RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001904 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY AND SUMMIT Classified By: A/DCM James D. Melville, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Medvedev's proposal for a new European Security Treaty is not intended to create a new institution to replace NATO or other existing Euroatlantic organzations, but to eliminate remaining dividing lines in Europe and provide a mechanism for dealing with new threats and challenges on the Continent, according to the MFA. The MFA has few details on the proposal, saying that most of them could be discussed and worked out at a Summit, but Russia does envision the key elements to include non-use of force among members states, mutual assistance and security guarantees in case of an external threat, and cessation of military planning against each other. The MFA contends that divisive issues such as missile defense and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) could be resolved easily within such a framework. End Summary. New Kellogg-Briand Pact? -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Deputy Director for European Cooperation Yuriy Gorlatch elaborated July 1 on Russia's proposal for a new European Security Treaty first presented by Medvedev in Berlin on June 5 and discussed during the Russia-EU Summit in Khanty-Mansiysk June 26-27. Gorlatch said that the Russian proposal was intended to address the changes in Europe and Russia after the end of the Cold War and to eliminate remaining dividing lines by providing security "from Vancouver to Vladivostok." The idea arose, not from the Helsinki Act, but the post-WWI Kellogg-Briand Pact. Russia wanted to remove the environment which had led to tensions over the past four or five years, including over NATO enlargement, missile defense and the CFE Treaty. With a new pact, which covered the entire European continent, and in which all countries were equal and all security issues were discussed before decisions taken, such problems would not arise. ¶3. (C) During a briefing for the Diplomatic Corps on the Russia-EU Summit July 2 (septel),Dmitriy Polyanskiy, MFA Head of the European Union Unit, emphasized that Russia did not accept that NATO was the pillar of European security. NATO enlargement was not the answer to all Europe's security problems, not did it enhance Russia's security. Instead of "wasting time discussing security threats 'from' each other," he said, we should focus on the "real threats that endanger us all," including terrorism, organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and other non-traditional security issues such as climate change, water shortages, and disease. Key Elements -------------- ¶4. (C) Gorlatch said it was important for the treaty to be legally binding, and, while noting that all details could be worked out at the proposed Summit, identified three elements Russia considered essential: 1) renunciation of use of force among the member states; 2) mutual assistance in case of an external threat; and 3) no military planning against each other. When asked whether the GOR envisioned a NATO Article 5-type of security guarantee, Gorlatch said yes, but noted that the type of assistance provided would be decided by each country and could include non-military assistance. ¶5. (C) When asked how NATO could continue to exist with such an overarching structure containing security guarantees for all, Gorlatch replied that the treaty was not designed to create a new organization or to replace NATO or other institutions such as the EU, OSCE, or Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but to unify their efforts. Gorlatch acknowledged that some NATO members could have difficulty recognizing how to combine the concept with NATO, but pointed to Operation Active Endeavor as an example: Some NATO members did not take part in OAE while Russia did. ¶6. (C) Each of the existing institutions provided security, but they were not coordinated, Gorlatch argued. Medvedev had been asked why not just strengthen the OSCE, but Russia perceived that the OSCE was an "instrument of the past, from the Cold War," designed as an interim mechanism to allow former enemies to work together. "Some members" had sought to prevent it from playing a major role on security issues, so that today its focus was more on non-military, non-security issues. The OSCE also contained no legally-binding obligations. ¶7. (C) NATO was similarly inadequate because not all countries, most notably Russia, were members, Gorlatch said. NATO portrayed an image that its security was only for a selective group of countries - its members, and NATO could not guarantee the security of non-members. Russia saw no positive benefit from NATO enlargement, but believed it could lead to new dividing lines and an increase in tension between Russia and potential members like Ukraine. While Russia believed the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) could serve as an example of how to do practical dialogue and cooperation, Russia did not see the NRC as a way of eliminating the dividing lines. ¶8. (C) Although the EU had its European Security and Defense Policy, Russia did not see it as primarily a security institution, and its membership was also limited. Borrowing a line from NATO, Russia wanted to ensure that under the proposed framework, there would be no members with "second-class" security. ¶9. (C) Gorlatch said that the concept would be based on UN principles and the treaty could incorporate elements of the UN Charter, but the Charter contained no obligations. In response to a question on whether the group could take action without a UN Security Council resolution, Gorlatch replied that it could, by relying on the self-defense provisions of Article 51. 10 (C) When asked who would be members of such a treaty, and how it would be decided, and whether decisions would be taken by consensus, Gorlatch said Russia believed membership could be similar to that of the OSCE (noting that, while the concept was focused on security on the European continent, the U.S. and Canada would be "welcome to participate"),but that all those and other details could be worked out at the proposed summit. Russia did not want to present a "fait accompli" to prospective participants, but to work out all the elements together. Polyanskiy clarified that Russia believed all of the countries should participate in the summit in their individual capacities, while institutions such as the EU, NATO and OSCE could also send representatives. ¶11. (C) Finally, Russia believed that recent divisive issues such as missile defense and CFE could be resolved quite easily under such an arrangement if the central elements of inclusivity and joint decision-making were respected. ¶12. (C) Polyanskiy confirmed that MFA European Directorate head Sergey Ryabkov was the driving force on the concept. BEYRLE