MEDVEDEV DENIES RENEGING ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002118

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ZI RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV DENIES RENEGING ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL
ZIMBABWE DEAL

REF: MOSCOW 1996 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric Rubin. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. President Medvedev vehemently denied July 22
that he committed to agree on UN Security Council (UNSC)
sanctions on Zimbabwe at the G8 meeting in Japan. While
acknowledging concerns about the situation in Zimbabwe,
Medvedev maintained that he had insisted that all mention of
the UNSC be dropped from the G8 statement, and that African
leaders be given time to work with the two sides. The MFA
also issued a statement July 21, harshly criticizing UK
Foreign Secretary Miliband's comments about Russia's action
on Zimbabwe. While some experts speculate that Medvedev was
reined in by Putin after the G8, most believe his actions at
the G8 have been misinterpreted. Chinese diplomats tell us
Russia pressured China strongly to veto the UNSC resolution,
rather than abstain. End summary.

Medvedev, MFA Deny Commitment Broken
--------------


2. (SBU) Russian media reported widely on U.S. and UK anger
over Medvedev's perceived reneging of a deal reached at the
G8 to agree to a UNSC resolution imposing sanctions on
Zimbabwe. During his press conference following a meeting
with Venezuelan President Chavez July 22 (septel),Medvedev
categorically denied that he had made and then walked back a
commitment to impose sanctions. Medvedev said that the G8
leaders had discussed their concerns over the situation and
conduct of elections in Zimbabwe, and had a common position
which had been contained in the G8 Declaration. But, he
said, "we did not agree to adopt sanctions immediately in the
UNSC." On the contrary, Medvedev maintained that he had
insisted on excluding any mention of the UNSC in the
Declaration because he believed then, and he still believed
now, that the UNSC should concern itself with questions under
the Charter of the UN. Medvedev said that from the beginning
of the discussions, he had told his G8 colleagues that it was
necessary to let the African representatives work on the
problem together with the Zimbabwe authorities and
opposition, to give them the opportunity to hold
consultations. Medvedev continued that the events on the
ground had since proved his position was the correct one,
pointing to the agreement reached by Mugabe and Tsvangirai,
with the mediation of South African President Mbeki, to
overcome their disagreements.


3. (SBU) On July 21, the MFA had issued a strong retort to UK
FS Miliband's comments that Russia's veto of the UNSCR on
Zimbabwe had been "incomprehensible," and contrary to the
commitment Russia had made at the G8 "to take further steps
including introducing financial and other sanctions." The
MFA statement took exception to the "distortion" of Russia's
position on Zimbabwe, driven by the "mythical" violations of
a G8 agreement. It claimed that the references to "financial
and other measures against those responsible for the violence
in Zimbabwe" did not constitute an obligation to support the
U.S. UNSCR draft. The statement reiterated Russia's
arguments that the situation in Zimbabwe did not pose a
threat to international peace and security, and thus did not
warrant the imposition of sanctions. It also stated that a
solution to Zimbabwe's "internal" problems would be found
through dialogue between the political factions, and said
Russia had acted in accordance with the positions of the
African Union and Development Community of South Africa.

Experts Mostly Believe Situation was Misinterpreted
-------------- --------------


4. (C) While several of the experts we spoke to believed
Medvedev had been made to change his position on the Zimbabwe
resolution following his return to Moscow after the G8, most
believed Medvedev's stand had been misinterpreted by the West
and the press. They pointed out that Russia's decision to
vote against the resolution was consistent with its policy
that the UNSC should "not interfere" in the internal affairs
of other nations.


5. (C) Carnegie Center's Dmitry Trenin dismissed speculation
that Medvedev had "gotten his instructions wrong" in Japan or
was reined in after the fact, noting that the President was a
"lawyer's lawyer," carefully briefed, with Kremlin Foreign
Policy Adviser Sergey Prikhodko by his side. Russian
opposition to "outside interference" dated back to the
1990,s and constituted a "fundamental tenet" of Russian
foreign policy; Medvedev would not undertake an uncleared
initiative - "he's no Khrushchev." Trenin suggested that
Russia had attempted some "preemptive diplomacy," seeking to
placate the West with condemnation of Mugabe, while stopping
short of calling for intervention in the G8 statement. Since
Zimbabwe was not important to Russia, with Mugabe a longtime
"Beijing man," the cost of the condemnation to Russia was
negligible. It was not inconsistent, Trenin argued, for
Russia to insist on the Security Council as the proper locale
for a discussion of sanctions, despite having no intention of
supporting a U.S. resolution. In public musings, which he
reiterated to us, Trenin speculated that the U.S. sought to
put pressure on Medvedev with the Security Council vote,
knowing full well the standing Russian instructions at the
UN. Trenin, who credited Medvedev with a satisfactory
foreign policy performance to date, was willing to see an
element of Western cynicism in seeking to "besmirch" Medvedev
with charges of backsliding.


6. (C) Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Institute for African Studies Vladimir Shubin also believed
that Russia's veto was consistent with long-standing Russian
policy, but noted that Russia did not have many interests in
southern Africa and therefore preferred to let African
leaders solve their own problems.

China Pressured by Russia to Veto
--------------


7. (C) Chinese diplomats (please protect) told us that Russia
pushed China hard to veto, and that China had decided to go
along because "Russia expected much from us on this."
RUBIN