SIXTEENTH SESSION OF U.S-RUSSIA WORKING GROUP ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 MOSCOW 001865

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV EFIN AF IZ RS
SUBJECT: SIXTEENTH SESSION OF U.S-RUSSIA WORKING GROUP ON
COUNTERTERRORISM, JUNE 19-20, 2008, MOSCOW, RUSSIA

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Iraq leaving Iraq and seeking to commit terrorist acts in
other countries, he said that although Russia was not with
the U.S. in Iraq, Russia was "100 percent on the U.S. side"
and willing to cooperate not just on Russian or CIS
citizens but on any third-country foreign fighters.


5. (C) Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council,
Vladimir Nazarov, said the CTWG helped Russia to focus on
the threats and challenges both sides face and enhanced our
understanding of each other's intentions and plans. It was
important to maintain a frequent dialogue and use joint
efforts to resolve conflicts.


6. (C) Federal Security Service (FSB) Deputy Director,
Viktor Komogorov, said that Russia had compiled a "huge
database" of foreign militants and terrorists who had gone
to fight in Chechnya, some of whom could become active in
Iraq or Afghanistan. The GOR had offered to compare its
contents with the U.S.'s terrorism databases. He added
that Russia's annual meeting of intelligence services'
representatives from 75 countries in Khanty-Mansiysk had
decided to create a joint terrorism databank. More than 20
countries were contributing to the databank, including some
European and Middle Eastern countries. The information in
the databank was classified and encrypted, and enabled
different levels of access to the information. If an
inquiry was made about a particular person, then the
databank would track the person. The databank also
contained analytical information on terrorism issues, such
as general trends, suicide bombers, and recruitment. The
GOR hoped to expand the databank. Komogorov invited
Ambassador Dailey to attend next year's Russian-hosted
annual intelligence gathering.


7. (C) Ambassador Dailey, while noting the sensitivities of
sharing intelligence information, responded that it was
important to exchange information so we could work together
more effectively. It was particularly critical to share
information on travel of foreign fighters from Iraq, since
many of them would seek to go to other countries. While no
country could give its friends all of the information in its
databank, we could help when provided with a name. Safonov
concurred on the need to exchange information.


8. (C) Kevin Kellenberger, Counterterrorism Center (CTC)
Department Chief, noted that intelligence played a critical
role supporting policy, and that the U.S. and Russia were
already successfully sharing information, but the
intelligence community would always have to balance the
need to get the information to the people who required it
with the need to protect sources. He said the CTC would
use the concept of balance to look at the databank, but that
there might be other alternatives to participation in the
databank that could be considered to share information,
including on the question of terrorist travel.


9. (C) In closing, DAS Merkel expressed the desire to share
the accomplishments of the CTWG more with the public, as
evidence of the value of the U.S.-Russian cooperation, and
highlighted the importance of concluding the press
statement and fact sheet. Safonov agreed, and stressed the
need to be quick in setting the group's tactical and
long-term strategic objectives. He closed with a final
toast that our strength be up to carrying the burden.

CTWG Plenary Session (June 20)

--------------
Afghanistan
--------------


10. (C) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
William Burns, thanked Russia for the practical steps taken
to stabilize Afghanistan, including writing off Afghan debt,
supporting OSCE programs in Afghanistan, and working toward
the reconstruction of Afghan infrastructure. SCA/A Acting
Director Timothy Wilder thanked Russia for providing $90
million worth of weapons and military equipment to the Afghan
National Army (ANA) between 2002 to 2005, and encouraged the
GOR to move forward on its latest proposal to resume

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providing weapons, emphasizing our preference for donations
over sales and the importance of coordination with Combined
Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A). He
called for Russian support for OSCE counternarcotics training
efforts, including training within Afghanistan. Wilder
provided an overview of ISAF's three-pronged integrated
counter-insurgency strategy: (security, governance,
reconstruction),and underscored the importance of a
politically responsive, Afghan-led reconciliation program to
draw disenchanted insurgents off the battlefield. He noted
that this consideration informed U.S. views on the matter of
1267 listings and de-listings, to be discussed later. Wilder
cited progress in re-establishing the nation's energy
distribution system, and encouraged Russia to consider
refurbishing dams and hydro-electric plants constructed
during the Soviet-era - especially projects in northern
Afghanistan.


