AMBASSADOR'S JULY 17 MEETING WITH DFM KISLYAK:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002055 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM NATO GG IR RS SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JULY 17 MEETING WITH DFM KISLYAK: KUZNETSOV, MILES, IRAN, GEORGIA, MISSILE DEFENSE, EURO SECURITY TREATY, CFE, CTR, JDEC Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. During a 1 1/2 hour meeting July 17, the Ambassador and DFM Sergey Kislyak reviewed key issues in the relationship and agreed on the need to emphasize the positive areas of cooperation, as the Sochi Strategic Declaration had done. The Ambassador told Kislyak we expected a decision on the Kuznetsov case soon. Kislyak described his conversation impressing on the Iranian Ambassador the significance of U/S Burns' participation in the P5 1 meetings with Iran that weekend. He said Russia saw a non-use of force agreement by Georgia as a first step as a way of opening up other steps. Ambassador said Russia would also need to take steps. Kislyak reiterated familiar arguments on missile defense, but noted he would be willing to hold another delegation meeting with U/S Rood, but stressed it needed to be before the end of July. He described Medvedev's proposal for a new European security architecture, emphasizing it was intended to be inclusive while protecting Russia's security. The Ambassador and Kislyak also briefly touched on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE),the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement (CTR),the meeting of Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) experts, and digital library cooperation. End summary. Cooperation, Miles and Kuznetsov Cases -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and Kislyak discussed areas of disagreement and cooperation in the relationship, noting that it was important to build on the Sochi Strategic Declaration and to get the message out more clearly to our publics. Kislyak said the Declaration had shown that not only could the U.S. and Russia cooperate together; we were cooperating. The Ambassador agreed, citing as one example that we had issued 35,000 visas to Russian students to participate in the work-travel program in the U.S. this summer, and commenting that we needed to look at ways to bring more American students to Russia. He expressed appreciation for the MFA's efforts on Pastor Miles' behalf. Kislyak said he was glad the case was resolved, but noted it was unprecedented; nobody had ever been sentenced to a "suspended sentence" before. He said that while it was recognized Miles' action had been unintended, it was still a very serious crime to enter Russia with a weapon and without permits. ¶3. (C) Kislyak immediately raised the case of Vladimir Kuznetsov, and requested that the State Department become more actively involved. He stressed that the GOR had taken all of the steps we had asked them to do; the Russian court had sentenced Kuznetsov, and all the legal requirements had been met. He noted that FM Lavrov had spoken to the Secretary and sent a letter to her about the case the previous week. The Ambassador told Kislyak the Secretary had spoken to the Attorney General, and a decision was imminent. It was important that Russia not question the verdict, and respect the terms of the sentence. He said U/S Burns and the Secretary would likely discuss the issue in their respective meetings with Kislyak and FM Lavrov over the next few days. Iran -------------- ¶4. (S) Kislyak said he had spoken to the Iranian Ambassador to convey the importance of U/S Burns, participation in the P5 1 talks in Geneva this weekend. He said he told the Iranian this did not mean a change in the P5 1 position but showed that all six took the proposal seriously, and were together on it and in supporting Solana. Recognizing that U/S Burns would not be in Geneva to negotiate, Kislyak had said it was an opportunity to "negotiate to negotiate." In response to Ambassador Beyrle's question ,he said he did not know how the Iranians would respond, but he did not expect a sudden change in their policy, or full acceptance of the P5 1 proposals. It would be a difficult negotiation, he expected, but if the Iranians "extended their hand, we should grab it and pull them forward." Kislyak added he may go to Tehran next week after the meetings in Geneva. ¶5. (S) The Ambassador delivered the Iran/Igla-S MANPADS demarche (septel). Kislyak said he would look into the concerns, but if we had more specific info, it would help the GOR investigation. He said Russia had tight export controls for such types of systems, and such a transfer would need to have the approval of the GOR, which had not been given. MOSCOW 00002055 002 OF 004 Georgia -------------- ¶6. (C) Kislyak said if we could get Saakashvili to agree to a non-use of force pledge as a first step, it would open up the possibilities for many more steps afterward. The Ambassador emphasized that Russia would be expected to take more steps also. Kislyak said that depended on what steps, but said Russian steps were less important. The most important thing was for Georgia to agree to non-use of force. Saakashvili was saying lots of calm things, but the reality on the ground was different. There needed to be a commitment, borne out by steps on the ground. ¶7. (S) Georgia HEU Sample: The Ambassador raised the possibility of moving a 10-gram sample of HEU recovered by Georgian authorities in 2006 from the U.S. to Russia for forensic tests. Kislyak said it was difficult for the GOR to send a plane to pick up the sample, but they were still interested in bringing it to Russia. He said he needed to move the issue through interagency process, but would continue to work on it. Missile Defense -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador conveyed U/S Rood,s request that Kislyak identify dates for the next Missile Defense delegation meeting and stressed the importance of holding the meeting. Kislyak said he would need to check with the other agencies, but that the meeting would have to take place before the end of July as he was going on leave for four weeks starting the beginning of August. He undertook to get back to us with dates by Tuesday, but emphasized it would be easier if the meeting were held in Moscow. ¶9. (C) Kislyak reiterated many familiar arguments about the lack of specificity in the transparency and confidence-building measure (TCBM) proposals, the U.S. allegedly "walking back" its proposals, and lack of responses to specific questions. The problem with the TCBMs, he said, was that they kept getting watered