MEDVEDEV DENIES RENEGING ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002118 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ZI RS SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV DENIES RENEGING ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL ZIMBABWE DEAL REF: MOSCOW 1996 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric Rubin. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. President Medvedev vehemently denied July 22 that he committed to agree on UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Zimbabwe at the G8 meeting in Japan. While acknowledging concerns about the situation in Zimbabwe, Medvedev maintained that he had insisted that all mention of the UNSC be dropped from the G8 statement, and that African leaders be given time to work with the two sides. The MFA also issued a statement July 21, harshly criticizing UK Foreign Secretary Miliband's comments about Russia's action on Zimbabwe. While some experts speculate that Medvedev was reined in by Putin after the G8, most believe his actions at the G8 have been misinterpreted. Chinese diplomats tell us Russia pressured China strongly to veto the UNSC resolution, rather than abstain. End summary. Medvedev, MFA Deny Commitment Broken -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Russian media reported widely on U.S. and UK anger over Medvedev's perceived reneging of a deal reached at the G8 to agree to a UNSC resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. During his press conference following a meeting with Venezuelan President Chavez July 22 (septel),Medvedev categorically denied that he had made and then walked back a commitment to impose sanctions. Medvedev said that the G8 leaders had discussed their concerns over the situation and conduct of elections in Zimbabwe, and had a common position which had been contained in the G8 Declaration. But, he said, "we did not agree to adopt sanctions immediately in the UNSC." On the contrary, Medvedev maintained that he had insisted on excluding any mention of the UNSC in the Declaration because he believed then, and he still believed now, that the UNSC should concern itself with questions under the Charter of the UN. Medvedev said that from the beginning of the discussions, he had told his G8 colleagues that it was necessary to let the African representatives work on the problem together with the Zimbabwe authorities and opposition, to give them the opportunity to hold consultations. Medvedev continued that the events on the ground had since proved his position was the correct one, pointing to the agreement reached by Mugabe and Tsvangirai, with the mediation of South African President Mbeki, to overcome their disagreements. ¶3. (SBU) On July 21, the MFA had issued a strong retort to UK FS Miliband's comments that Russia's veto of the UNSCR on Zimbabwe had been "incomprehensible," and contrary to the commitment Russia had made at the G8 "to take further steps including introducing financial and other sanctions." The MFA statement took exception to the "distortion" of Russia's position on Zimbabwe, driven by the "mythical" violations of a G8 agreement. It claimed that the references to "financial and other measures against those responsible for the violence in Zimbabwe" did not constitute an obligation to support the U.S. UNSCR draft. The statement reiterated Russia's arguments that the situation in Zimbabwe did not pose a threat to international peace and security, and thus did not warrant the imposition of sanctions. It also stated that a solution to Zimbabwe's "internal" problems would be found through dialogue between the political factions, and said Russia had acted in accordance with the positions of the African Union and Development Community of South Africa. Experts Mostly Believe Situation was Misinterpreted -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) While several of the experts we spoke to believed Medvedev had been made to change his position on the Zimbabwe resolution following his return to Moscow after the G8, most believed Medvedev's stand had been misinterpreted by the West and the press. They pointed out that Russia's decision to vote against the resolution was consistent with its policy that the UNSC should "not interfere" in the internal affairs of other nations. ¶5. (C) Carnegie Center's Dmitry Trenin dismissed speculation that Medvedev had "gotten his instructions wrong" in Japan or was reined in after the fact, noting that the President was a "lawyer's lawyer," carefully briefed, with Kremlin Foreign Policy Adviser Sergey Prikhodko by his side. Russian opposition to "outside interference" dated back to the 1990,s and constituted a "fundamental tenet" of Russian foreign policy; Medvedev would not undertake an uncleared initiative - "he's no Khrushchev." Trenin suggested that Russia had attempted some "preemptive diplomacy," seeking to placate the West with condemnation of Mugabe, while stopping short of calling for intervention in the G8 statement. Since Zimbabwe was not important to Russia, with Mugabe a longtime "Beijing man," the cost of the condemnation to Russia was negligible. It was not inconsistent, Trenin argued, for Russia to insist on the Security Council as the proper locale for a discussion of sanctions, despite having no intention of supporting a U.S. resolution. In public musings, which he reiterated to us, Trenin speculated that the U.S. sought to put pressure on Medvedev with the Security Council vote, knowing full well the standing Russian instructions at the UN. Trenin, who credited Medvedev with a satisfactory foreign policy performance to date, was willing to see an element of Western cynicism in seeking to "besmirch" Medvedev with charges of backsliding. ¶6. (C) Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute for African Studies Vladimir Shubin also believed that Russia's veto was consistent with long-standing Russian policy, but noted that Russia did not have many interests in southern Africa and therefore preferred to let African leaders solve their own problems. China Pressured by Russia to Veto -------------- ¶7. (C) Chinese diplomats (please protect) told us that Russia pushed China hard to veto, and that China had decided to go along because "Russia expected much from us on this." RUBIN