11. (C) MFA Afghanistan Desk Chief, Yuri Khokhlov, noted ISAF
success against insurgents that had, in some regions,
reduced the Taliban to counterproductive asymmetric attacks
against soft targets that caused civilian casualties. He
explained that a Russian company was preparing to begin
work on reconstructing a power plant in Naghlu, but said
that concerns for security minimized Russian business
interest in Afghanistan.


12. (C) Khokhlov clarified that Russian military aid
provided to Afghanistan from 2002-2005 amounted to $200
million. It was stopped after the GOR learned that the
equipment was sitting in warehouses; Afghan officials said
they were told not to use the equipment by their "American
mentors." Russia was concerned that the utility of future
military aid would diminish as the ANA moved toward
NATO-standard weapons. Khokhlov asked the U.S. to provide
a "clear picture" of Afghan military needs, including how
to reach a balance between donated supplies and commercial
procurement. Kislyak seconded Khokhlov's description of
Russian frustration over learning the ANA's needs, and
called upon the to U.S. to "send a more coherent message."
(Note: Kislyak provided U/S Burns a copy of a letter from
the U.S. Defense Attache in Kabul to his Russian
counterpart explaining that the U.S. "will not permit the
Afghan government to use U.S. funds to purchase equipment
directly from the Russian government" and that the ANA will
transition in many cases from Russian standard equipment to
U.S./NATO equipment. End note.)


13. (C) Safonov stressed that the U.S. and Russia must avoid
public debate over their respective military roles in
Afghanistan. Kislyak concurred, saying that Afghanistan
should not be turned into a venue where the U.S. and Russia
are competing over each other's public image. U/S Burns
agreed that public polemics should be avoided, and suggested
follow-up discussions to develop a way forward on military
aid, OSCE proposals, and possible cooperation on
infrastructure. (Note: In subsequent discussions on the
margins with Wilder, Khokhlov proposed sending a Russian
delegation to Washington later in the summer for follow-up
consultations on weapons transfers and project assistance.
He expected there could be progress on both fronts, noting
that while there had been some mixed messages from the U.S.
on weapons, Russia was open to providing some weapons as a
donation - though Russia was ultimately looking for a mix of
donations and sales.)

--------------
Counternarcotics
--------------


14. (C) Kislyak urged the U.S. to use the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC) to push Afghanistan to do more to fight the
trafficking of illicit drugs, but stressed that any high
level engagement of the NRC should be results-oriented. He
lamented the lack of Afghan recruits to Russian MOI
counternarcotics training center at Domodedovo Airport in
Moscow, and wondered aloud if the U.S. wanted to see Afghan
counternarcotics officers train in Western countries rather
than Russia. Noting that Russia is a major transit point for
narcotics headed to Europe and the U.S., Kislyak urged

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greater cooperation to deal with this mutual threat. He also
argued for greater interoperability of forces to combat the
Afghan drug problem.


15. (C) Embassy Moscow's Law Enforcement Section (LES) Chief
Peter Prahar responded that the U.S. fully supported the NRC
Counternarcotics Project and would contribute USD 100,000 to
the Project's budget. He also said the NATO Secretary
General was working to persuade Afghanistan to resume
participation in counternarcotics training programs outside
Afghanistan.

DEA and FSKN Liaison Officer Cooperation


16. (C) Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Drug Control
Service (FSKN) Aleksandr Fedorov touted U.S.-Russian
cooperation in fighting narcotics trafficking, especially
along the Tajik border. He said 14 seminars have been held
in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Omsk, the Budapest Law Enforcement
Academy, and other places, to share information on issues
such as confiscating drug money. The GOR has also sent its
officers to UN conferences in Vienna. Fedorov argued that
more data and information sharing between counternarcotics
services is needed.


17. (C) Prahar responded that the DEA would like to exchange
samples of seized drugs and is willing to host Russian
chemists on a study tour to the DEA Special Testing
Laboratory. He also invited members of the GOR's
newly-established State Anti-Narcotics Committee to visit the
White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, DEA
Headquarters, and other facilities that combat drugs. Prahar
also announced plans to reopen the DEA office in Tashkent in
August and to assign a DEA officer to Almaty.

UNODC Paris Pact


18. (C) Calling the Afghan drug problem "sad," Fedorov called
for a regional counternarcotics center to be built
in Almaty. He also argued more counternarcotics efforts
should be directed at kingpins and their sources of finance
rather than "rank and file" drug dealers. He also suggested
a separate counternarcotics working group be established.


