GEORGIA: RUSSIA MAY NOT ATTEND BERLIN FRIENDS'

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002152

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA MAY NOT ATTEND BERLIN FRIENDS'
MEETING

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.
4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The MFA told us July 25 that Russia had
"nobody appropriate" to send to the Friends' meeting in
Berlin next week. German Embassy officials confirmed that
MFA 4th CIS Director Kelin told German envoy Lukas July 24
that they would try to find someone to attend the meeting,
but with him and DFM Karasin both on leave, he was not sure
they had anyone to send. They added they planned to
introduce a UNSC Presidential Statement July 25 that they
hoped would encourage the Georgians and Abkhaz to participate
in the Berlin meeting. MFA told us that while Russia "in
principle" supported Germany's three-stage approach, they
continued to believe a non-use of force (NUF) statement was
the essential first step. The MFA confirmed that Russia
would withdraw its railroad troops by the end of July, saying
their work was completed. They added that withdrawal of
Russian paratroopers could occur, but only after Georgia
removed the bulk of its forces from Kodori and some degree of
confidence and stability was restored. The GOR did not
support the idea of a "new" monitoring or policing force in
Abkhazia, but would not object to UNOMIG increasing the
number of its policemen to 40 or 50, some of whom could be
sent to upper Kodori. The GOR did not plan to unveil any new
"surprises" from the April Instructions in the near-term, but
defended Putin's initiative. Russia was ready to reconfirm
the principle of the right of IDP return, but it was too soon
to discuss a concrete proposal. Russia would not "abandon"
South Ossetia leader Kokoity before the 2011 elections, but
was concerned Kokoity might take some "impulsive steps." End
summary.

Berlin Friends' Meeting, UNSC PRST
--------------


2. (C) MFA 4th CIS Deputy Directors Dmitriy Tarabrin and
Semyon Grigoriev told us July 25 that Russia would not have
anyone appropriate to send to the Friends, meeting in Berlin
next week. Director Kelin was going on vacation July 26 and
would be gone for a month (Tarabrin would be acting),and DFM
Karasin did not return from vacation until August 4. In
response to the Germans, invitation to DFM Kislyak, they
said that Kislyak did not cover these issues and would not be
appropriate. They added that the meeting needed to have a
"positive agenda that could yield concrete results." They
said Russia was not telling Abkhazia not to go to Berlin, but
expressed skepticism that Abkhazia would agree to meet.


3. (C) German Embassy officials told us Kelin had also told
Lukas July 24 that he and DFM Karasin would both be on leave,
so he was not sure the MFA would be able to find someone at
the appropriate rank to attend the meeting, but they would
try. The officials added that Germany intended to introduce
a Presidential Statement at the UN Security Council July 25
and hoped it would help persuade the Georgians and Abkhaz to
agree to talks.

German Plan
--------------


4. (C) Tarabrin said that in principle Russia approved of the
German plan's general three-stage, step-by-step, approach,
but did not agree with the sequencing. He reiterated that
there needed to be a NUF first. Regarding Georgia's
insistence on Russian steps - withdrawal of the railroad
forces and Russian paratroopers, and cancellation or
moratorium on implementation of the April 16 Instructions -
Tarabrin confirmed press reports that the railroad troops
would be withdrawn by the end of the month. Any further
repairs would be done by the Ministry of Transport.
Withdrawal of Russian paratroopers could not be a preliminary
condition, he said, but once Georgia withdrew the bulk of its
forces from Kodori and a degree of confidence and stability
had been restored, the Russian forces could be removed. He
added that Georgia could keep "some policemen" there, but the
"main Georgian force" needed to be withdrawn. Tarabrin said
he had told UNOMIG representative Ramcharan that Russia did
not object to increasing the number of UNOMIG policemen to
"40 or 50," some of which could be sent to the upper Kodori
Valley. Grigoriev noted that Abkhaz views had hardened over
the last several months; whereas leaders earlier were
amenable to a partial GOG withdrawal of forces, now demands
for a total pull-out were ascendant.


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5. (C) Russia had "no surprises" or additional initiatives
tied to the April 16 Instructions planned for the near-term,
but Tarabrin defended Putin's "principled stand," as the
instructions were purely humanitarian in nature, designed to
help the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During
Georgian DFM's visit to Moscow and DFM Karasin's trip to
Tbilisi in June, the GOR had suggested that Russia and
Georgia cooperate in the reconstruction of Abkhazia, and
proposed using Russia's April Instructions as a basis for
that cooperation.

Refugees and IDP Return
--------------


6. (C) Tarabrin said FM Lavrov had reiterated to the
Secretary July 21 that Russia supported the principle of
return of refugees and Internally Displaced Person (IDPs),
and was ready to reconfirm it. But, the GOR did not believe
it was possible to elaborate a concrete proposal at this
time. The return of some 200,000 refugees and IDPs would
cause violence and clashes, and the sides were not ready for
it. The GOR did not believe the issue should be included in
the same document as the NUF. We noted that Phase One
underscored the principle of the right of return; there was
no expectation of an immediate influx.


7. (C) There was a possibility that Medvedev and Saakashvili
might meet on the margins of the CIS meeting September 5-6,
Tarabrin said, and the GOR's offer to meet in Sochi was still
on the table.

South Ossetia
--------------


8. (C) Russian JCC Ambassador Yuri Popov told us Russia was
"not going to abandon" Kokoity before the 2011 elections, but
said that Kokoity was "getting jealous" of the attention
given to Bagapsh, and Popov was concerned he might take some
"impulsive steps." Popov said that he had sought to engage
Yakobashvili on the issue of rehabilitation and return of
refugees in South Ossetia, but had not received an answer.
He expressed concern at the increase in violence in the
region, but repeated the GOR assessment that some of the
incidents, such as the attack on Sanakoyev's car, had been
staged. He said Sanakoyev was seen as a traitor by and had
no support from the populace. Russia had intelligence that
had indicated Georgia intended to commence a "meaningful
military action" in South Ossetia, which had prompted
Russia's overflight, but thanks partially to U.S.
intervention, the moderates in Tbilisi had prevailed and
prevented the action. Popov said he would meet with
Yakobashvili in Tbilisi next Wednesday.

RUBIN