GOR REACTS TO SECRETARY'S VISIT TO TBILISI

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001980

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: GOR REACTS TO SECRETARY'S VISIT TO TBILISI

Classified By: Acting Pol M/C Bob Patterson. Reasons 1.4
(b, d).


1. (C) Summary. While affirming that the GOR welcomed U.S.
high-level visits to Tbilisi as a stimulus to facilitate the
negotiation process, MFA officials expressed unease over the
message delivered by Secretary Rice during her visit to
Tbilisi. They were particularly "alarmed" by her support for
the internationalization of the peacekeeping force and the
emphasis on a NATO MAP offer to Georgia. At the same time as
the Secretary's meeting with Saakashvili, Abkhazian
"president" Bagapsh met with FM Lavrov in Moscow. MFA
officials denied that Bagapsh had come to discuss the opening
of a Russian diplomatic mission in Abkhazia, describing it
instead as an "institute" for dealing with legal, economic,
and humanitarian issues. The GOR criticized the GOG for
"staging" provocations in the zones of conflict and justified
the July 9 overflight of a Russian aircraft as an effort to
"clarify" the situation and avoid "bloodshed" in South
Ossetia. For the time being, the GOR was urging the signing
of an agreement stipulating the non-use of force, the
normalization of Kodori, and direct dialogue between the
parties, the MFA officials said. End summary.

Reacting to Secretary in Tbilisi
--------------


2. (C) MFA CIS Deputy Directors Aleksey Pavlovskiy and
Dmitriy Tarabrin told us July 10 that they believed Secretary
Rice's visit to Tbilisi had not sent a sufficiently
"constructive" message to the parties to the conflicts. They
expressed "alarm" that the Secretary had endorsed the
internationalization of the peacekeeping force in an effort,
they said, to minimize the Russian peacekeepers' role. The
proposal, they insisted, was something that the Abkhaz would
never accept. Pavlovskiy and Tarabrin claimed that U.S.
policy makers failed to understand that NATO membership meant
the end of Georgian territorial integrity. Pavlovskiy asked
rhetorically what the U.S. position on Abkhazia and South
Ossetia would be if Georgia joined NATO. Earlier in the day,
FM Lavrov had said: "Regrettably, we heard Secretary Rice
saying that granting MAP to Georgia would resolve the
problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the contrary,
MAP would end any hope of resolving the conflict."

In the meantime, Bagapsh is Back in Moscow
--------------


3. (C) Tarabin denied that Bagapsh's July 10 visit to Moscow
was for further discussions on the opening of a Russian
diplomatic mission in Abkhazia. According to him, Moscow was
planning to open an "institute" that would concern itself
with legal, economic, and humanitarian issues, and would
perform no consular functions. Tarabin was reluctant to
provide the exact date, but expected that the institute could
open by the end of 2008 or the beginning of 2009.

Karasin in Tbilisi
--------------


4. (C) Pavlovskiy informed us that the July 4 mortar
shelling had so angered DFM Karasin, then visiting Tbilisi
with a message from Medvedev, that he wanted to cut the visit
short and return to Moscow immediately. He stayed, but the
subsequent talks were overshadowed by the incident and the
feeling that the Georgians were "staging" provocations while
pretending to engage in a dialogue with the Russians.
Pavlovskiy maintained that "by now the GOR understood well
the tactics" employed by the GOG. The July 3 "assassination
attempt" on Sanakoyev was not convincing. Sanakoyev had
"naturally" not been injured. MFA officials also had heard
that twenty minutes before the July mortar attack, the
Georgian military had left its posts for a safe haven.


5. (C) Pavlovskiy confirmed that Karasin's visit to Tbilisi
was part of preparations for the summit suggested by Medvedev
during the his June meeting with Saakashvili. With
"provocations" increasing, however, Pavlovskiy thought that
planning for the summit could not go forward. Through
Karasin, Medvedev had sent a reply to the Georgian non-paper
peace proposal which DFM Vashadze had delivered in Moscow on
June 23. In essence, the GOR position was that all good
elements in the proposal could be implemented only when the
two parties to the conflict talk directly and establish a
certain level of mutual trust.

Friends' Meeting
--------------


6. (C) Pavlovskiy affirmed that the Friends' proposal
accorded with Russia's position. It was now time to move it
forward, he thought. Pavlovskiy lamented that every
improvement in the situation was foiled by Georgian
"provocations." Tarabrin added that for now the GOR would
push for the signing of an agreement stipulating the non-use
of force, the normalization of Kodori, and direct dialogue
between the parties to the conflict in all international fora.
BEYRLE