GEORGIA: RUSSIA MAY NOT ATTEND BERLIN FRIENDS'

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002152 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA MAY NOT ATTEND BERLIN FRIENDS' MEETING Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1. 4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The MFA told us July 25 that Russia had "nobody appropriate" to send to the Friends' meeting in Berlin next week. German Embassy officials confirmed that MFA 4th CIS Director Kelin told German envoy Lukas July 24 that they would try to find someone to attend the meeting, but with him and DFM Karasin both on leave, he was not sure they had anyone to send. They added they planned to introduce a UNSC Presidential Statement July 25 that they hoped would encourage the Georgians and Abkhaz to participate in the Berlin meeting. MFA told us that while Russia "in principle" supported Germany's three-stage approach, they continued to believe a non-use of force (NUF) statement was the essential first step. The MFA confirmed that Russia would withdraw its railroad troops by the end of July, saying their work was completed. They added that withdrawal of Russian paratroopers could occur, but only after Georgia removed the bulk of its forces from Kodori and some degree of confidence and stability was restored. The GOR did not support the idea of a "new" monitoring or policing force in Abkhazia, but would not object to UNOMIG increasing the number of its policemen to 40 or 50, some of whom could be sent to upper Kodori. The GOR did not plan to unveil any new "surprises" from the April Instructions in the near-term, but defended Putin's initiative. Russia was ready to reconfirm the principle of the right of IDP return, but it was too soon to discuss a concrete proposal. Russia would not "abandon" South Ossetia leader Kokoity before the 2011 elections, but was concerned Kokoity might take some "impulsive steps." End summary. Berlin Friends' Meeting, UNSC PRST -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA 4th CIS Deputy Directors Dmitriy Tarabrin and Semyon Grigoriev told us July 25 that Russia would not have anyone appropriate to send to the Friends, meeting in Berlin next week. Director Kelin was going on vacation July 26 and would be gone for a month (Tarabrin would be acting),and DFM Karasin did not return from vacation until August 4. In response to the Germans, invitation to DFM Kislyak, they said that Kislyak did not cover these issues and would not be appropriate. They added that the meeting needed to have a "positive agenda that could yield concrete results." They said Russia was not telling Abkhazia not to go to Berlin, but expressed skepticism that Abkhazia would agree to meet. ¶3. (C) German Embassy officials told us Kelin had also told Lukas July 24 that he and DFM Karasin would both be on leave, so he was not sure the MFA would be able to find someone at the appropriate rank to attend the meeting, but they would try. The officials added that Germany intended to introduce a Presidential Statement at the UN Security Council July 25 and hoped it would help persuade the Georgians and Abkhaz to agree to talks. German Plan -------------- ¶4. (C) Tarabrin said that in principle Russia approved of the German plan's general three-stage, step-by-step, approach, but did not agree with the sequencing. He reiterated that there needed to be a NUF first. Regarding Georgia's insistence on Russian steps - withdrawal of the railroad forces and Russian paratroopers, and cancellation or moratorium on implementation of the April 16 Instructions - Tarabrin confirmed press reports that the railroad troops would be withdrawn by the end of the month. Any further repairs would be done by the Ministry of Transport. Withdrawal of Russian paratroopers could not be a preliminary condition, he said, but once Georgia withdrew the bulk of its forces from Kodori and a degree of confidence and stability had been restored, the Russian forces could be removed. He added that Georgia could keep "some policemen" there, but the "main Georgian force" needed to be withdrawn. Tarabrin said he had told UNOMIG representative Ramcharan that Russia did not object to increasing the number of UNOMIG policemen to "40 or 50," some of which could be sent to the upper Kodori Valley. Grigoriev noted that Abkhaz views had hardened over the last several months; whereas leaders earlier were amenable to a partial GOG withdrawal of forces, now demands for a total pull-out were ascendant. MOSCOW 00002152 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Russia had "no surprises" or additional initiatives tied to the April 16 Instructions planned for the near-term, but Tarabrin defended Putin's "principled stand," as the instructions were purely humanitarian in nature, designed to help the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During Georgian DFM's visit to Moscow and DFM Karasin's trip to Tbilisi in June, the GOR had suggested that Russia and Georgia cooperate in the reconstruction of Abkhazia, and proposed using Russia's April Instructions as a basis for that cooperation. Refugees and IDP Return -------------- ¶6. (C) Tarabrin said FM Lavrov had reiterated to the Secretary July 21 that Russia supported the principle of return of refugees and Internally Displaced Person (IDPs), and was ready to reconfirm it. But, the GOR did not believe it was possible to elaborate a concrete proposal at this time. The return of some 200,000 refugees and IDPs would cause violence and clashes, and the sides were not ready for it. The GOR did not believe the issue should be included in the same document as the NUF. We noted that Phase One underscored the principle of the right of return; there was no expectation of an immediate influx. ¶7. (C) There was a possibility that Medvedev and Saakashvili might meet on the margins of the CIS meeting September 5-6, Tarabrin said, and the GOR's offer to meet in Sochi was still on the table. South Ossetia -------------- ¶8. (C) Russian JCC Ambassador Yuri Popov told us Russia was "not going to abandon" Kokoity before the 2011 elections, but said that Kokoity was "getting jealous" of the attention given to Bagapsh, and Popov was concerned he might take some "impulsive steps." Popov said that he had sought to engage Yakobashvili on the issue of rehabilitation and return of refugees in South Ossetia, but had not received an answer. He expressed concern at the increase in violence in the region, but repeated the GOR assessment that some of the incidents, such as the attack on Sanakoyev's car, had been staged. He said Sanakoyev was seen as a traitor by and had no support from the populace. Russia had intelligence that had indicated Georgia intended to commence a "meaningful military action" in South Ossetia, which had prompted Russia's overflight, but thanks partially to U.S. intervention, the moderates in Tbilisi had prevailed and prevented the action. Popov said he would meet with Yakobashvili in Tbilisi next Wednesday. RUBIN