19. (C) Prahar referred to the upcoming Paris Pact Working
Group meeting on financial flows related to the Afghan drug
trade. He also noted that the world's attention is focused
on the precursor issue and the tightening of controls on the
manufacture and trade of chemical precursors, as UNSCR 1817,
passed June 11, demonstrated. He said the U.S. also welcomed
the start of Targeting Anti-Trafficking Regional
Communication, Expertise, and Training (TARCET) to combat
trafficking of acetic anhydride to Afghanistan and said all
Paris Pact members should support this effort.

Narco-Finance Networks


20. (C) Kislyak argued for establishing "financial safety
belts" along Afghanistan's border to prevent drug money from
financing terrorism and crime. He said the GOR would
continue to support the Collective Security Treaty
Organization's (CSTO) Operation Channel, which includes drug
interdiction blitzes along northern trafficking routes from
Afghanistan, as a way to build up such safety belts. Kislyak
touted Operation Channel's success over the past four years,
but said the international community should do more along
Afghanistan's border to deprive terrorists and criminals of
money.


21. (C) First Deputy Head of the Federal Service on Financial
Monitoring, Yuriy Korotkiy, argued that drug financing is
tantamount to terrorist financing, and pointed to trilateral
cooperation between the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Russia
as a model for future efforts to fight narco-finance. The
group's investigations, he said, uncovered many links
between many of those who profit from narcotics trafficking
are also on UNSCR 1267 sanctions lists. Counterterrorism and
counternarcotics efforts therefore should be closely
coordinated, he argued.


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22. (C) According to Korotkiy, the Eurasia Group (EAG) should
be the first line of defense in the fight against
narco-finance. Through the EAG, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan have established new government agencies to fight
narco-finance in the region. The GOR has hosted workshops to
strengthen these new organizations and engage in human
capacity building. More must be done to engage Afghanistan
in such efforts, he said, but offering that cooperation
should not be limited in focus to one country.

Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center


23. (C) Prahar urged the GOR to take the necessary steps to
sign and ratify the CARICC Framework Agreement. Fedorov
said the GOR has the necessary documents to sign up to CARICC
and does not see any impediments to joining. He stopped
short, however, of giving an estimated date for when Russia
would sign the Framework Agreement.

-------------- ---
United Nations (UN 1267 Listings and Delistings)
-------------- ---


24. (C) U/S Burns expressed U.S. concern that the UN 1267
(al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions) process must be strengthened by
designating drug traffickers whose activities financed
terrorists and delisting former insurgents who had reconciled
with the Afghan government. IO Deputy Assistant Secretary
Brian Hook said that we need to make progress on the listing
and delisting of Al-Qaeda and Taliban individuals and
entities. He noted that we raised the issue in 2005, and the
problem has only grown worse with wide criticism that the
1267 list is frozen in time, particularly the Taliban list.
Out of date lists lack credibility, he said, which hurts
implementation by Member States. He explained that Russian
approval of one or some ex-Taliban delistings would send a
"positive message" to Member States that were concerned 1267
sanctions had become a "life sentence," and that it would
create the conditions for new Taliban listings. DAS Hook
also registered concern with the Russian holds on three of
our proposed listings in the 1267 Committee and six in the
Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1518 (sanctions on
former regime elements under Sadaam Hussein).


25. (C) Kislyak agreed 1267 should not be a "life sentence,"
but warned against "over optimism" regarding a
reconciliation process that allowed the Taliban to return to
power. Delisting someone, he said, does not make him a
partner because he is still part of the Taliban network. We
should make the UN machinery efficient. Further, Kislyak
said that delisting required "clear cut criteria" showing
that the individual was no longer affiliated with terrorist
or drug trafficking networks. He warned that delisting an
individual did not make them a partner of the Afghan
government and said those with "blood on their hands" should
not be allowed in the government.


26. (C) Khokhlov explained that Russia was a "strong
believer" in reconciling mid-level Taliban leaders to the
Afghan government, but there must be limits to who could
participate in such a process. He called for a "transparent
process" headed by the Afghans themselves. Khokhlov noted
that Russia was often accused of "being stubborn" when it
came to delisting, but defended Russian caution with the
example of a supposedly deceased Taliban member who, after
being delisted, was found to be alive. Furthermore, Russian
requests to the Government of Afghanistan for more
information on the reconciliation program were not answered,
he alleged.


