RUSSIAN OPPOSITION: UNITE OR SEEK KREMLIN COVER?

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002181

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OPPOSITION: UNITE OR SEEK KREMLIN COVER?

Classified By: Acting DCM Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: While an informal convocation of opposition
leaders, engineered by former PM Kasyanov, fueled rumors of a
united opposition movement, recent conversations suggest that
Russia's mainstream liberal parties seek accommodation or
"constructive" relations with the Kremlin. Following
informal "feelers," delivered by Kremlin Deputy Chief of
Staff Surkov, and back-to-back Medvedev and Putin meetings
with SPS leader Chubais, SPS is considering whether to
position itself as the loyal opposition, with potential
access to the Rosnanotech trough of administrative resources.
With Yabloko's change in leadership and titular ascendance
of the pragmatic Mitrokhin, new possibilities for cooperation
with SPS have emerged, but financial realities and apathy
among liberals continue to make "constructive engagement"
with the Kremlin a preferred strategy for some national
leaders. One of the few points of agreement between the SPS
and Yabloko leadership is dislike of Garry Kasparov and his
Other Russia movement. The threat of political extinction
leaves many opposition leaders looking for a way to woo the
Medvedev administration away from reliance on the ruling
party's liberal wing. It is not clear that a younger
generation of more radical leaders will be satisfied with
Kremlin cooptation. End Summary

The Opposition Postures
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2. (C) In a July 25 meeting, Moscow Helsinki Group Chair
Lyudmilla Alekseyeva dispelled rumors, fanned in the media,
that her July 14 hosting of opposition leaders was aimed at
unifying Russia's liberal opposition forces. According to
Alekseyeva, the event was a favor to former PM Kasyanov, as
head of the Russian People's Democratic Union (RPDU),who
sought a "neutral party" to host a conversation between him
and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) leader Nikita Belykh,
Yabloko party chairman Sergei Mitrokhin, and the leader of
the unregistered Republican Party, Vladimir Ryzhkov.
Alekseyeva described the meeting as friendly, despite the
fact that the respective party heads had butted heads over
the past year. Alekseyeva told the press that she invited
only "the brightest orators" that had attended her 80th
birthday last year, thereby justifying the exclusion of Other
Russia's Garry Kasparov, with whom both Alekseyeva and
Kasyanov have had public falling outs.


3. (C) While Kasyanov used the RPDU's July 13 Third
Congress, convened one day before Alekseyeva's dinner, to
argue for exploring the possibility of another joint
opposition movement, this one focused on SPS, Yabloko and the
ex-Republican Party, we see no evidence that the initiative
has gained public or private traction. SPS leader Leonid
Gozman told us that party leaders were puzzled by the
Alekseyeva gathering, but attended as part of their on-going
effort to "love Lyudmilla." He described Kasyanov's public
statements as "public posturing," stressing that there was
little point in the opposition uniting after the election
season had concluded. Likewise, Yabloko Chief Mitrokhin
insisted to us that Kasyanov remained politically irrelevant.
The real question, he underscored, was whether SPS and
Yabloko could find common ground at the national level, as
they had earlier done in the Moscow City Duma.
Interestingly, during a July 11 visit to the Embassy for visa
processing, Kasyanov opted not to mention the upcoming dinner
with Alekseyeva when asked about next steps in liberal
opposition politics.

SPS Weighs Another Kremlin Accommodation
--------------


4. (C) According to Gozman, the SPS inner circle --
Anatoliy Chubais, former PM Yegor Gaidar, Belykh, Boris
Nemtsov (who "left" the party, when his Kremlin criticisms
became too hot for Chubais' comfort),and himself -- are
weighing yet another run at serving as the Kremlin's
"constructive opposition." Gozman argued that the fate of
SPS would reflect the outcome of the balancing act between
Putin and Medvedev: if Putin remained ascendant, he had no
need for an opposition vehicle and United Russia would remain
the unrivaled party of power; if Medvedev began to accrete
influence, he would look to dilute United Russia's dominance,
since it was intrinsically Putin's "personal project."
Gozman referred vaguely to "feelers" from Medvedev's camp,
noting the irony that they were delivered by Kremlin Deputy
Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, despite Surkov's own
authorship of United Russia and the "sovereign democracy"
theory that posited a monolithic ruling party. Describing
the conversations as "under the table" and "discreet," Gozman
said that Medvedev's other option was to rely upon United
Russia's more liberal wing.

5. (C) Acknowledging that SPS's previous bid to serve as a
loyal opposition to the Kremlin prior to the 2007 Duma
elections had been rebuffed and the party's candidates
subjected to "black p.r. (particularly after Belykh and
Nemtsov temporarily supported Other Russia allies)," Gozman
argued that SPS had little alternative but to seek an
accommodation, which would give party members access to
senior government positions (and attendant administrative
resources) and a freer hand in regional elections, at a time
when members were shut out of the Duma. Party members were
"tired of demonstrations" and fights with the Kremlin that
precluded any near-term access to political power; Other
Russia was unacceptable -- Stalinists and Communists were
worse than Putin. Relying on a chess analogy, Gozman said
that SPS had reached the stage where any move resulted in a
worsening of position. The party was essentially bankrupt,
with party leaders writing personal checks to ride out the
next few months. There was "no chance" for independent
survival, much less political victory.


