RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS MONOPOLIZED BY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001517 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS MONOPOLIZED BY UKRAINE'S NATO BID Classified By: Charge Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The consensus here is that Yushchenko's "clearly anti-Russia" agenda and his "blind pursuit" of NATO membership have hijacked Russian-Ukrainian relations. MFA officials confirmed that Russia's top issue in bilateral contacts with Ukraine, including Lavrov's meeting with Ukrainian FM Ogryzko and DFM Grushko's trip to Kyiv, is the "disastrous consequences" of Ukrainian NATO membership for Russian-Ukrainian relations. Analysts told us that Russia's thinly veiled threats to use any and all levers at its disposal to resist Ukraine's "forced entry" into NATO, including undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity and boosting gas prices, should be taken seriously, but note that the deep and multifaceted ties that bind Russia and Ukraine may restrain Russia from taking the most extreme measures. End Summary. NATO Dominates Russian-Ukrainian Relationship -------------- ¶2. (C) Senior Russian officials have taken virtually every opportunity to stress to their Ukrainian counterparts that Russia is serious about its objection to Ukraine's NATO bid. MFA Second CIS Department Deputy Director Mordvintsev told us on May 27 that Lavrov expressed in the clearest terms in his April 15 meeting with Ukrainian FM Ogryzko that Russia would continue to resist MAP for Ukraine, given the "disastrous consequences for Europe, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and NATO-Russia relations." Lavrov also raised Russia's concerns (albeit in general terms) over Ukrainian arms sales to Georgia, underscoring the negative impact of such sales on the settlement of the separatist conflicts. Mordvintsev said that Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko reinforced this message during his May 23 meeting with Ukrainian First DFM Handogiy in Kyiv, noting that Russia has yet to receive a clear explanation from Ukraine for its "forced efforts" to join NATO. ¶3. (C) Mordvintsev said that Putin's 20 minute one-on-one meeting with PM Timoshenko on the margins of a May 21 CIS meeting in Minsk focused on gas and economic issues, including the possibility of eliminating intermediaries from Ukraine's purchase of Russian gas, but acknowledged the "possibility" that NATO was raised in the context of future gas deals. The Ukrainian Embassy noted that Putin's only formal bilateral meeting in Minsk was with Timoshenko and speculated that Russia was likely trying to strengthen its relationship with Timoshenko, who is perceived in Moscow as an "opportunist." ¶4. (C) GOR Special Envoy for Black Sea Fleet Issues Dorokhin acknowledged that Moscow Mayor Luzhkov's May 11 remarks during the 225th anniversary of the Black Sea Fleet were "unnecessary and incendiary," but stressed that they accurately reflected public opinion in Russia and stem from the GOU's failure to address Russian concerns over further NATO expansion. The most recent opinion polls indicate that almost 70% of Russians believe that Crimea belongs to Russia. Dorokhin added that Ukraine's decision to present Russia (during Ogryzko's April meeting with Lavrov) with an official memorandum declaring Ukraine's readiness to commence immediate negotiations on the withdrawal of the fleet, Yushchenko's recent instructions to the Rada to prepare a bill on the fleet's withdrawal, and announcing Luzhkov's persona non grata status in Ukraine were "premature and hasty moves," but were "probably connected" to Ukraine's NATO aspirations. If Georgian Membership is Hard to Swallow, Ukraine's Membership...Impossible -------------- ¶5. (C) Russian analysts across the political spectrum asserted that Russia could never be persuaded to understand, much less accept, Ukraine's full court press to receive a MAP offer in December. Although GOR officials have generally denounced Ukrainian and Georgian membership bids with equal fervor, Ukraine's possible accession hits much closer to home than that of Georgia and thus is viewed with considerably more consternation and anger. Analysts provide the following explanation for Russia's strong and unmovable opposition to MAP for Ukraine: -- Most Ukrainians Not Interested in NATO. Russians firmly believe that Ukrainians vehemently oppose NATO membership. As Carnegie Center analyst Dmitriy Trenin put it, "if Ukrainian society shared the same anti-Russian views as in Poland or Estonia, Russia would have less difficulty swallowing Ukraine's accession to NATO." Russian officials and analysts frequently throw around poll figures indicating MOSCOW 00001517 002 OF 003 that anywhere from 60-75 percent of Ukrainians are against membership. Moreover, experts are convinced that such statistics cannot be reversed simply by a GOU-led aggressive PR campaign on the benefits of NATO membership. Our contacts contend that Ukraine is simply not ready to abandon close ties with Russia for an uncertain future with NATO and would split at the seams if it were forced to make that choice in the near future. -- Anti-Russia Hysteria Generated by Yushchenko. Russian analysts find it unacceptable that Yushchenko and his political allies view the "demonization" of Russia as the only path to the development of Ukraine's identity and independence. Russians point to Ukraine's exaltation of Soviet "traitors" such as Roman Shukhevich, the designation of the 1930 