DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001681

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY
SECRETARY ZUBAKOV

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. In a June 5 meeting, DAS Bryza and Security
Council Deputy Secretary Yuriy Zubakov reviewed the latest
developments in Abkhazia and discussed a possible joint
effort to improve relations with Georgia. Both agreed that a
military solution was not an option. DAS Bryza briefed
Zubakov on positive developments in Tbilisi's relationship
with Sukhumi, and urged the GOR to make concessions in order
to reduce tensions. Zubakov presented a long list of
grievances against the Georgian leadership, but agreed that
the U.S. and Russia should jointly attempt to move the
negotiation process forward. End summary.

Common Language Not Impossible
--------------


2. (C) Zubakov opened the meeting by stressing the
importance of continued U.S. - Russian dialogue. During his
recent trip to Tbilisi, Zubakov had met his "old friend"
Ambassador Tefft, and had felt the two had understood one
other. DAS Bryza reviewed U.S. efforts to normalize direct
contacts between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, and to help
the two parties overcome the historic animosity and navigate
the current delicate situation in and around Abkhazia. He
underscored U.S. concern that the GOR, despite its repeated
rhetoric of respect for Georgia's territorial integrity, had
engaged in provocative actions. DAS Bryza thought that the
independence of Kosovo had created an expectation that
"something" might happen in Abkhazia. Many in Georgia had
feared an impending cataclysm. To complicate matters
further, the Saakashvili leadership was contending with a
group of hard-liners who would protect Georgian honor at any
cost. The hard-liners saw only two choices: to lose Abkhazia
through its independence or annexation to Russia or to
attempt to regain it via military action. DAS Bryza said
that the U.S. goal was to help Georgia make a third choice:
to resume direct negotiations with Abkhazia. With many
serious professionals in Georgia, including Minister of
Reintegration Yakobashvili, urging a moderation on the
Georgian leadership, the GOG has begun to talk to the Abkhaz
and understand that their ultimate goal was a guarantee of
security and of respect for Abkhazian cultural and political
rights. DAS Bryza thought that the May 11 Alasania proposal
had brought Tbilisi and Sukhumi closer together. The task
now was to find a workable formula, perhaps one borrowed from
international precedents, such as Bosnia or Cyprus, to ensure
that if/when Georgian IDPs return to Abkhazia, ethnic Abkhaz
will maintain disproportionately large political rights. DAS
Bryza added that each party's concerns, including the return
of IDPs, the renunciation of force, and the reduction of
forces in the Upper Kodori, would have to be negotiated.

Russia's Turn to Make Concession
--------------

3, (C) DAS Bryza said that Russia's willingness to make
concessions -- whether it be the removal of paratroops and
their artillery or the discontinuation of railway
construction by the Ministry of Defense -- would be immensely
helpful in opening a new and promising negotiating process.
He emphasized that Russia's "humanitarian" work would have
been acceptable and appreciated had Russia consulted first
with Georgia and especially if the two countries were to
engage in joint projects. The GOR's dispatch of MOD
personnel for railway construction in Abkhazia a day after
Georgia had announced the discontinuation of UAV flights was
not very helpful.

Without Russia, Nothing Goes
--------------


4. (C) DAS Bryza, recalled that both Abkhaz "president"
Bagapsh and the UNSYG Special Representative to Georgia Jean
Arnault believed the Friends' Group was "non-functional," and
reiterated that the conflict could be solved only if the U.S.
and Russia worked together with a strong commitment to a
peaceful solution. Without Russia, there would be nothing.

Trusting Georgia: Hardest Thing to Do
--------------


5. (C) Zubakov said he met with many prominent Georgians
during his recent trip to Tbilisi, including President
Saakashvili. He expressed concern for the Georgian
hard-liners, who tended to make emotional decisions, with no
regard for their consequences. He requested that the U.S.
attempt to dampen emotion among Georgian leaders. Zubakov
dismissed the GOG's list of complaints as not serious.
Georgia's grievance about the Joint Control Commission (JCC)
for the South Ossetia conflict was not convincing, as the
success of any negotiation depended on the commitment of the
participants. Zubakov criticized the GOG for pretending that
Putin's April 16 instructions had triggered the impasse,
although the current "abnormal" relationship had in fact
preceded it. Zubakov presented to DAS Bryza a list of
Georgian "provocations," including the recent firing on a bus
in Gali, where the journalists and TV crew had been
"pre-positioned" to record the "event;" and the killing of
six Cossacks in South Ossetia. In the latter instance,
Zubakov said, the Georgians had quickly changed the clothing
of a murdered South Ossetian to make him look like a Russian
Cossack. Give that track record, he asked, "How can we trust
the Georgians?"