27. (C) MFA New Threats and Challenges Director Vladimir
Chkhikhvishvili said the GOR was not confident Afghan
authorities had the ability to control individuals after they
were delisted and lacked the ability to guarantee that funds
unfrozen after deceased individuals were delisted were not
used to finance terrorism. Chkhikhvishvili was also
surprised by DAS Hook's remarks regarding their holds in the
1267 and 1518 Committees, noting that the GOR responds
rapidly to our requests except for a few exceptions.


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--------------
Terrorism Finance
--------------


28. (C) Treasury Director of Global Affairs in the Office of
Terrorist Finance and Financial Crimes Brian Grant said
combating terrorism finance was a "robust area" of
U.S.-Russia cooperation. In particular, he described
U.S.-Russia cooperation in the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF),an intergovernmental body dedicated to the
development of international policies to combat money
laundering and terrorism financing, as good and praised
Russia for its leadership in the Eurasian Group, a FATF-style
regional body. He highlighted the need for the U.S. and
Russia to work together to press Uzbekistan to reinstate the
anti-money laundering/terrorist finance regime the GOU
suspended until 2013 and described recent FATF statements
expressing concern over the Uzbek action. (NOTE: During the
June 18-20 FATF plenary, the FATF reaffirmed its February 28
statement identifying Uzbekistan's suspension of its
anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism
(AML/CTF) regime as a vulnerability in the international
financial system and noted Uzbekistan's continued lack of
progress in addressing this issue. END NOTE.) Grant
suggested a variety of possible steps, such as a suspension
of Uzbekistan's membership in the Eurasian Group or limiting
Uzbek access to the Russian financial system if the Uzbek
government did not return to international financial
standards. He also raised concern about Turkmenistan's
AML/CFT regime.


29. (C) Korotkiy said Russia shared U.S. concerns about
Uzbekistan and was attempting to convince the Uzbek
government to reconsider its decision. He reviewed measures
taken by the FATF to press Uzbekistan, but Chkhikhvishvili
warned that punitive measures could be counterproductive.
Kislyak agreed on the need to press Uzbekistan, but cautioned
this must be done "carefully and thoughtfully" in order to
allow the Uzbek government to respond to the international
community while also saving face. He emphasized the
importance of working through the EAG Secretariat.


30. (SBU) EEB Director for Terrorism Finance and Economic
Sanctions Policy, Steven Bondy, thanked Russia for its
support of the initiative in the G8 to implement FATF Special
Recommendation Eight on combating terrorist abuse of
non-profit organizations. Referring to Russia's leadership
in the EAG, he suggested that Russia consider organizing a
regional session on implementing Special Recommendation Eight
and offered to consult with the GOR bilaterally to address
the substantive elements of a workshop. In response,
Chkhikhvishvili praised the G8 initiative and said that
Russia faced challenges in delinking terrorists from
charities in the North Caucasus. After the meeting,
Chkhikhvishvili suggested the CTWG Terrorism Finance Subgroup
meet soon to discuss next steps on charities and other
initiatives on the margins of some multilateral event such as
the Lyon-Roma Group or a FATF meeting.


--------------
Intelligence and Law Enforcement
--------------


31. (S) FSB Service for the Protection of Constitutional
System and Fight against Terrorism Deputy Head Mikhail
Belousov provided numerous examples of counterterrorism
cooperation by U.S. and Russian intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to illustrate that cooperation had gone
beyond mere talk and reached a practical level. He
emphasized that counterterrorism finance has been a part of
the subgroup's work, noting that a large portion of terrorist
financing occurred through Hawalas. He noted that U.S. and
Russian Intelligence Subgroup experts had met to exchange
information on terrorist groups, including Tatar Jamaat, the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, and
North Caucasus-linked terrorists. He also stated that the
U.S. and Russia had worked together against extremists in the
North Caucasus. He cited several areas where additional
progress was possible, including reaching agreement on how

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best to combat terrorists' use of the Internet and
cyber-crime. He also cited the need to improve cooperation
on preventing terrorism finance through illegal commercial
transactions.


