U/S BURNS'S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001772

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON GG UP MD RS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS'S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. Prior to the CTWG Core Group consultations,
on June 19, U/S Burns met with Deputy Foreign Minister
Karasin and covered Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and
Nagorno-Karabakh. Karasin described to U/S Burns Russia's
reaction to the increasing distance between Russia and
Ukraine and expressed hope for a Ukraine able to maintain
good relations with both Russia and the West. U/S Burns
urged Russian restraint in Abkhazia, while Karasin put the
onus for an improvement there on Saakashvili. Karasin hoped
the USG would ease sanctions against Belarus. DAS Merkel
noted the need for Belarus to allow the U.S. Embassy to
return to normal and to free political prisoners. Karasin
was cautiously optimistic about progress over Nagorno -
Karabakh, terming the Aliyev - Sarkisyan meeting at the St.
Petersburg Economic Forum "not bad." End summary.


2. (C) In a June 19 meeting, U/S Burns and Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin discussed Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova
and Nagorno-Karabakh. DFM Karasin expounded his view that,
in the 21st century, international problems defy a simple
solution. Unfortunately, leaders of new young democracies
were in search of rapid solutions that did not require a
concerted, protracted effort. The U.S., Russia, and other
global leaders must remain in close contact in order to help
guide more inexperienced players. U/S Burns recalled
Karasin's visit to Washington 18 months ago and invited him
back. Karasin suggested consultations in Washington close to
the end of the year.

Ukraine
--------------


3. (C) Karasin thought that NATO Secretary General de Hoop
Scheffer's just-completed visit to Ukraine had yielded no
surprises, and the situation on the ground remained
unchanged. The majority of Ukrainians continue to oppose
Ukraine's entry into NATO, but "the picture is messy." NATO
membership -- a choice with enormous strategic implications
-- continued to widen divisions within the country and could
catalyze early elections. At the same time, Russia and
Ukraine, which share a common history, are moving further and
further away from their traditionally close ties. Karasin
reinterated that stability in Ukraine was of paramount
importance to Russia. The GOR hoped for a Ukrainian
government friendly to Russia, to the U.S, and the EU. At
the same time, the GOR had to take into account an emotional
response by the Russian people to events inside Ukraine. U/S
Burns emphasized that stability in Ukraine and a healthy
relationship between Moscow and Kiev were likewise important
for the U.S. The decision to seek NATO membership was for
sovereign Ukraine alone to make, but the NATO MAP process was
careful, measured, and transparent.


4. (C) U/S Burns expressed concern about the recent
escalation in rhetoric vis-a-vis Ukraine and urged a more
low-key approach. Karasin likened the current situation to
close relatives who had shared one communal apartment but
were now scattered among several while memories of their
shared "time together" remained fresh. He defended Moscow
Mayor Luzhkov who, in a May 12 speech, had claimed Russia's
right to the naval base in Sevastopol. Luzhkov was
responding to a large crowd chanting "Sevastopol! Crimea!
Russia!" during the ceremony marking the 225th anniversary of
the base. Karasin, who had accompanied Luzhkov on May 12 and
DPM Sergey Ivanov on June 14 to Sevastopol, had witnessed the
fervor of the community first hand. He agreed that respect,
calm, and predictability should prevail, but argued that the
Black Sea Fleet was "at home" in Sevastopol. Karasin warned
that a NATO MAP offer for Ukraine would change everything in
the Russian approach to the 1997 bilateral agreement on the
Black Sea Fleet.


5. (C) Karasin affirmed that bilateral relations with
Ukraine were continuing to develop, but the complicated
relationship between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko made the work
of the Intergovernmental Commission difficult.

