BLACK SEA FLEET STIRS CONTROVERSY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001568 SENSITIVE SIPDIS REF: A. MOSCOW 1517 ¶B. MOSCOW 1330 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MARR MCAP PBTS PGOV PREL ECIN ETRD WTRO SUBJECT: BLACK SEA FLEET STIRS CONTROVERSY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The dispute over the termination of Russia's Black Sea Fleet basing in Sevastopol by 2017 has only grown more intense since Russia celebrated the fleet's 225th anniversary on May ¶12. In response to Ukrainian President Yushchenko's order to draw up a draft law by July 20 to terminate all international agreements regarding the Black Sea Fleet's base, the Russian MFA asserted it was too early to consider the fleet's status, and predicted that the fleet would continue to be located in Ukraine, with Medvedev counseling Yushchenko against any hasty decision. MFA negotiators argue that treaty language foresaw a "likely" extension of the lease, with experts stressing Russia's resistance to Sevastopol falling into NATO hands. FM Lavrov accused the GOU of fanning populist flames to galvanize support for NATO accession, a move he said would have dire consequences. Russian experts point to statements by Ukrainian officials potentially linking Sevastopol's status to Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession as a further irritant. Mayor Luzhkov's recent comments questioning Crimea's Ukrainian status continue to reverberate, with the MFA announcing a tit-for-tat travel ban and a local newspaper falling victim to the Mayor's wrath. End Summary. -------------- Russia Presumes Right to Sevastopol... -------------- ¶2. (U) On May 21, the MFA posted a response to Ukrainian President Yushchenko's May 20 decree ordering his cabinet to draft a law by July 20 that would terminate all international agreements on the presence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. Citing the 1997 Agreements on the Status and Conditions of Stationing the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine, the Parameters for Division of the Black Sea Fleet, and on Mutual Settlements Associated with the Division of the Black Sea Fleet and with the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet's Presence on the Territory of Ukraine, MFA officials pointed out that the Agreements provide for automatic five-year extensions past their 2017 expiration unless one side notified the other in writing one year prior. Thus, the MFA said the GOR presumed that the Black Sea Fleet would continue to be based in Ukraine in the future, and argued Russia and Ukraine should concentrate on practical issues to improve operations of the fleet. These issues included housing, navigation support, citizenship of servicemen and their families, and others. MFA officials argued the Russian and Ukrainian presidents agreed to work on these issues when they signed the Russia-Ukraine Action Plan To 2009. ¶3. (U) Lavrov and other GOR officials called Yushchenko's order premature and said it jeopardized trust between Russia and Ukraine. In press coverage, some GOR officials speculated that Ukraine's actions could endanger the ten-year Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Russia and Ukraine, which came into force on April 1, ¶1999. On May 29 Medvedev called Yushchenko and stressed the importance of not taking unilateral decisions that run counter to previous treaty obligations. -------------- ...Then Clarifies the Record -------------- ¶4. (U) In an attempt to control the press speculation and clarify the MFA's May 21 statement, Ambassador at Large Vladimir Dorokhin in a press conference on May 29 pointed out the benefits the Black Sea Fleet brings to Sevastopol: Russia pays about USD 98 million per year to rent the base, plus an additional USD 4 million in subsidies to the local government. The base also provides about 25,000 jobs for local residents. Dorokhin stressed that 20-year lease on the base at Sevastopol would be automatically renewed for another five years unless one side notified the other in writing. This, according to Dorokhin, meant that the original agreement foresaw a "likely" further presence of the fleet in Ukraine. He argued that it has never been a secret that the GOR would like to keep the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for as long as possible. ¶5. (U) Dorokhin acknowledged that, as a sovereign state, Ukraine had the right to conduct its own affairs, but argued that Russia should also have a voice in the matter. He questioned the timing of Yushchenko's announcement, as well as the GOU's logic that it would take nine years for Russia to withdraw the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol. He also said the GOR would not give up its interests in the Black Sea. A recent opinion poll showed approximately 70 percent of Russians support basing the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. -------------- - MOSCOW 00001568 002 OF 002 GOR Links Black Sea Fleet Issue To Ukraine MAP -------------- - ¶6. (SBU) At the BRIC Ministerial on May 16, FM Lavrov linked the GOU's demands to have the Black Sea Fleet leave Sevastopol by 2017 to a possible NATO MAP offer to Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian authorities have been "whipping up emotions" as part of an effort to "artificially draw Ukraine into NATO." Lavrov said the GOU was damaging Russia-Ukraine relations and acting against the will of the majority of Ukrainians. He said this would have "destructive consequences," and Russia would do everything it could to prevent Ukrainian accession to NATO. Other GOR officials have made similar statements, including Chair of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs Alexey Ostrovsky, who declared in April that Russia could reclaim Crimea if Ukraine was admitted to NATO. Other GOR officials have speculated that Ukraine wants to conclude negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet early in order to make a NATO MAP offer easier to extend. ¶7. (SBU) Russian experts tell us that the GOR remains concerned that Sevastopol could become a NATO base, despite provisions in Ukraine's constitution that prohibit foreign bases. In the GOR's assessment, Ukrainian politics show that constitutions can be changed on a whim. Some experts argue that the GOR would like to drag out negotiations over the Sevastopol base as long as possible in the hope that the next Ukrainian president might be more amenable to hosting the Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian soil. Experts maintain that the GOR does not want Sevastopol to become a central issue in its relationship with Ukraine, and so is in no hurry to commence negotiations on the fleet's withdrawal. GOR officials reiterate that Russia would like to avoid the logistical and financial trouble of relocating the Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk (ref A). -------------- WTO-Sevastopol Linkage? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Russian experts are concerned that Ukraine could use bilateral negotiations with Russia over WTO to introduce political linkage to Sevastopol. Gaining wide press play in Russia was Supreme Rada member Andrey Paruby, of the pro-Yushchenko Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc, statment that Ukraine can "block Russia's accession to the WTO until an agreement on the withdrawal of Russia's Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine is signed." Ukraine was expected to participate in the Working Party multilateral negotiations and Russian trade negotiators have been prepared for a bilateral request. -------------- Luzhkov's Revenge -------------- ¶9. (U) In retaliation for the GOU's May 12 announcement that Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov was no longer welcome in Ukraine following comments questioning Crimea's Ukrainian status (ref B),the Russian MFA announced on May 22 that it would impose entry restrictions on Ukrainian politicians who "damage the Russian Federation by action or word." The MFA immediately banned Ukraine's First Deputy Prime Minister Evhen Kornichuk from entering Russia because of his suggestion that Putin should be declared persona non grata. "Considering what Evhen Kornichuk said in his public address, we assume that he will not be planning to visit the Russian Federation," said Andrey Nesterenko, a Foreign Ministry spokesman. ¶10. (SBU) Domestically, Luzhkov has lashed out against the independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta for its critical coverage of his Sevastopol remarks, with Editor Konstantin Remchukov receiving a one-month eviction notice from the newspaper's city-owned premises. While Remchukov intends to fight the order, he noted that the Russian media have been muted in their analysis of Luzhkov's incendiary rhetoric, precisely because the mayor holds substantial levers with which to complicate their operations. RUSSELL