32. (C) Kellenberger agreed with Belousov's assessment that
the intelligence cooperation had progressed. He noted that
the decision at the last meeting of the U.S.-Russian
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Subgroups in November to
hold one formal meeting rather than two per year reflected
the advance. He observed that the move also reflected the
reality that our efforts are better served through passing
information in a timely manner vice waiting for the formal
sessions. Kislyak reinforced the point, noting that even
though the CTWG last met in 2006, law enforcement agencies
continued engagement in the field.


33. (U) FBI Section Chief for Counterterrorism James
Robertson saluted FBI-GOR law enforcement cooperation, but
asked that the GOR respond to a recent MLAT request for
information on Al-Haramain, a U.S.-based charity facing trial
for material support to terrorists. The request asks whether
the GOR has any information indicating Al-Haramain financed
terrorist operations in the North Caucasus.


34. (C) U/S Burns stressed U.S.-Russia cooperation on
bringing to justice those responsible for the murder of
Russian diplomats in Iraq. He said the U.S. was committed
on a political level to help GOR officials access to the
suspects held by the Iraqis, and that the U.S. would
attempt to expedite this once Russia made a formal request
to the Iraqi government for access to the suspects.

--------------
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism
--------------


35. (C) Ambassador Dailey began by stressing the critical
nature of our joint work on WMD Terrorism, most importantly
the need for the GOR to reaffirm its commitment to the
workplan adopted by both sides at the February WMD Subgroup
meeting. He also called for a reciprocal WMD terrorism
threat brief by the GOR, (which they had promised to provide
in February) at the next Subgroup meeting. Ambassador Dailey
then provided a detailed review of the commitments in the
workplan. He urged the GOR to clarify their interest in a
U.S.-proposed nuclear forensics plan and a consequence
management MOU with the Department of Energy, and also to
indicate whether a July-August timeframe would suit Russia
for planning meetings on a bioterrorism tabletop exercise, a
law enforcement methodological exchange, and a foreign
consequence management seminar.


36. (C) Safonov asserted that a WMD terrorism attack was a
Russian 'red line' and responded that such an attack was not
a matter of "if," but "when." He noted that the fourth
meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT) held in Madrid earlier in the week demonstrated that
the GICNT mechanism was valuable, with "practical and
political outcomes." He noted that every year we have held
numerous workshops, meetings, and discussions on training
personnel and share research and development information. As
an example, Safonov said Russia had moved forward on a large
project involving the CIS to coordinate transportation and
nuclear security. He said that while there had been
successes, they "hadn't achieved the level of
interoperability they would like and did not know if their
systems would all work together." Safonov also noted that
the GOR needed to streamline its priorities and decide on
sequencing - although he averred that Russia was moving
forward on preparations for meetings in July. While the
Russian side did not directly respond to a U.S. invitation to
visit a DOE training facility on secure ground transport of
nuclear materials, Safonov called for both sides to work more
closely on developing common standards to check radioactive
material on air planes. Chkhikhvishvili added that Russia is
ready to exchange bioterrorism threat methodologies, but that
both sides needed to agree on substance and timeframe. He
said that the GOR would be in touch soon on U.S. consequence
management proposals. (COMMENT: In a sidebar with

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Ambassador Dailey, Chkhikhvishvili admitted he was 'confused'
about Russian commitments to the WMD workplan, revealing that
Ambassador Titorenko had not relayed Russia's commitment to
it in February. END COMMENT.)

Proposed Framework on Nuclear Forensics


37. (C) Safonov related an experience with nuclear forensics
involving a highly enriched uranium (HEU) sample interdicted
on the Turkish - Bulgarian border, had resulted in lengthy
negotiations and the development of new protocols. He said
Russia "had to create methods to do this." But now, there
were other cases, like the Georgian HEU sample, and Russia
needed to set up temporary legal frameworks to handle these
problems. Safonov added that recent exercises with NATO
demonstrated shortcomings in nuclear forensics, as current
Russian customs regulations were not flexible enough to
handle the various international groups and their equipment
on short notice. Anatoliy Bushlya, Principal Specialist from
Rosatom State Corporation, said Russia had established
procedures for exchanges of samples and had visited emergency
centers in the U.S. He stated that Russia recently performed
an exercise in St. Petersburg and envisioned similar training
in the U.S. later in 2008.

Transportation of Radiological and Nuclear Material


38. (C) Vladimir Chertok, Deputy Head of the Transport
Supervising Agency, stated his concern regarding radiation
detection. He said that while Russian airport security was
much like that in U.S. airports, the U.S. and Russia needed
to "work together" to figure out the levels of radiation "we
want to detect". He elaborated that problems with traces of
radioactive materials, coupled with unfamiliar technologies
in foreign aircraft, made the process difficult for Russia.