Saakashvili's Policies
--------------


6. (C) Zubakov maintained that the Georgian leadership
should be more cognizant of the negative consequences of its
behavior. Saakashvili's intention to settle status before
the principle of the non-use of force and confidence building
had been established did not work. Zubakov urged the
Georgian leadership to study the origins of the 1994 war, and
listen more closely to the Abkhaz. As Russia cherishes and
loves Georgian culture, the Georgians should learn to respect
Abkhaz culture instead of trying to supplant it with their
own. He advised never to forget that it was Russia who saved
Shevardnadze. Saakashvili claimed that Russia was Georgia's
number one threat and had boasted to Zubakov that the whole
international community was behind Georgia in its conflict
with Russia. (DAS Bryza questioned the validity of such
assertion.) In contrast to the GOG's impulsive and
provocative actions, the GOR has been transparent and abided
by the rules set: in increasing peacekeeping troops it had
been careful to keep their number below the ceiling
established by the 1994 mandate. Instead of reciprocating
the GOR's goodwill gestures, the GOG had endlessly talked
about the wine embargo -- which was simply "ridiculous." The
Russian market was flooded with counterfeit Georgian wines
that required GOR quality control.


7. (C) Zubakov noted that Georgian cabinet members rotate
with alarming rapidity, and many "competent" professionals
were dismissed for no reason, making long-term cooperation
based on personal rapport difficult. He lamented the loss of
"respectable" Georgian leaders, with whom the GOG could work
effectively, such as former FM Zourabichvili, former Georgian
Ambassador to Russia Abashidze and former Russian Ambassador
to Georgia Chikvishvili. Where is Salome now?" Zubakov
asked, referring to the former Georgian FM, Salome
Zourabichvili, who is now working for the opposition.
Zubakov said that he had much respect for Yakobashvili and
his academic background but Yakobashvili himself admitted to
Zubakov that he might not last long. For the time being,
Yakobashvili is busy "looking for scholarly justifications
for Saakashvili's emotional decisions."

Kosovo Not Yet Finished
--------------


8. (C) Zubakov warned that the Kosovo settlement was not yet
completed and many unexpected results of the forced
settlement were in store. He asked DAS Bryza how the West
would handle the second largest Moslem country in the heart
of Europe. Arguing Russia's policy toward Kosovo based on
"tolerance" was more responsible than the West's, Zubakov
advised against a hasty imposition of a settlement on
Abkhazia.

Defending GOR "Humanitarian" Assistance
--------------


9. (C) Zubakov defended the dispatch of MOD troops to
Abkhazia as a good example of humanitarian work performed by
unarmed, disciplined military personnel. The proposal to
jointly restore the railway had been rejected by the
Georgians a few years ago. The GOR's proposal for a railway
connecting Abkhazia with the Russia-Georgia-Armenia railway
had also been dismissed by the Georgians. "In the meantime,
the Gali district lies in complete ruin," said Zubakov. He
claimed that the Abkhaz were entitled to basic human rights
including freedom of movement, trade and health care, which
the GOR was trying to restore. Georgia should join Russia in
its effort to improve the lives of the Abkhaz, rather than
continuing provocative actions such as flying UAVs which had
only two purposes: military intelligence and improved
targeting.

Joint Steps
--------------

10. (C) Zubakov stressed that Russia welcomed open
consultation and dialogue with the U.S., and asked DAS Bryza
to publicize the U.S.'s intention to work with Russia on the
frozen conflicts, especially through the press. He claimed
that even the Georgian press understood the responsibility to
inform the public correctly and was ready to help. During
his four press interviews -- two with the Russian wire
services immediately after the Zubakov meeting -- DAS Bryza
had done just that. Zubakov ended the meeting by thanking
DAS Bryza for seeking consultations with GOR officials.


11. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this message.
RUSSELL