Georgia
--------------


6. (C) U/S Burns reminded Karasin that the U.S. had made a
steady effort to have the GOG exercise restraint and engage
Abkhazia directly. In light of the Georgians' unilateral
discontinuation of UAV flights and reduced security forces
in Kodori, the GOR should withdraw its military railroad
construction battalion as soon as possible. U/S Burns also
recommended that the GOR consult with the Georgians in
advance of any new initiatives. Karasin predicted that the
battalion would depart Abkhazia about August 10. He stressed
that Saakashvili must understand that the process of conflict
resolution started with him, not with Washington, Moscow or
the Friends. Karasin argued that the GOG had launched an all
out diplomatic offensive against Russia on a global scale,
including in New York and Vienna. Now the new theme was the
CIS PKO, he said. Karasin warned that no amount of drawn out
legal analysis could produce constructive results until the
Georgians accepted Abkhazia as a partner to the 1994
Agreement. In the case of the CIS PKO, the Georgians
pretended not to understand that the Abkhaz were afraid of
the Georgians and that UNOMIG could not stay without a CIS
mandate.


7. (C) Karasin praised Alasania's visit to Abkhazia. The
first step should be to sign an agreement not to resort to
force and to normalize the situation in Kodori. That would
set the stage for further constructive steps, said Karasin.
Karasin briefed on his discussion with visiting German
Coordinator the Friends' Group Hans-Dieter Lucas earlier the
same day, adding that the Russia would participate in the
June 30 Friends' meeting in Berlin. (CIS Fourth Department
Director Andrey Kelin will represent the GOR.) One danger,
Karasin warned, was Saakashvili's mistaken belief that the
settlement would be arranged for him by the Friends. U/S
Burns countered, maintaining that the German three-step
proposal and a Georgia - Abkhazia dialogue were not mutually
exclusive. Both tracks should be pursued. In response to
U/S Burns's repeated questions on the areas where Russia
could take positive steps, Karasin replied only that the GOG
must create the appropriate circumstances by reducing its
forces in Kodori.


8. (C) Karasin insisted that instead of criticizing the
April 16 Presidential instructions to strengthen social,
economic and consular ties, Georgia should join in. Abkhaz
aspirations had been heightened by Kosovo's declaration of
independence. A "delicate" issue remained IDP return,
because the Abkhaz worried it could jeopardize their survival
as a people. U/S Burns suggested that, instead of waiting
for the Georgians to make the first move, Russia could move
unilaterally to reduce tensions. Karasin noted that the June
18 phone conversation between Medvedev and Saakashvili, had
resulted in DFM Vashadze's June 23 Moscow visit. He,
however, insisted that the Georgian leadership should muster
the political courage to sign the non-use of force agreement
and normalize the situation in Kodori. Georgia's gesture
would not only increase trust among the Abkhaz but allow the
GOG to challenge the Abkhazians with "We have done it, how
about you?" "Bargaining," long arguments, and political
rhetoric have led the Georgians nowhere.

Belarus
--------------


9. (C) Karasin said that Lukashenko had launched reforms and
advised the U.S. to ease sanctions against Belarus,
particularly Belneftkhim. U/S Burns said that the USG
planned no significant changes in its policies at this time.
DAS Merkel added that the re-establishment of a normal
embassy, the freeing of political prisoners, including
opposition leader Kozulin, and good cooperation with the OSCE
could help.

Moldova
--------------


10. (C) In response to U/S Burns's request for information on
Security Council Deputy Secretary Zubakov's June 18-21 visit
to Tiraspol and Chisinau, Karasin said that the preliminary
report over the phone had been positive. He also previewed
the Moldovan Prime Minister's June 20 visit to Moscow for
meetings with Prime Minister Putin. Karasin indicated that
not much movement had taken place since the April
Voronin-Smirnov meeting. Plans for a meeting between their
representatives were in place, however.

Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


11. (C) Karasin observed that the flurry of unhelpful
behavior by the Azerbaijan government that followed Kosovo's
independence had subsided. The Aliyev - Sarkisyan meeting at
the St. Petersburg Economic Forum had been "not bad." The
two determining factors remained the internal situation in
Armenia and the level of political patience in a dynamic and
oil-flush Azerbaijan, where certain political factions
supported a military solution. Fortunately, Aliyev understood
the danger of precipitous military action, said Karasin.
RUSSELL