GOR ON TRANSNISTRIA: MORE OF THE SAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000190 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS SUBJECT: GOR ON TRANSNISTRIA: MORE OF THE SAME Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Moldovan President Voronin's January 20-21 visit to Moscow prompted much speculation about an alleged "Putin plan for Transnistria." Following the visit, GOR officials denied that any new GOR proposal had been offered to Voronin and continued to insist that the only way to move the process forward was to revive face-to-face Chisinau-Tiraspol talks, rather than have other interested parties -- the EU, U.S., Russia and Ukraine -- broker the conflict on their behalf. The MFA confirmed that the so-called three new conditions reported by the press -- Moldovan neutrality, the continued presence of Russian peacekeeping forces, and the guarantee of property rights in Tiraspol -- were not new and remain the essential elements of the Russian proposal. End summary. New Year, Renewed Consultations -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Transnistria negotiator Nesterushkin told us January 24 that Voronin and Putin met on January 21 and discussed bilateral issues, including the Transnistria conflict. The two presidents met five times in 2007 and the January 20-21 Voronin visit kicked off this year's consultations between the two leaders. Nesterushkin lamented the absence of negotiations on Transnistria and the failure in November 2007 to convene the 5 plus 2 on the margins of the OSCE Madrid Ministerial. Nesterushkin claimed that to this day, no "understandable explanation" had been offered the GOR for Moldovan FM Shova's "no show," while Transnistrian FM Litskai had managed to persuade a reluctant Smirnov and flown to Madrid for the talks. Nesterushkin said he did not understand why so much talk on the need to resume the negotiations had not been followed by concrete actions. He criticized Voronin's "erroneous" belief that Moscow was the key player and could open or close the door to a resolution at will. In thinking that obtaining Moscow's agreement was all that is necessary to solve the Transnistrian conflict, Nesterushkin said, Voronin continued the "bad habit" of ignoring Tiraspol and its interests. ¶3. (C) Nesterushkin argued that Voronin, "encouraged by the EU and the U.S.," preferred pressure to dialogue, which could not unlock the current impasse. After 17 years of a separate existence based on an "independent" economy, Tiraspol would not simply accept a unitary constitution drafted by Chisinau. Nesterushkin acknowledged that in the absence of an ethnic or religious dispute, Transnistria was in principle a simpler problem (than Abkhazia or South Ossetia) and Russia was willing to entertain various options as long as the two directly involved parties agreed on a settlement. He termed it "grotesque" that the stacks of documents and agreements signed by Chisinau and Tiraspol had been neither rejected nor incorporated into a new framework, while the negotiation mechanism has remained stalled for two years. No New "Putin Plan" -------------- ¶4. (C) Nesterushkin denied Russia has added new "conditions" and said that what the press was calling "the Putin plan for Transnistria" -- the alleged three new conditions -- had been the Russian position all along: --Moldova's neutrality: Although stipulated in the Moldovan constitution, Russia has always demanded the strengthening of the neutrality clause via a document signed by the U.S., EU and Russia. --Continued presence of Russian troops in Transnistria: Russia is a "hostage to its own past" and the Russian military presence is a legacy of the Soviet era. But with no political settlement to guarantee peace and stability, it would be "irresponsible" to withdraw. According to Nesterushkin, the last five years had demonstrated that the situation is volatile and that the Moldovan side had failed to engender confidence on the part of Transnistria. He credited the presence of the Russian peacekeeping forces for the absence of violence in spite of continued political clashes. --Guarantee of property rights awarded through privatization by Tiraspol authorities: Nesterushkin said that Voronin had made repeated promises, but the GOR wanted a written agreement that would preclude backtracking. ¶5. (C) Nesterushkin repeated that the GOR would agree to the re-configuration of the peacekeeping forces and the withdrawal of the Russian military (400 peacekeepers and 800 supporting personnel) after the two "conflict partners" reach a political settlement. Having rejected the Kozak document, which had "many good, workable elements," Voronin would now have to try his utmost if he wants to make a deal before his term ends in 2009. BURNS