Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW1864
2008-07-01 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA-GEORGIA RELATIONS: ABKHAZIA

Tags:  PREL PGOV GG RS 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1864/01 1831413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011413Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8820
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001864 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA RELATIONS: ABKHAZIA

Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001864

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA RELATIONS: ABKHAZIA

Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. Both the MFA and the Georgian Embassy
rejected as "nonsense" Kommersant Daily's June 27 report that
Georgia had proposed dividing Abkhazia into two separate
zones, one controlled by Russia and the other by Georgia.
The MFA termed Georgian DFM Vashadze's June 23 visit to
Moscow a failure, as it did not yield a concrete agenda for
the planned summit at the end of the summer, but acknowledged
that Vashadze had brought some proposals. The proposals
included creating free economic zones in the Gali and
Ochamchire districts, withdrawing peacekeeping forces, and
creating a joint Georgian-Abkhaz administration and police
presence in the two districts. They also provided for the
return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Abkhaz leader
Bagapsh rejected the proposals during his June 25-26 meetings
with Medvedev and DFM Karasin in Moscow. Bagapsh instead
confirmed the crucial role of Russian peacekeepers in
providing security in the conflict zone and urged the
Georgians to abide by the 1994 Moscow Agreement and relevant
UNSC resolutions. In a June 27 statement, the MFA expressed
disappointment that the details of the June 30 Friends'
meeting had been known to the GOG, which intentionally leaked
the information to the press to pressure Russia. End
summary.

Ignore Kommersant
--------------


2. (C) FM Lavrov rejected what the Kommersant Daily reported
on June 27 as a new Georgian proposal -- to divide Abkhazia
into two spheres of influence -- as a plan that had
"absolutely no relation to reality." On June 23, MFA CIS
Fourth Department Conflicts Division Chief Aleksey Dvinyanin
termed Georgian DFM Vashadze's June 23 visit, a "failure,"
and the Kommersant article on the new plan for Abkhazia,
"nonsense." Per Dvinyanin, it was telling that all involved
parties, who rarely agreed on any issue regarding the
conflict, unanimously rejected the report on the "new
Georgian proposal" to divide Abkhazia into spheres of
influence between Georgia and Russia while keeping Georgian
territorial integrity intact. Dvinyanin dismissed the
article as disinformation.

Vashadze Failed
--------------


3. (C) Dvinyanin and MFA CIS Fourth Deputy Director Semyon
Grigoriyev affirmed that Vashadze, who came to Moscow to
prepare for the Medvedev-Saakashvili summit (suggested by
Medvedev during the two presidents' first meeting during the
St. Petersburg Economic Forum),brought a non-paper on
Georgia's proposal for a peace settlement. Among the ideas
in the non-paper were the creation of free economic zones in

Gali and Ochamchire districts, withdrawal of peacekeeping
forces, and the creation of a joint Georgian-Abkhaz
administrative and police presence in the two districts, as
well as the return of refugees and IDPs. Although certain
points were acceptable, Dvinyanin argued, the paper as a
whole could not be the basis for the planned summit. The GOR
could agree to the easing of economic restrictions,
establishment of maritime communication and Georgia's
participation in the preparations for the Sochi Olympics, but
rejected the cancellation of the April 16 presidential
instructions to establish closer ties with Abkhazia and the
immediate withdrawal of the railroad battalion. He said that
the Georgians should not waste the opportunity opened up by
the good beginning between the two presidents and should
prepare a serious agenda for the summit. (Note: Ekho Moskvy's
Aleksey Venediktov told us June 30 that Medvedev and
Saakashvili had hit it off during their maiden meeting. In
Venediktov's version, subsequent problems, such as Russia
border troops, and the weekend explosions in Gagra and
Sukhumi were caused by those who wished to sabotage that
rapprochement.) Medvedev and Saakashvili will meet once more
on July 6 at Nazarbayev's birthday celebration in Astana
before the late summer summit in Sochi.

Bagapsh in Moscow
--------------


4. (C) Grigoriyev, who attended the June 25 Karasin-Bagapsh
meeting, told us June 30 that DFM Karasin had informed
Bagapsh and "Foreign Minister" Shamba about the general ideas
in the Georgian non-paper. Bagapsh had been largely
negative, saying that Abkhazia was not yet ready for "such
serious proposals." Shamba, who had just returned from
Stockholm where he met with Alasania, had also expressed
disappointment at what he perceived to be Alasania's tougher
position.


5. (C) Grigoriyev cautioned against reading too much into
Bagapsh,s visit to Moscow, noting that Bagapsh visited the
Russian capital frequently. The only unexpected element (for
the MFA, too) had been Bagapsh's meeting with Medvedev.
Grigoriyev characterized the meeting as a 10 - 15 minute
courtesy call, intended to establish a personal link between
the two. A short statement issued after the meeting said
that Medvedev and Bagapsh stressed that any progress in
resolving the conflict could only be achieved by the
implementation of all earlier agreements, including the 1994
Moscow Agreement and all relevant UNSC resolutions, while
Bagapsh noted the crucial role of Russian peacekeepers in
providing security in the conflict zone. Grigoriyev repeated
the "well-known" GOR position: the signing of a non-use of
force agreement and "normalization" of the situation in the
Kodori Gorge. In response to a query about press reports
that Bagapsh had asked for Russian assistance in tightening
security of the sea border, Grigoriyev said Bagapsh had not
made an official request, but had speculated about such
assistance within the framework of the 1994 Moscow Agreement.

Friends More Friendly with Georgia
--------------


6. (C) In a June 27 statement, the MFA expressed surprise
and disappointment at reports that the GOG had accepted the
new peace plan proposed by the Friends and that it remained
only to convince Russia to join the rest in accepting it.
Understanding that the details were to be worked out during
the June 30 meeting in Berlin, the GOR felt "left out" and
thought that the "leak" was designed to exert pressure on
Russia. Still, Grigoriyev said, Russia was generally
positive about the German proposal and agreed that a
three-step process was a good idea. He noted, however, that
some of the suggestions were "too far from reality," and
cited the plan for full return of IDPs as an example.

Georgian Embassy View
--------------


7. (C) Georgian Ambassador Kitsmarishvili also rejected the
Kommersant article, saying that no such proposal was
presented by Vashadze, as reported in the article. Georgian
officials said in chorus that the exchange -- Abkhazia for
NATO -- was out of the question. The main theme of the
non-paper presented to the GOR by Vashadze was first to solve
urgent political issues such as IDP return, which was the
precondition for subsequent economic cooperation, and to
install measures to increase economic ties such as the
creation of free economic zones in the Gali and Ochamchire
regions. The Georgian officials informed us that DFM Karasin
planned to visit Tbilisi soon for further preparations for
the summit. Georgian DCM Shugarov thought it was important
that the negotiation process was in place, even if each
meeting produced little result. He felt that the
international community, including the EU, the Friends and
Russia, had begun to study Georgia's proposals more
seriously.
RUSSELL

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