6. (C) Predicting that the party's course would not be
clear until the dacha season closed in September, Gozman
pointed to two unpublicized meetings with Chubais as evidence
of the on-going maneuvering. Medvedev, who invited Chubais
to dinner following the successful privatization of RAO UES,
reportedly spent three hours discussing the lay of the land,
expressing respect for Chubais, as well as sympathy for his
political situation. Similarly, Putin invited Chubais to an
off the record chat, the first personal contact between the
two since the Duma elections. As a result of these
conversations, Chubais expected to be appointed Director
General of Rosnanotech, replacing Leonid Melamed, by the end
of August. (Left unsaid by Gozman was the role Rosnanotech
could play in replenishing SPS coffers, replacing RAO UES as
the opposition party's trough for administrative resources.)

Yabloko Reevaluates Strategy Also
--------------


7. (C) Yabloko's Mitrokhin confided to us in a recent
meeting that Yavlinskiy's departure would allow joint action
with other parties, such as SPS, albeit on his party's
strictly stipulated terms. Reiterating conditions for
cooperating with SPS that earlier had been laid down by
ex-party chief Yavlinskiy -- the need to merge with Yabloko,
the stepping aside of 1990's era political figures --
Mitrokhin said he was amenable to discussing a union like
that achieved during the 2005 Moscow City Duma elections.
Gozman confirmed to us that Mitrokhin was "easier to deal
with" and that a concordat was possible, despite Yavlinskiy's
intent to serve as a shadow leader from the wings. While
Mitrokhin insisted that Yabloko was an opposition party, he
conceded his members' interest in finding a constructive way
to work with the current government, as evidenced by
Yavlinskiy's March 2008 meeting with Putin. The party faced
numerous hurdles, including financial problems stemming from
business reluctance to contribute to a non-Kremlin blessed
party; lack of access to the national media; and the apathy
of liberal voters. Mitrokhin downplayed internal party
divisions, especially between Yabloko's St. Petersburg
faction and representatives in Moscow, and noted that all
party members except four -- Yabloko renegades Reznik and
Yashin included -- agreed on ways to move forward at the
Fifteenth Congress.


8. (C) Political observers believe that Yabloko's future
hinges on the post-Yavlinskiy leadership's ability to
compromise. Mikhail Vinogradov, General Director of the
Center for Current Politics, commented that "the decay of the
party is a more likely future unless it is chosen by the
state as the major democratic party in Russia." Political
scientist Dmitriy Oreshkin disagreed in part with skeptics,
believing Mitrokhin would bring change "along the lines of
organization and personnel." Whether Yavlinskiy, whose
political principles produced political gridlock among the
Russian opposition, will allow Mitrokhin, a simpler man of
action, to lead the party in a new direction without
interference remains to be seen.

Unity -- Past its Sell Date
--------------


9. (C) Kremlin-insider and incoming director of the GOR's
Democracy Institute in New York, Andranik Migranyan was among
those experts who questioned whether Medvedev needed the
baggage-laden parties of the 1990's, predicting to us a
bolstering of liberal elements within United Russia instead.
After several years of SPS and Yabloko flirtations,
Alekseyeva also downplayed the party machinations, commenting
wryly that Americans were giving the Russian opposition more
than their due share of attention. Recalling that Ryzhkov, a
"good, honest speaker," had pleaded with the other opposition
leaders to forget about past differences and move forward,
Alekseyeva noted that Mitrokhin had countered with more
rhetoric about the purity of the Yabloko brand.

Checkmate for Kasparov
--------------


10. (C) While some political analysts, such as Stanislav
Kulakov, continue to argue for a "horizontal" opposition
structure that includes all groups, including Other Russia
and its spin-off "National Assembly," the mainstream
opposition appears to have united around dislike of Garry
Kasparov -- a reference to whom left Alekseyeva sputtering in
anger. She categorically stated that Kasparov would not have
a future in Russian politics and decried his duplicitous
methods in manipulating the Other Russia movement. Alekseyeva
pointedly noted that she would not work with him in the
future, hoping to avoid the intrigue and back-biting that
Kasparov brought to the opposition efforts.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) This opposition dance seems awfully familiar and
its relevance -- in a United Russia-dominated, post-election
landscape -- appears negligible. If the Kremlin succeeds in
wooing SPS, it's record of tactical brilliance in coopting
the national opposition leadership will be further
embellished, although its unclear whether the senior
opposition standard bearers can bring along their more
radical (and youthful) members. For the older generation of
opposition leaders, the prospect of influencing
decisionmaking and winning a Medvedev administration over to
a more moderate course is the preferred alternative to life
in the political wilderness, where extinction is a real
possibility.
RUBIN