FM LIVNI VISIT TO MOSCOW: POST-ANNAPOLIS, GAZA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000180 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL IS RS SUBJECT: FM LIVNI VISIT TO MOSCOW: POST-ANNAPOLIS, GAZA, IRAN, BILATERAL Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: FM Lavrov used Israeli FM Livni's January 17 visit to reiterate Russian interest in hosting a follow-on Annapolis conference, but only when progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks merited reconvening. According to the MFA, Russia will remain flexible on the timing and agenda, plans to consult with Washington in February on next steps, and wants the event to build on U.S. diplomatic efforts. Livni told Lavrov that ISRAEL was not opposed to a conference, but would not negotiate with Syria in a multilateral setting. They disagreed on engagement with Hamas, with Russia viewing subsequent events in Gaza as underscoring the need for Palestinian reunification. Lavrov told Hamas' Mashaal to halt rocket attacks and refrain from criticism of the peace process. Livni urged Lavrov to keep a military option on the table while negotiating with Iran. The fact of Livni's visit and the visa free regime that is expected to be wrapped up by February are trumpeted by the GOR as proof of the growing significance of Russian-Israeli ties. End summary. ¶2. (C) MFA Middle East and North Africa Director Vershinin told us on January 23 that Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Livni discussed the Russian proposal for a Moscow Middle East conference during their January 17 meeting, but that this issue did not top an agenda that was heavy on bilateral issues. Lavrov reiterated Russian interest in hosting the follow-on conference to Annapolis, but only when the circumstances on the ground warranted reconvening. Lavrov acknowledged that the atmosphere currently was not propitious, and underscored that Russia remained flexible: the GOR had not set a timeframe, nor decided upon an agenda (a mantra that Lavrov repeated in his annual press conference on January 23). Vershinin clarified that, while the GOR was not set on a ministerial-level event, the MFA's view was that an experts-level meeting could only be a placeholder. Vershinin noted that DFM Saltanov and Security Council Acting Secretary Sobolev were engaged in a series of regional SIPDIS consultations, with the GOR planning to formally consult with Washington in February on the conference's prospects. Vershinin stressed that Russia wanted an event that would build on the success of U.S. diplomacy at Annapolis, and reiterated Russian satisfaction with the President's Middle East trip and direct engagement. ¶3. (C) According to Vershinin and Israeli emboffs, Livni told Lavrov that ISRAEL was not opposed to a Moscow conference, but was not prepared to negotiate with Syria in a multilateral setting. Vershinin asserted that the issue of Syrian participation could be finessed, as it had at Annapolis, and maintained that the Russian idea of resuming Madrid-style working groups was appealing to the Israeli government for the sense of greater normalcy that they would imply. ¶4. (C) Russian and Israeli diplomats told us that Lavrov reiterated to Livni the necessity of engaging with Hamas and encouraging a political reunification within the Palestinian community. Vershinin argued that subsequent events in Gaza had hardened Russia's views, since it saw Abu Mazen as more vulnerable, with the international spotlight on the suffering of Gazans raising the stakes for Arab unity. While Russia consistently condemned the indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israeli civilians and understood the need for ISRAEL to respond, the GOR was dismayed by the Israeli blockade, which was counterproductive and destructive to Israel's reputation. Vershinin noted that in the January 21 telephone conversation initiated by Hamas leader Khalid Mashaal, Lavrov reiterated Russian calls for a halt in rocket attacks and said that while the GOR would not oppose a Damascus gathering aimed at promoting Palestinian unity, it expected Mashaal to refrain from criticism of the peace process itself. Vershinin acknowledged that Livni rejected Russia's approach to Hamas, arguing that an artificial union between Palestinian moderates and extremists would spell an end to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. ¶5. (C) In their discussion on Iran, Vershinin said that Lavrov emphasized the threat that a nuclear Iran posed to Russia, as well as to Israel. At the same time, Lavrov argued that Iran's cooperation with the IAEA has produced a "delicate moment," which the international community should not undermine. According to an Israeli diplomat, Lavrov asked Livni if, after seeing the impact of foreign intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, any country should consider a military solution to Iran. Livni responded that Israel feared "hesitation" on the part of the international community would allow Iran to move forward with its nuclear program, which would result in other Middle East countries seeking nuclear weapons. Livni's bottomline was that Russia MOSCOW 00000180 002 OF 002 should allow the military option to remain on the table. ¶6. (C) Vershinin stressed that Russia was extremely pleased with the Livni visit, which reflected a deepening and expansion of Russian-Israeli ties. Israeli emboffs agreed with this assessment, and pointed to this week's visit to Israel of Security Council Acting Secretary Sobolev as further evidence of increasing ties. Among the bilateral issues discussed during Livni's visit, implementation of a visa free travel regime was most prominent. Completion of the agreement, which was to have been signed by Lavrov and Livni in Moscow, was delayed, but should be completed in February. Ending the visa requirement should significantly increase the already considerable number of Russians visiting Israel. BURNS