down, either by the U.S. or by the Poles and Czechs. For Russia, presence of Russian experts at the Polish and Czech sites was critical; anything less gave the U.S. the ability to change the system ("interruptors could be removed in five minutes"). But, Kislyak said, the Poles and Czechs had told him Russian "presence" was out of the question. The Poles had told him it would "interfere with Polish-American decisionmaking" at the site; the Czechs told him they could not accept any Russian combat units on Czech soil. Kislyak said he told them Russia was not planning to send combat units; it would send "normal, unarmed people" attached to the Embassy. But the Czechs just kept saying they could not accept Russian troops on their ground. ¶10. (C) Kislyak said the idea of reciprocity was also "unreasonable." The GOR was not planning to put missiles next to the U.S. border, so it was hard to understand the logic behind the concept of reciprocity. Russia was not trying to convince the U.S., Poland or the Czech Republic its ABM capabilities were not aimed at them; they were designed to address incoming American missiles. ¶11. (C) Kislyak also contended that the U.S. was not answering the GOR's questions. The GOR had said an important TCBM for them was not placing the interceptors in the silos, but when the GOR had asked if it could be assured that not a single missile would be placed, there was no answer. Now, he was hearing that maybe "some" interceptors would be loaded. He said the U.S. kept speaking in generalities, but the GOR needed the USG experts to describe the specifications and capabilities of the system. "We still cannot get from you exactly what it is you're offering us," Kislyak said, and urged U/S Rood to have more specific details at the next meeting. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern that harsh MFA statements like the July 8 criticism of the signing of the deal between the U.S. and the Czech Republic perpetuated the argument that there could be a military confrontation, risked the dispute affecting other issues in the relationship, and fueled the perception that the MD interceptors posed a threat MOSCOW 00002055 003 OF 004 to Russia. "They do," Kislyak said, and stressed that the issue was not about 10 interceptors; it was about the U.S. bringing part of its strategic defense closer to Russian borders. The system, especially the Czech radar, would be used to service other assets (AEGIS, air-based lasers, space-based system, etc.). He emphasized that the GOR was trying not to let the disagreement over MD spill over into other areas, noting that the GOR kept it separate from areas where we cooperate. He stressed that the cut in Czech oil supplies (septel) "had nothing to do" with the signing of the MD agreement with the Czech Republic. European Security Treaty/Summit -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Euro Security Treaty/Summit: In response to Ambassador's question about Medvedev's proposal for a new European security architecture, Kislyak reiterated that the GOR saw this as a "multifaceted" agreement on security in Europe that would cover Russia and end the dividing lines and "vestiges of the Cold War" in Europe. It would be inclusive, but was not intended to replace existing institutions like NATO or the OSCE. The key would be that it would provide "security, predictability, and reliability." The current situation did not favor Russian security; NATO was expanding at Russia's expense; the CFE Treaty was under threat due to "your unwillingness to ratify it;" and NATO was "pocketing quotas" from new NATO allies under CFE. There were double standards "all over Europe." The concept included not just arms control, but envisioned a comprehensive system that would enable all to work together to ensure security and, of increasing importance to Russia, predictability. It could, for instance, take the OSCE back to its original "four-basket" roots, whereas now the OSCE really focused only on one basket. The Agreement should be legally binding, and "of course," the U.S. and Canada would be part of the effort. ¶14. (C) The Ambassador said we hoped discussion of the new security concept would not come at the expense of cooperation with existing institutions - work in the NATO-Russia Council could be strengthened. In response, Kislyak mentioned the "Alliance within Alliance" idea that had been discussed some years previously, but the question had been against whom should such an Alliance act? Russia had rejected it being against its neighbors, but had liked the idea of it being against new threats and challenges. But the GOR had found that when the idea was presented to other NATO allies, they had gotten scared. Many had not even liked the idea of joint decision-making in the NRC. He concluded saying the new security architecture was not a trick; Medvedev was very interested in building a new security environment around Russia that was stable and predictable, and he personally favored the concept (note: Medvedev mentioned it in his speech to Ambassadors and in Russia's new "Concepts of Foreign Policy" issued on July 16 (reftels). JDEC -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The Ambassador asked if Kislyak could confirm August 5-7 dates for the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) site security and legal tax discussions. Kislyak said he had information that "the military is ready to meet in August," but no other details, and would have his staff check. CFE/CTR -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Kislyak confirmed Antonov would meet A/S Fried in New York July 29 to discuss CFE. Kislyak said it was an issue in which we were "moving in circles." He also noted that the GOR had recently ratified the Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement. Digital Library Cooperation -------------- ¶17. (U) Kislyak raised the possibility of "digital library cooperation," saying that the new library in St. Petersburg named for Boris Yeltsin, while not a Presidential Library in the U.S. sense, would be a digital library and contain a history of the State in Russia from the Middle Ages through the Yeltsin years. He had discussed the idea of cooperation between the Library and the U.S. Library of Congress with MOSCOW 00002055 004 OF 004 Librarian of Congress Billington, who was interested in exploring the idea. They had established several working groups and were looking at the possibility of a political and/or legal agreement between the two libraries. The Yeltsin Library was expected to be completed by the end of 2008 and inaugurated sometime in 2009. BEYRLE