HHS DELEGATION HEARS RUSSIAN VIEWS ON JOINT SMALLPOX

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001420 SENSITIVE SIPDIS USDA FAS FOR OSTA/MACKE, WRIGHT, ROSENBLUM; - OCRA/FLEMINGS; OA HHS FOR OGHA AND ASPR FAS PASS FSIS AND APHIS SECDEF FOR OSD STATE FOR ISN/CTR, G/AIAG, EB/TPP/ATP, EB/TPP/BTA, OES/STC VIENNA PASS APHIS/TANAKA, BRUSSELS PASS - APHIS/FERNANDEZ USDOC 3150/DAVID FULTON/MOLLY COSTA/ITA/CS/OIO/EUR GENEVA PASS HEALTH ATTACHE DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR GH/RCS/EE/ROSENBERG CDC ATLANTA PASS SEPRL FOR DAVID SUAREZ AND INGER DAMON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO KFLU EAGR PREL PGOV WHO RS SUBJECT: HHS DELEGATION HEARS RUSSIAN VIEWS ON JOINT SMALLPOX RESEARCH AND AVIAN AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA REFS: A. Moscow 1000 ¶B. Vladivostok 39 ¶C. 07 Moscow 3379 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Delegation led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness Gerald Parker visited Moscow and St. Petersburg May 4-7 to meet with senior GOR health officials to discuss the current state of smallpox research and avian and pandemic influenza surveillance and preparedness. Gennadidy Onishchenko, Russia's Chief Medical Officer and Head of the Federal Surveillance Service for Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being (Rospotrebnadzor),stated that the GOR would approve at least two of three proposed U.S-Russian joint smallpox research projects, but would not commit to a timetable for approval of the projects. While the GOR agrees with the USG view that the two declared smallpox repositories in the United States and Russia should not be destroyed, Russian health officials did not share our sense of urgency about restarting joint research and appeared unconcerned about the growing chorus of nations at the World Health Assembly calling for destruction of the smallpox repositories. GOR officials welcomed collaboration with U.S. officials and health specialists on avian and pandemic influenza preparedness. END SUMMARY. -------------- Smallpox Research -------------- ¶2. (SBU) An HHS Delegation led by HHS PDAS Parker visited Moscow and St. Petersburg May 4-7 to discuss the status of smallpox research and avian and pandemic influenza surveillance and preparedness with Rospotrebnadzor Head Onishchenko, Deputy Minister of Health and Social Development Ruslan Khalfin, the Director of the Ivanovskiy Institute of Virology Dmitriy L'vov, and the Director of the Research Institute of Influenza Oleg Kiselev. ¶3. (SBU) Onishchenko stated that the GOR would approve at least two of the proposed joint U.S.-Russia smallpox research projects, but refused to say when the projects would be approved, even when pressed by the HHS delegation. Onishchenko noted that the GOR had concerns about the third project, research on smallpox antivirals, but he refused to elaborate on the concerns, and stated that the project was still under GOR review. ¶4. (SBU) After the World Health Assembly May 19-24 in Geneva, Onishchenko stated that the GOR would like to begin discussions with the United State on a joint resolution commemorating the 30th anniversary of the eradication of smallpox in 2010 and the WHO-led scientific review of smallpox research. Onishchenko also invited PDAS Parker to visit the Vector State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology near Novosibirsk later this year, after the inauguration of President-Elect Medvedev but before the United States' political transition in January 2009. PDAS Parker invited Onishchenko to visit both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta (CDC) and HHS headquarters in Washington to discuss continued collaboration on live smallpox research and other matters of public health preparedness. Onishchenko noted that while he would like to visit both HHS and CDC, he was unsure when that MOSCOW 00001420 002 OF 002 could occur. ¶5. (SBU) Deputy Minister of Health and Social Development Khalfin confirmed that Onishchenko had the authority to address the smallpox research agenda and joint projects with the United States. He stated that the GOR shared the USG view that destruction of the smallpox repositories was premature and should not be placed on the WHO agenda. -------------- Avian and Pandemic Influenza -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Rospotrebnadzor Head Onishchenko briefed PDAS Parker on the GOR's application to establish Vector as a WHO reference lab and collaborating center for avian influenza (Ref C). He noted that Vector's location in central Siberia placed it at the "epicenter of migratory bird patterns" and, unlike other WHO Collaborating Centers, Siberia was not an "accidentally chosen" location for avian influenza (AI) research. Regardless whether Vector ultimately achieves recognition as a WHO collaborating center for AI, the GOR would be interested in fostering collaborative AI research projects between leading U.S. institutes and Vector, but Onishchenko did not mention the potential for collaboration with Russia's other two established national influenza centers in Moscow and St. Petersburg. ¶7. (SBU) Ivanovskiy Institute of Virology Director Dmitriy L'vov warned that the latest AI outbreak in the Russian Far East (Refs A, B) indicates that AI is now circulating among migratory birds in the Pacific Ocean region, raising the potential that AI could reach Alaska within the next several months as migratory birds from Russia cross the Bering Strait to Alaska. L'vov expressed a strong desire to collaborate with the United States in AI research. ¶8. (SBU) Research Institute of Influenza Director Oleg Kiselev stated that a private Russian firm was investing in the institute to build vaccine production capacity for manufacturing its proprietary H5N1 AI vaccine. Kiselev stated that the GOR had not yet finalized its draft national pandemic influenza preparedness plan, and he understood that approval of the draft plan had been pending with Onishchenko since 2006. Kiselev also expressed a strong interest in collaborating with the United States on AI research and pandemic preparedness. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The GOR's unwillingness to commit to a timetable for approving the proposed joint smallpox research projects indicates that leading health officials are not concerned by the growing chorus of nations at the World Health Assembly calling for the destruction of the declared smallpox repositories in the United States and Russia. They also do not share our sense of urgency about restarting joint smallpox research as the best way to present a strong argument against smallpox destruction. RUSSELL