AMBASSADOR'S JULY 17 MEETING WITH DFM KISLYAK:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002055

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM NATO GG IR RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JULY 17 MEETING WITH DFM KISLYAK:
KUZNETSOV, MILES, IRAN, GEORGIA, MISSILE DEFENSE, EURO
SECURITY TREATY, CFE, CTR, JDEC

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. During a 1 1/2 hour meeting July 17, the
Ambassador and DFM Sergey Kislyak reviewed key issues in the
relationship and agreed on the need to emphasize the positive
areas of cooperation, as the Sochi Strategic Declaration had
done. The Ambassador told Kislyak we expected a decision on
the Kuznetsov case soon. Kislyak described his conversation
impressing on the Iranian Ambassador the significance of U/S
Burns' participation in the P5 1 meetings with Iran that
weekend. He said Russia saw a non-use of force agreement by
Georgia as a first step as a way of opening up other steps.
Ambassador said Russia would also need to take steps.
Kislyak reiterated familiar arguments on missile defense, but
noted he would be willing to hold another delegation meeting
with U/S Rood, but stressed it needed to be before the end of
July. He described Medvedev's proposal for a new European
security architecture, emphasizing it was intended to be
inclusive while protecting Russia's security. The Ambassador
and Kislyak also briefly touched on the Conventional Forces
in Europe Treaty (CFE),the Cooperative Threat Reduction
agreement (CTR),the meeting of Joint Data Exchange Center
(JDEC) experts, and digital library cooperation. End summary.

Cooperation, Miles and Kuznetsov Cases
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador and Kislyak discussed areas of
disagreement and cooperation in the relationship, noting that
it was important to build on the Sochi Strategic Declaration
and to get the message out more clearly to our publics.
Kislyak said the Declaration had shown that not only could
the U.S. and Russia cooperate together; we were cooperating.
The Ambassador agreed, citing as one example that we had
issued 35,000 visas to Russian students to participate in the
work-travel program in the U.S. this summer, and commenting
that we needed to look at ways to bring more American
students to Russia. He expressed appreciation for the MFA's
efforts on Pastor Miles' behalf. Kislyak said he was glad
the case was resolved, but noted it was unprecedented; nobody
had ever been sentenced to a "suspended sentence" before. He
said that while it was recognized Miles' action had been
unintended, it was still a very serious crime to enter Russia
with a weapon and without permits.


3. (C) Kislyak immediately raised the case of Vladimir
Kuznetsov, and requested that the State Department become
more actively involved. He stressed that the GOR had taken
all of the steps we had asked them to do; the Russian court
had sentenced Kuznetsov, and all the legal requirements had
been met. He noted that FM Lavrov had spoken to the
Secretary and sent a letter to her about the case the
previous week. The Ambassador told Kislyak the Secretary had
spoken to the Attorney General, and a decision was imminent.
It was important that Russia not question the verdict, and
respect the terms of the sentence. He said U/S Burns and the
Secretary would likely discuss the issue in their respective
meetings with Kislyak and FM Lavrov over the next few days.

Iran
--------------


4. (S) Kislyak said he had spoken to the Iranian Ambassador
to convey the importance of U/S Burns, participation in the
P5 1 talks in Geneva this weekend. He said he told the
Iranian this did not mean a change in the P5 1 position but
showed that all six took the proposal seriously, and were
together on it and in supporting Solana. Recognizing that
U/S Burns would not be in Geneva to negotiate, Kislyak had
said it was an opportunity to "negotiate to negotiate." In
response to Ambassador Beyrle's question ,he said he did not
know how the Iranians would respond, but he did not expect a
sudden change in their policy, or full acceptance of the P5 1
proposals. It would be a difficult negotiation, he expected,
but if the Iranians "extended their hand, we should grab it
and pull them forward." Kislyak added he may go to Tehran
next week after the meetings in Geneva.


5. (S) The Ambassador delivered the Iran/Igla-S MANPADS
demarche (septel). Kislyak said he would look into the
concerns, but if we had more specific info, it would help the
GOR investigation. He said Russia had tight export controls
for such types of systems, and such a transfer would need to
have the approval of the GOR, which had not been given.

MOSCOW 00002055 002 OF 004



Georgia
--------------


6. (C) Kislyak said if we could get Saakashvili to agree to a
non-use of force pledge as a first step, it would open up the
possibilities for many more steps afterward. The Ambassador
emphasized that Russia would be expected to take more steps
also. Kislyak said that depended on what steps, but said
Russian steps were less important. The most important thing
was for Georgia to agree to non-use of force. Saakashvili
was saying lots of calm things, but the reality on the ground
was different. There needed to be a commitment, borne out by
steps on the ground.


7. (S) Georgia HEU Sample: The Ambassador raised the
possibility of moving a 10-gram sample of HEU recovered by
Georgian authorities in 2006 from the U.S. to Russia for
forensic tests. Kislyak said it was difficult for the GOR to
send a plane to pick up the sample, but they were still
interested in bringing it to Russia. He said he needed to
move the issue through interagency process, but would
continue to work on it.

Missile Defense
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador conveyed U/S Rood,s request that
Kislyak identify dates for the next Missile Defense
delegation meeting and stressed the importance of holding the
meeting. Kislyak said he would need to check with the other
agencies, but that the meeting would have to take place
before the end of July as he was going on leave for four
weeks starting the beginning of August. He undertook to get
back to us with dates by Tuesday, but emphasized it would be
easier if the meeting were held in Moscow.


