Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW1774
2008-06-20 15:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

SECURITY COUNCIL'S NAZAROV HOLDS FIRM ON IRAN,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR GG IR RS 
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8717
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001774 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR GG IR RS
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL'S NAZAROV HOLDS FIRM ON IRAN,
GEORGIA, NATO ENLARGEMENT AND MISSILE DEFENSE

REF: MOSCOW 1681

MOSCOW 00001774 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001774

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR GG IR RS
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL'S NAZAROV HOLDS FIRM ON IRAN,
GEORGIA, NATO ENLARGEMENT AND MISSILE DEFENSE

REF: MOSCOW 1681

MOSCOW 00001774 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: In a June 19 meeting with NSC Senior
Director for Russia Mary Warlick, EUR/DAS David Merkel and
EUR/RUS Office Director Ian Kelly, Russian Federation
Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov repeated
the now well worn list of grievances against U.S. policy on
Iran and interference in Russia's relations with Georgia.
Nazarov urged renewed contact between the Security Council
and the Administration. At the same time, he took a dim view
of the prospects for significant progress on various areas in
the Strategic Framework Agreement agreed to in Sochi, saying
that the GOR was willing to "wait it out" on issues like
missile defense until after the U.S. presidential elections
in November. End Summary.

U.S. Cannot Take Russia's Relations with Iran Hostage
-------------- --------------


2. (C) NSC Senior Director Warlick began the meeting by
noting that there had been some progress in several areas of
the Strategic Framework Agreement issued after the meeting
between Presidents Bush and Putin in Sochi. Among these was
the signature in Moscow and the forwarding by the
Administration of the 1-2-3 Agreement regarding nuclear
cooperation to Congress for its mandatory 90 consecutive day
review. Warlick noted that the Administration was consulting
closely with key members of Congress and staff regarding the
benefits and importance of the Agreement, but also warned
that Russian actions related to Iran, including possible
sales of conventional military equipment, would be closely
scrutinized on the Hill.


3. (C) Nazarov agreed with the importance of the proposed
1-2-3 Agreement for both Russia and the U.S., but in response
to the point that Congress would see the 1-2-3 Agreement in a
negative light with regard to arms transfer to Iran, he added
that he hoped its entry into force would not be contingent on
Russia altering its relations with Iran. Nazarov said that
GOR policy on Iran is well developed and based on the notion
that Iran's perception of its own security is important for
peace and security in the entire region. He contrasted this
with U.S. policy on Iran he felt was based on "phobias,
threats and sanctions" which, in his view, was sure to result
in a dead-end. He said that direct USG negotiations with
Iran are absolutely necessary and asked how the USG could
negotiate directly with North Korea, a country that already
possesses nuclear weapons, and not with Iran, which does not.

He also down-played EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana's
efforts on behalf of the EU and U.S. as a poor substitute for
direct U.S. engagement with Iran.

"Hands Off" Russia's Relations with Georgia
--------------


4. (C) On Georgia, Nazarov feigned appreciation of U.S.
efforts to calm things down in Abkhazia (which he described
as being within Russia's "zone of influence"),including our
support for the recent meeting in St. Petersburg between
Saakashvili and Medvedev. He challenged DAS Merkel's
assertion that the introduction of additional railroad troops
destabilized the situation, stating that their deployment was
within the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping agreement. He
also described their deployment as a humanitarian gesture,
repeating the argument fellow Security Council Deputy
Secre-tary Yuriy Zubakov had made earlier this month (reftel)
that the troops were needed to restore the railroad through
Abkhazia to Georgia and then onward to Armenia, the timing of
which Merkel said Washington did not understand. He added
that these railroad troops were really engineers with little
military training who could do the work to repair the
railroad cheaper and faster than civilian employees.


5. (C) Nazarov closed the discussion on Georgia by accusing
the USG of providing the Georgian military with heavy
armaments which could then be used against Russian
peace-keepers. Nazarov accused the GOG of creating a mirror
government in the Kodori Gorge region and made reference to a
recent incident involving Georgian troops and several Russian
soldiers. (NOTE: The meeting with Nazarov took place one
day after Georgian police detained and later released four
Russian soldiers in the Zugdidi district while they were
transporting anti-tank missiles between two Russian bases.
END NOTE.) Nazarov also alleged that unlike Georgia's
"friends" in Europe, only the USG was providing Georgia with
such heavy weaponry. He said the GOR has information
purporting to show that the USG is paying a salary to
Saakashvili and others, including Georgian officials involved

MOSCOW 00001774 002.2 OF 002


in the initial attempt to ethnically cleanse Abkhazia at the
beginning of the conflict. He added that he receives
information every day that the USG is working actively to
worsen Russia's relations with its fellow CIS members.

Ramifications NATO Enlargement Not Fully Understood
-------------- --------------


6. (C) On NATO enlargement, Nazarov said the GOR was most
bothered by the situation in Georgia. Accepting Georgia into
NATO, he said, would destabilize Europe and harm relations
between the U.S. and Russia. He said he knew that the USG
has been working very hard since the NATO Summit in Bucharest
in April to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine receive their
formal invitation to join in December. He added that the
situation in Ukraine is also dangerous and could destabilize
both eastern and western Ukraine. He concluded that the
people who are pushing NATO membership for Georgia and
Ukraine are far away from the area geographically and do not
fully understand its ramifications.

GOR Willing to Wait on Missile Defense
--------------


7. (C) Nazarov disagreed with Warlick's suggestion that some
progress had been achieved in recent missile defense experts'
discussions regarding transparency and confidence building
measures related to the proposed missile defense
installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Nazarov
asserted that the promised dialogue on coordination and
transparency has not been concrete and Russia remains
troubled by the actions of several eastern European
countries. He reiterated that the GOR does not see any logic
for the U.S. in setting up such a system and negotiating with
Poland and the Czech Republic for its installation on their
sovereign territory. He also discounted any attempts by the
USG to convince the GOR that the system is not directed at
Russia and suggested that the GOR might be able to reach
agreement with a new administration after the U.S.
presidential elections. DAS Merkel told Nazarov that while
any future U.S. administration will be free to make its own
decision on missile defense, both political parties in the
U.S. see a value in such a system.

New Security Council; New National Security Strategy
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Nazarov said that in addition to former FSB chief
Nikolay Patrushev as its head, the Security Council has also
gotten additional staff who are well experienced in security
work. He said that many of the Council's "old guard" remain,
some of whom will work on a new law on national security (to
replace the 1992 law which has 40 amendments) and a new
National Security Strategy that will reflect the changes in
Russia's economy and its new status in the world. Nazarov
said that the Security Council had studied the U.S. National
Security Strategy and that theirs would be a similarly open
document. The long-term strategy would focus on existing
groups that threaten Russia's security as well as some new
threats. When pressed by Warlick, he said that despite the
recent selection of former Russian Ambassador to the U.S.
Ushakov as Putin's foreign affairs advisor, Medvedev would
continue to run Russia's foreign policy, as is required by
the constitution.

Comment:
--------------


9. (C) A 30-year veteran of the KGB and FSB intelligence
services, Nazarov pulled few punches in the meeting. He
urged renewed contact by the Administration with the Security
Council. But, he was frank in his assertion that a resurgent
Russia will not countenance meddling in its "sphere of
influence" and is willing to wait out the U.S. presidential
election cycle to see what kind of hand Russia is dealt the
next time around.


10. (SBU) NSC Senior Director Warlick and EUR DAS Merkel
cleared this message.
RUSSELL

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