RUSSIA BAITS GEORGIA ON N. OSSETIA; NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001440

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA BAITS GEORGIA ON N. OSSETIA; NEXT STEPS

REF: MOSCOW 1407

Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. On May 21, MFA officials reiterated Russian
respect for Georgia's territorial integrity and said there
was no plan to recognize South Ossetia's independence, or
annex the republic, despite the May 20 appeal by North
Ossetian President Mamsurov for unification. The appeal,
issued during an MFA-hosted conference, was not commented on
by FM Lavrov at the conference or reflected in statements on
the MFA website; however, Lavrov used his May 20 Duma
testimony to blame Georgia for increasing tensions in the
separatist territories and met later that day with Abkhaz
"president" Bagapsh to discuss the situation in the zone of
conflict. On May 21, Georgia's new Ambassador Kitsmarishvili
described to us his strategy of quiet diplomacy, and interest
in rebuilding trust and blunting Russia's campaign to paint
Georgia as the aggressor. Acknowledging the poor MFA
reception to Integration Minister Yakobashvili's visit, the
Georgian Embassy is pressing for a Medvedev-Saakashvili
meeting during June 7-8 St. Petersburg Economic Forum, with
Kitsmarishvili personally supportive of a DFM Vashadze
channel to the GOR. End summary.

Lavrov Pushes All Buttons
--------------


2. (SBU) FM Lavrov pushed Georgian buttons on Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in May 20 testimony to the Duma, a set-piece
meeting with Abkhaz "president" Bagapsh, and an MFA-hosted
conference on North Ossetia. Before the CIS Committee,
Lavrov focused on Georgian UAV violations of the 1994 Moscow
Agreement, blamed Georgia for historically placing conditions
on a no-use-of-force pledge, defended Putin's "instructions"
on humanitarian grounds, attributed the increase in CIS
peacekeepers to the need to prevent further Georgian
provocations, and put the onus on Georgia to respond to
Russian offers to improve bilateral relations. Noting
Saakashvili's peace plan, Lavrov argued that Georgian
militant actions on the ground belied its public diplomacy.
Meeting with Bagapsh, Lavrov emphasized "ways to reduce
tensions in the spirit of the UNSC resolutions and
recommendations by the Friends' Group," reinforcing his
previous message that Russia was not interested in changing
the formats for Caucasus conflict resolution. After praising
North Ossetia's successful experience of peaceful
co-existence among 100 ethnic groups, Lavrov listened quietly
to Republic President Mansurov's call for foreign support for
the unification of North and South Ossetia (which South
Ossetian "president" Edvard Kokoity echoed in a statement
from Tskhinvali).

MFA Denies Backsliding
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3. (C) In the wake of the Mansurov and Kokoity statements,
both MFA Fourth CIS Deputy Director Dmitriy Tarabrin and
Special Envoy for the South Ossetian Conflict Yuriy Popov
reiterated Russia's continued respect for Georgian
territorial integrity. In response to our strong concerns
over Mansurov's appeal, particularly in the context of an FM
Lavrov-hosted event, Tarabin said that the GOR would neither
recognize the two separatist territories, nor annex them.
Tarabrin defended Lavrov's participation in the program,
noting that the MFA regularly hosted events to showcase
Russian republics and North Ossetia deserved the Russian
leadership's attention. Tarabrin denied that Mansurov's
comments had been scripted. (Note: MFA statements
summarizing the conference have not included the Republic
President's call for unification; nor, however, has there
been any effort to officially distance Lavrov from the
appeal.) Popov told us May 21 that Kokoity's statement led
nowhere and nobody should be troubled by it. Noting that the
GOR had done nothing to encourage Kokoity's remarks, Popov
said that Russia's position on a peaceful and diplomatic
solution to the territory remain unchanged.

New Energy at the Georgian Embassy
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4. (C) On May 21, newly arrived Georgian Ambassador Erosi
Kitsmarishvili previewed for us an ambitious plan to reach
out to Moscow's elite to rebuild the lost trust between the
two countries. Thanking the U.S. for its support, he said
that Georgia's preference for Euro-Atlantic integration
should not be news to the Russians, and Russia should opt for
a stable non-Russophobic neighbor in the south. Noting the
emotional nature of Russian-Georgian relations, and the
Russian feeling of "betrayal," Kitsmarishvili said Georgia
would have to do a better job advertising the fact that
Russophobia did not dominate Georgian attitudes towards

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Moscow. Kitsmarishvili said that Georgia had made mistakes
in its approach to Russia, but that he took up the
challenging assignment to Moscow because he believed
Saakashvili had grown in office. He expressed concern that
many Russians, including DFM Karasin, erroneously connected
the May 21 elections with mounting tensions in the zones of
conflict.


5. (C) Diplomacy in the period after the Georgian
parliamentary elections and the inauguration of Medvedev,
Kitsmarishvili argued, could revitalize the political
landscape, moving beyond the bad personal relations between
Putin and Saakashvili that had dogged the bilateral
relationship. Kitsmarishvili noted that Medvedev had not
sought opportunities to comment on Georgia, which he
considered to be "not necessarily a bad sign."
Kitsmarishvili attributed the frosty MFA reception to
Integration Minister Yakobashvili (reftel) to both the
messenger and the fact that the new Russian government was
still operating under "old instructions." Kitsmarishvili
said he was pushing for a first meeting between Medvedev and
Saakashvili in early June during the St. Petersburg Economic
Forum, which could reframe relations. Kitsmarishvili said he
supported the idea of DFM Vashadze acting as a special envoy,
whose Moscow schooling and Bolshoi ballerina wife would give
him an entree and acceptability to Russian inner circles that
the GOG should exploit.


6. (C) With the Georgian Embassy transformed into a voting
station on May 21, Kitsmarishvili said his officers had not
engaged with the MFA on the North Ossetian President's call
for unification, but welcomed our message of concern.

Comment
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7. (C) Kitsmarishvili struck us as a savvy operator, whose
previous experience running Rustavi 2 television in Tbilisi
appears to have contributed to a rolodex of Russian political
and cultural figures. His more measured appreciation of
Saakashvili, willingness to criticize aspects of Georgia's
past tactics with the Kremlin, and entrepreneurial approach
to the strategic bottom-line may help open the door to a
broader range of opinionmakers than his predecessor enjoyed.
His support of a Vashadze channel strikes us as sound.
RUSSELL