Consequence Management


39. (C) Igor Neverov, MFA Director of the North America
Department, said that the U.S. and Russia needed to intensify
coordination on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
issues - not just that of Iran. He stated that the GICNT was
a good mechanism for this. He also said he hoped to provide
a response to the USG on these issues soon.

--------------
MANPADS
--------------


40. (C) While noting that none of his experts were in the
room, Safonov related an example of cooperation on MANPADS.
Through FBI and FSB cooperation a plot involving terrorists,
criminals, and narcotics to acquire these missiles and
smuggle them into the U.S. was discovered and defeated.
Safonov also noted that the RF had requested all of the
former Soviet republics to account by serial number for all
MANPADS weapons still in their possession. He stated that
with the exception of Ukraine and Georgia, this had been
accomplished. EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary David Merkel
noted the upcoming MANPADS experts meeting in Moscow July
28-30. Safonov said that it was important to use such venues
to emphasize that MANPADS security and control were a shared
interest. When the message was put out "alone, in different
geographic regions, it was not as powerful as when we do so
jointly."

--------------
Transportation Security
--------------


41. (C) Vladimir Chertok, Deputy Head Transport Supervising
Agency, opened the Transportation Security session with a few
general comments expressing the positive nature of the work
that had preceded the plenary session. However, he said that
while the proposals were fine, moving forward on some of the
issues had slowed, and Russia was still having difficulty
with a draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on peer-to-peer
partnerships sent to them in 2005. Even though there were
Terms of Reference in force, we needed to meet and show each
other what we were doing and back it up with a comprehensive

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document. (Note: Chertok and TSA Assistant Administrator
Bill Gaches met after the CTWG for an extensive bilateral
discussion. End Note.)


42. (U) Bill Gaches, Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Assistant Administrator for the Office of Global
Strategies, responded they were anxious to establish an
expanded relationship with Russia and build on the productive
meeting in May between Federal Authority Transportation
Oversight's (FATO) Alexander Sveshnikov and TSA
Administrator, Kip Hawley. Gaches noted that the U.S. and
Russia share many common views on the threats to
transportation. Noting the growth in U.S. airline service to
Russia - approximately 40,000 passengers per month, inbound
and outbound - Gaches called for finalization of the draft
MOA on peer-to-peer partnerships and revised Terms of
Reference as well as additional peer-to-peer meetings.

Air Marshals


43. (C) Chertok said the RF legislative framework did not
allow for armed air marshals onboard commercial flights. It
was a legal issue which could have repercussions on the
marshals when they arrived in Russia. Chertok stated, "our
lawmakers are very negative on this." Oleg Zhidkov, Deputy
Chief of Staff, National Anti-Terrorist Committee added that
the "problem was urgent" and not just in air transport. All
modes of transportation must be addressed. He said that
Russia had put forward a project for railways and hoped the
recommended standards would be implemented by the G8. This
was seconded by Safonov, who clarified that the Russians had
a "painful experience" with the use of firearms onboard a
plane. In 1973, during an attempted highjacking, the
perpetrator had explosives with a dead man switch. When he
was shot, the explosives detonated, killing all on board.
Since then, there had been a prohibition on firearms on
board. Safonov suggested that with modern, non-lethal
technologies such as Tasers, it might be possible to resolve
this problem through bilateral and multilateral agreements.
Vladimir Makarov of the Ministry of Interior indicated that
more research needed to be conducted by ICAO regarding the
use of non-lethal weapons that would not threaten the
integrity of an aircraft. Gaches noted the productive
Hawley-Sveshnikov meeting, TSA's desire to resolve
outstanding differences on a bilateral FAMS Memorandum of
Understanding, its standing invitation to Russian officials
to visit TSA's training facilities, the need for 24-hour
points of contact, and its readiness to share additional
information on liquids, gels and aerosols.


44. (C) After the U.S. delegation gave a summary of threats
and cooperative efforts, Kislyak stated our cooperation has
been successful in combating terrorism and the criminal
threat. He expressed the view that much would be
accomplished in the separate subgroups that were to meet
after the CTWG plenary.