9. (C) Kislyak reiterated many familiar arguments about the
lack of specificity in the transparency and
confidence-building measure (TCBM) proposals, the U.S.
allegedly "walking back" its proposals, and lack of responses
to specific questions. The problem with the TCBMs, he said,
was that they kept getting watered down, either by the U.S.
or by the Poles and Czechs. For Russia, presence of Russian
experts at the Polish and Czech sites was critical; anything
less gave the U.S. the ability to change the system
("interruptors could be removed in five minutes"). But,
Kislyak said, the Poles and Czechs had told him Russian
"presence" was out of the question. The Poles had told him
it would "interfere with Polish-American decisionmaking" at
the site; the Czechs told him they could not accept any
Russian combat units on Czech soil. Kislyak said he told
them Russia was not planning to send combat units; it would
send "normal, unarmed people" attached to the Embassy. But
the Czechs just kept saying they could not accept Russian
troops on their ground.


10. (C) Kislyak said the idea of reciprocity was also
"unreasonable." The GOR was not planning to put missiles
next to the U.S. border, so it was hard to understand the
logic behind the concept of reciprocity. Russia was not
trying to convince the U.S., Poland or the Czech Republic its
ABM capabilities were not aimed at them; they were designed
to address incoming American missiles.


11. (C) Kislyak also contended that the U.S. was not
answering the GOR's questions. The GOR had said an important
TCBM for them was not placing the interceptors in the silos,
but when the GOR had asked if it could be assured that not a
single missile would be placed, there was no answer. Now, he
was hearing that maybe "some" interceptors would be loaded.
He said the U.S. kept speaking in generalities, but the GOR
needed the USG experts to describe the specifications and
capabilities of the system. "We still cannot get from you
exactly what it is you're offering us," Kislyak said, and
urged U/S Rood to have more specific details at the next
meeting.


12. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern that harsh MFA
statements like the July 8 criticism of the signing of the
deal between the U.S. and the Czech Republic perpetuated the
argument that there could be a military confrontation, risked
the dispute affecting other issues in the relationship, and
fueled the perception that the MD interceptors posed a threat

MOSCOW 00002055 003 OF 004


to Russia. "They do," Kislyak said, and stressed that the
issue was not about 10 interceptors; it was about the U.S.
bringing part of its strategic defense closer to Russian
borders. The system, especially the Czech radar, would be
used to service other assets (AEGIS, air-based lasers,
space-based system, etc.). He emphasized that the GOR was
trying not to let the disagreement over MD spill over into
other areas, noting that the GOR kept it separate from areas
where we cooperate. He stressed that the cut in Czech oil
supplies (septel) "had nothing to do" with the signing of the
MD agreement with the Czech Republic.

European Security Treaty/Summit
--------------


13. (SBU) Euro Security Treaty/Summit: In response to
Ambassador's question about Medvedev's proposal for a new
European security architecture, Kislyak reiterated that the
GOR saw this as a "multifaceted" agreement on security in
Europe that would cover Russia and end the dividing lines and
"vestiges of the Cold War" in Europe. It would be inclusive,
but was not intended to replace existing institutions like
NATO or the OSCE. The key would be that it would provide
"security, predictability, and reliability." The current
situation did not favor Russian security; NATO was expanding
at Russia's expense; the CFE Treaty was under threat due to
"your unwillingness to ratify it;" and NATO was "pocketing
quotas" from new NATO allies under CFE. There were double
standards "all over Europe." The concept included not just
arms control, but envisioned a comprehensive system that
would enable all to work together to ensure security and, of
increasing importance to Russia, predictability. It could,
for instance, take the OSCE back to its original
"four-basket" roots, whereas now the OSCE really focused only
on one basket. The Agreement should be legally binding, and
"of course," the U.S. and Canada would be part of the effort.


14. (C) The Ambassador said we hoped discussion of the new
security concept would not come at the expense of cooperation
with existing institutions - work in the NATO-Russia Council
could be strengthened. In response, Kislyak mentioned the
"Alliance within Alliance" idea that had been discussed some
years previously, but the question had been against whom
should such an Alliance act? Russia had rejected it being
against its neighbors, but had liked the idea of it being
against new threats and challenges. But the GOR had found
that when the idea was presented to other NATO allies, they
had gotten scared. Many had not even liked the idea of joint
decision-making in the NRC. He concluded saying the new
security architecture was not a trick; Medvedev was very
interested in building a new security environment around
Russia that was stable and predictable, and he personally
favored the concept (note: Medvedev mentioned it in his
speech to Ambassadors and in Russia's new "Concepts of
Foreign Policy" issued on July 16 (reftels).

JDEC
--------------


15. (SBU) The Ambassador asked if Kislyak could confirm
August 5-7 dates for the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC)
site security and legal tax discussions. Kislyak said he had
information that "the military is ready to meet in August,"
but no other details, and would have his staff check.

CFE/CTR
--------------


16. (SBU) Kislyak confirmed Antonov would meet A/S Fried in
New York July 29 to discuss CFE. Kislyak said it was an
issue in which we were "moving in circles." He also noted
that the GOR had recently ratified the Cooperative Threat
Reduction umbrella agreement.

Digital Library Cooperation
--------------


17. (U) Kislyak raised the possibility of "digital library
cooperation," saying that the new library in St. Petersburg
named for Boris Yeltsin, while not a Presidential Library in
the U.S. sense, would be a digital library and contain a
history of the State in Russia from the Middle Ages through
the Yeltsin years. He had discussed the idea of cooperation
between the Library and the U.S. Library of Congress with

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Librarian of Congress Billington, who was interested in
exploring the idea. They had established several working
groups and were looking at the possibility of a political
and/or legal agreement between the two libraries. The
Yeltsin Library was expected to be completed by the end of
2008 and inaugurated sometime in 2009.
BEYRLE