Another Kremlin Accommodation -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Gozman, the SPS inner circle -- Anatoliy Chubais, former PM Yegor Gaidar, Belykh, Boris Nemtsov (who "left" the party, when his Kremlin criticisms became too hot for Chubais' comfort),and himself -- are weighing yet another run at serving as the Kremlin's "constructive opposition." Gozman argued that the fate of SPS would reflect the outcome of the balancing act between Putin and Medvedev: if Putin remained ascendant, he had no need for an opposition vehicle and United Russia would remain the unrivaled party of power; if Medvedev began to accrete influence, he would look to dilute United Russia's dominance, since it was intrinsically Putin's "personal project." Gozman referred vaguely to "feelers" from Medvedev's camp, noting the irony that they were delivered by Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, despite Surkov's own authorship of United Russia and the "sovereign democracy" theory that posited a monolithic ruling party. Describing the conversations as "under the table" and "discreet," Gozman said that Medvedev's other option was to rely upon United Russia's more liberal wing. ¶5. (C) Acknowledging that SPS's previous bid to serve as a loyal opposition to the Kremlin prior to the 2007 Duma elections had been rebuffed and the party's candidates subjected to "black p.r. (particularly after Belykh and Nemtsov temporarily supported Other Russia allies)," Gozman argued that SPS had little alternative but to seek an accommodation, which would give party members access to senior government positions (and attendant administrative resources) and a freer hand in regional elections, at a time when members were shut out of the Duma. Party members were "tired of demonstrations" and fights with the Kremlin that precluded any near-term access to political power; Other Russia was unacceptable -- Stalinists and Communists were worse than Putin. Relying on a chess analogy, Gozman said that SPS had reached the stage where any move resulted in a worsening of position. The party was essentially bankrupt, with party leaders writing personal checks to ride out the next few months. There was "no chance" for independent survival, much less political victory. ¶6. (C) Predicting that the party's course would not be clear until the dacha season closed in September, Gozman pointed to two unpublicized meetings with Chubais as evidence of the on-going maneuvering. Medvedev, who invited Chubais to dinner following the successful privatization of RAO UES, reportedly spent three hours discussing the lay of the land, expressing respect for Chubais, as well as sympathy for his political situation. Similarly, Putin invited Chubais to an off the record chat, the first personal contact between the two since the Duma elections. As a result of these conversations, Chubais expected to be appointed Director General of Rosnanotech, replacing Leonid Melamed, by the end of August. (Left unsaid by Gozman was the role Rosnanotech could play in replenishing SPS coffers, replacing RAO UES as the opposition party's trough for administrative resources.) Yabloko Reevaluates Strategy Also -------------- ¶7. (C) Yabloko's Mitrokhin confided to us in a recent meeting that Yavlinskiy's departure would allow joint action with other parties, such as SPS, albeit on his party's strictly stipulated terms. Reiterating conditions for cooperating with SPS that earlier had been laid down by ex-party chief Yavlinskiy -- the need to merge with Yabloko, the stepping aside of 1990's era political figures -- Mitrokhin said he was amenable to discussing a union like that achieved during the 2005 Moscow City Duma elections. Gozman confirmed to us that Mitrokhin was "easier to deal with" and that a concordat was possible, despite Yavlinskiy's intent to serve as a shadow leader from the wings. While Mitrokhin insisted that Yabloko was an opposition party, he conceded his members' interest in finding a constructive way to work with the current government, as evidenced by Yavlinskiy's March 2008 meeting with Putin. The party faced numerous hurdles, including financial problems stemming from business reluctance to contribute to a non-Kremlin blessed party; lack of access to the national media; and the apathy of liberal voters. Mitrokhin downplayed internal party divisions, especially between Yabloko's St. Petersburg faction and representatives in Moscow, and noted that all party members except four -- Yabloko renegades Reznik and Yashin included -- agreed on ways to move forward at the Fifteenth Congress. ¶8. (C) Political observers believe that Yabloko's future hinges on the post-Yavlinskiy leadership's ability to compromise. Mikhail Vinogradov, General Director of the Center for Current Politics, commented that "the decay of the party is a more likely future unless it is chosen by the state as the major democratic party in Russia." Political scientist Dmitriy Oreshkin disagreed in part with skeptics, believing Mitrokhin would bring change "along the lines of organization and personnel." Whether Yavlinskiy, whose political principles produced political gridlock among the Russian opposition, will allow Mitrokhin, a simpler man of action, to lead the party in a new direction without interference remains to be seen. Unity -- Past its Sell Date -------------- ¶9. (C) Kremlin-insider and incoming director of the GOR's Democracy Institute in New York, Andranik Migranyan was among those experts who questioned whether Medvedev needed the baggage-laden parties of the 1990's, predicting to us a bolstering of liberal elements within United Russia instead. After several years of SPS and Yabloko flirtations, Alekseyeva also downplayed the party machinations, commenting wryly that Americans were giving the Russian opposition more than their due share of attention. Recalling that Ryzhkov, a "good, honest speaker," had pleaded with the other opposition leaders to forget about past differences and move forward, Alekseyeva noted that Mitrokhin had countered with more rhetoric about the purity of the Yabloko brand. Checkmate for Kasparov -------------- ¶10. (C) While some political analysts, such as Stanislav Kulakov, continue to argue for a "horizontal" opposition structure that includes all groups, including Other Russia and its spin-off "National Assembly," the mainstream opposition appears to have united around dislike of Garry Kasparov -- a reference to whom left Alekseyeva sputtering in anger. She categorically stated that Kasparov would not have a future in Russian politics and decried his duplicitous methods in manipulating the Other Russia movement. Alekseyeva pointedly noted that she would not work with him in the future, hoping to avoid the intrigue and back-biting that Kasparov brought to the opposition efforts. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) This opposition dance seems awfully familiar and its relevance -- in a United Russia-dominated, post-election landscape -- appears negligible. If the Kremlin succeeds in wooing SPS, it's record of tactical brilliance in coopting the national opposition leadership will be further embellished, although its unclear whether the senior opposition standard bearers can bring along their more radical (and youthful) members. For the older generation of opposition leaders, the prospect of influencing decisionmaking and winning a Medvedev administration over to a more moderate course is the preferred alternative to life in the political wilderness, where extinction is a real possibility. RUBIN