Central Asian CT Cooperation


45. (C) In a sidebar discussion, Ambassadors Dailey and
Safonov sought a way to deepen U.S. and Russian cooperation
on counterterrorism capacity building in Central Asia.
Safonov proposed that the two sides engage in a bilateral
exchange of information on ongoing projects and ideas to
strengthen efforts, suggesting a focus on counterterrorism,
counterterrorism finance, and counternarcotics. Dailey
requested that such an exchange occur under a multilateral
framework with broader participation, and focus on civilian
(non-military) assistance. Safonov agreed, offering the
FATF-style Eurasia Group as a good example of how a regional
umbrella had worked in countering terrorism finance. Both
sides agreed to compare ideas on ways forward in the near
future.

--------------
Meeting Conclusion
--------------


46. (C) DAS Merkel and Safonov closed the session, agreeing
that, working through the embassies, a list of "next steps"

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would be produced within two weeks. The atmosphere as the
meeting wound down was very positive. Safonov's final
comment was "this is like the theater after a good show; no
one wants to leave."


47. (SBU) Delegation List: United States: DOS: U/S for
Political Affairs William Burns, Charge d'Affaires Daniel
Russell, S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey, EUR DAS David Merkel,
IO DAS Brian Hook, EUR/RUS Dir Ian Kelly, EEB/ESC/TFS Dir
Steven Bondy, SCA/A A/Dir Timothy Wilder, ISN/WMDT DepDir
David Weekman, LES Dir Peter Prahar, P Spec. Asst. Sumona
Guha, EUR/PGI CTWG Exec Dir Lonni Reasor, S/CT Zachary
Rothschild, Emb PolMinCouns Alice Wells, Emb PolExt Chief
Margaret Hawthorne, Emb Poloffs Michael Kelleher, Nickolas
Katsakis, Emb ESToff Michael Dunkley, DOS Interpreter Yuri
Shkeyrov, Emb Interpreter Marina Gross. NSC: SAP Sr Dir Mary
Warlick. OSD: DASD Special Ops Dr. Kalev Sepp, Rus deskoff
Michael Barnes. Treasury: Dir Brian Grant. Intelligence
Community: CTC Dept Chief Kevin Kellenberger, Emb: Timothy
Lattig. FBI: CT Div. Int'l Ops Section II Chief James
Robertson. DOJ: CT Section, Deputy Chief Sharon Lever.
DHS/TSA: Office of Global Strategies, Asst Administrator
William Gaches, Int'l Office Bert Williams.


48. (SBU) Delegation List: Russia: DFM Sergey Kislyak,
Special Presidential Representative for CT Anatoliy Safonov,
State Secretary, DepDir, Federal Drug Control Service
Aleksandr Fedorov, Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir
Nazarov (dinner only),Security Council Chief of Directorate
Yevgeniy Nikitenko, FSB Director 5th Dept. Viktor Komogorov
(dinner only),FSB Deputy Head Mikhail Belousov, SVR Director
CT Center Petr Bayulin (dinner only),National Anti-Terrorism
Committee Deputy Chief of Staff Oleg Zhidkov, MOD Chief of
Directorate Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, Fed. Service on Financial
Monitoring First Deputy Head Yuriy Korotkiy, Transport
Supervising Agency Vladimir Chertok, MFA Director North
America Dept. Igor Neverov, MFA Director New Threats and
Challenges Vladimir Chkhikhvishvili, MFA Director of
International Organizations Gennadiy Gatilov, Vladimir
Makarov, Ministry of Interior, Transport Supervising Agency
Sr State Inspector Nadezhda Malikova, SVR CT Center Deputy
Head Aleksey Martynkin, RosAtom Principal Specialist Anatoliy
Bushlya, Security Council Counselor Stanislav Ivanov, FSB
Int'l Cooperation Directorate First Deputy Head Denis
Sibayev, FSB Information Security Center Officer Dmitriy
Stolyarov, MFA N. Amer. DepDir Nikolay Sofinskiy, MFA Second
Asia Dept. Section Chief Yuriy Khokhlov, MFA Principal
Counselor El'brus Kargiyev, MFA N. Amer. Sr Counselor (Sec'y
of CTWG) Shakarbek Osmanov, MFA Sr. Counselor Vladimir
Prokhorov, FSB Officer Ella Mal'tseva, International
Cooperation Directorate Roman Vladimirov, Yuriy Patrin.
RUSSELL