famine in Ukraine as genocide, the banning of films not dubbed into Ukrainian, and the closing down and banning of Russian-language schools, as evidence of this anti-Russia policy. In his May 23 op-ed in Izvestia, well-known analyst Vyacheslav Nikonov wrote that in contrast with Kazakhstan (in light of Medvedev's recent visit), Ukraine's elite is "maximally interested" in limiting Russia's influence, blaming Russia for its "past tragedies," and building a national identity in "direct opposition to Russian culture." -- Damage to Russia's Military Industrial Complex. MFA officials claimed that Ukraine's accession to NATO would force Russia to sever its billion-dollar arms production and technology sharing agreements with its neighbor, noting that the costs of shifting away from Ukrainian-made parts for Russian equipment would be astronomical. Moreover, once under the protection of NATO, Russians are convinced that Ukraine would be less flexible on extending the lease of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol beyond 2017. Dorokhin told us that securing a renewal of the lease was a top priority for Russia, if for no other reason than to avoid the significant financial costs and logistical nightmare of relocation, and Russia would insist on delaying withdrawal negotiations until at least 2013. Russia's Response to MAP -------------- ¶6. (C) GOR officials publicly and privately do not hide that their endgame is the status quo. Russia has accepted Ukraine's westward orientation, including its possible accession to the EU and closer ties with NATO, but NATO membership and the establishment of a U.S. or NATO base in Ukraine remain clear redlines. Ideally, Russia aims to secure a written neutrality pledge from Ukraine. ¶7. (C) In contrast to Georgia, most experts believe that Ukraine's close economic relationship (bilateral trade reached more than USD 30 billion in 2007),energy interdependence, historical and cultural ties, a relatively open border (internal passports are only necessary),could restrain Russia from taking the most extreme measures. Moreover, the view here is that Bucharest "proved" that Russia's anti-NATO expansion policy is unattractive but effective, at least temporarily. Analysts doubt that the position of key Allies will be reversed in December at the NATO Ministerial, or anytime in the near future; Trenin commented that it made little sense for France and Germany "to give the gift of MAP" to an outgoing U.S. administration. At the same time, Ukraine's possible NATO membership grates on the rawest Russian nerves. Mordvintsev warned that Ukraine and NATO should not downplay statements from Putin and Lavrov -- "Russia will not swallow a MAP offer to Ukraine; our reaction will be strong." ¶8. (C) In the event of a likely MAP offer, MFA officials and analysts assert that Russia could take the following measures: -- Boost Gas Prices. Mordvintsev said that Russia would be released from any commitment to maintain below-market gas prices for Ukraine. Specifically, Russia could dramatically raise prices from $179/bcm to "near European levels" (over $300/bcm). Russia would argue that the price increases were consistent with Russia's continuing efforts to base all gas deals on market principles and would be fully prepared to undergo the heavy international criticism for taking such a step. -- Scale Back Cooperation with NATO. Russians stress that a MAP offer to Ukraine would weaken or dissolve NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia cooperation on common concerns such as countering terrorism and drug trafficking in Afghanistan. Some experts such as CIS Institute Deputy Director Vladimir Zharikhin pointed to Medvedev's decision to travel to Beijing on his maiden international trip as a warning that Russia would be MOSCOW 00001517 003 OF 003 forced to look eastward and focus more attention on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization if NATO and the U.S. ignored one of Russia's most important strategic concerns. -- Withdraw from the "Big Treaty." Mordvintsev also raised the possibility that Russia would withdraw from -- or refuse to extend in 2009 -- the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership ("Big Treaty"),in which Russia recognizes the current borders of Ukraine. Although Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Chernomyrdin publicly dismissed the possibility of Russia's withdrawal from the Big Treaty on April 24, Mordvintsev stressed that Russia has not ruled out this option. Ukraine's decision to join NATO would violate Article 6 of the Treaty, which stipulates that neither party will take any action or join any organization that threatens the security of the other. Mordvintsev and Dorokhin added that Russia would not have to exert any effort to weaken Yushchenko's grip on Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, but analysts told us that Russia could certainly fan the flames of separatism in Crimea. -- Other Measures: Mordvintsev said that Russia is looking at other punitive measures, such as canceling the open border policy and possibly redirecting Russia's ballistic missiles toward Ukraine, but these plans have not been fully developed. ¶9. (C) Conspicuously absent in Russia's approach to Ukraine's NATO bid is the offer of positive incentives in exchange for Ukraine's neutrality; sticks are the only items on display at the moment. However, even if Russia were inclined to calibrate its dialogue with Ukraine, the GOR would be hardpressed to offer anything other than more of the same. RUSSELL