GOVERNMENT/PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION RE-SHUFFLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001403 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON RS SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT/PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION RE-SHUFFLE REF: MOSCOW 1336 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell. Reason: 1.4 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: With most major appointments to the Kremlin administration completed as of May 16, continuity remains the watchword, with observers arguing that the same old faces mean a new "nomenklatura" has been formed. Medvedev's Kremlin has been largely purged of the "siloviki," who stalked its halls during Putin's eight-year presidency, but they remain present --if more peripheral-- elsewhere in the new governing configuration. More St. Petersburgers have been added to the White House - Kremlin mix, among them Medvedev associate and Presidential Administration Control Directorate Head Konstantin Chuychenko. Presidential Administration Head Naryshkin is better known for his bureaucratic skills than power ministry credentials, and it is expected he has been put in place to ensure seamless working relations with Igor Sechin, his counterpart in the White House. Central television coverage May 14 - 18 suggests that the official media are becoming more comfortable portraying a Medvedev presidency, and some observers believe that the new President will become first among equals in what Medvedev himself in interviews has termed a presidential republic. Other observers see in the continued presence of faces associated with Putin and bureaucratic gestures, like Putin's May 15 decision to form a Cabinet "Presidium," an effort by the Prime Minister to ensure he remains at the center of the Russian universe. One of the few new faces in the Cabinet is Minister of Justice Konovalov, whose devout Russian Orthodoxy has caught the attention of representatives of other confessions here. End summary. Features of New Arrangement -------------- ¶2. (C) With the May 16 appointment of Presidential Administration Cadre Chief Ivanov, the White House - Kremlin jigsaw puzzle seems virtually complete. Its main features are: -- Personnel Continuity: The Center for Political Technologies' Aleksey Makarkin goes so far as to describe the latest iteration as the beginning of a recognizable "nomenklatura." Although there are seven new ministers and the Kremlin deck has been re-shuffled, there are few genuinely new faces, and most of those are in the less critical ministries. Only Minister of Justice Konovalov, Minister of Energy Shmatko, Minister of Culture Avdeyev, Minister of Sport and Tourism Mutko, and the Presidential Administration's Chuychenko have been brought in from slightly more distant orbits. Those who have left the inner circle --Ustinov, Viktor Ivanov, Viktor Cherkesov, and Nikolay Patrushev-- have not gone far, with the exception of Minister of Culture Sokolov and Federal Agency for Culture and Cinema Head Shvidkoy, who to date have not been offered new positions. -- More Corporate PA: The departure of Sechin, Sobyanin, and Viktor Ivanov has left only one "grey cardinal" Vladislav Surkov in the Medvedev Presidential Administration. A less Silovik-studded PA is reportedly more to Medvedev's liking and, some commentators contend, Surkov was retained only with the proviso that he not be slotted to head the Presidential Administration. (With Medvedev's ascent to the presidency, Surkov's pro-Kremlin youth groups have had their sails trimmed, and the State Committee for Youth Affairs, headed by Surkov protege Vasiliy Yakemenko, folded into the Ministry for Sport and Tourism.) -- More Petersburgers: Geography is not destiny, but it helps to have connections to the northern capital. FSB Chief Bortnikov, Justice Minister Konovalov, PA Control Commission Head Chuychenko, PA Deputy Head Aleksandr Beglov, and PA Personnel Chief Oleg Markov join Petersburgers Putin, Medvedev, Zubkov, Kudrin, Sechin, Fursenko, Zhukov, Reiman, Zurabov, Levitan, Naryshkin, Yentaltseva, and Laptev. -- More Decisionmaking in White House: The transfer with Putin of experienced bureaucrats like First Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov, Deputy Prime Minister Sechin, and Deputy Prime Minister Sobyanin has given the White House additional heft and the Cabinet of Ministers will play a more active role in policy formation than it did under "technical" prime ministers Zubkov and Fradkov. (Of note, all of the key economic decision-makers report to Putin.) -- Reduced Role for "Siloviki": Commentators agree that the departure of the siloviki from the Presidential Administration, the appearance of some of their number, like Igor Sechin, in more public roles where they may be less free to operate behind the scenes, and the demotion (Sergey Ivanov) or sidelining (Viktor Ivanov, Viktor Cherkesov, MOSCOW 00001403 002 OF 003 Nikolay Patrushev, Vladimir Ustinov) of still others suggest they will be less influential in the new Kremlin - White House constellation. Russian Newsweek's Mikhail Fishman thought that FSB Chief Aleksandr Bortnikov would be weaker, and hence easier for Medvedev to work with than the outgoing Patrushev. In addition, he saw in the exile of Viktor Ivanov to the Federal Narcotics Control Service the hand of Medvedev confidante, Higher Arbitration Court Chairman Anton Ivanov, following Viktor Ivanov's attempt to pressure an Arbitration Court judge. That story is now unfolding in the media here (septel). Some commentators, however, note that Ivanov and Patrushev could use their new posts as platforms for renewed influence and point out that from his current perch, Sechin's influence over state industries and concomitant ability to issue orders blocking projects on economic or ecological grounds, in addition to his close relationship with Putin, means he retains enormous power. The Presidential Administration -------------- ¶3. (C) The lack of established institutions of power places a premium on personality and relationships. The power of the presidency will provide opportunities for the likely ambitions of figures like Naryshkin, Surkov, Deputy Head Aleksey Gromov, and Aide Arkadiy Dvorkovich, who will now be free to step out from behind the shadows of their predecessors in the Presidential Administration. The Moscow Carnegie Center's Andrey Ryabov believes the Naryshkin - Surkov combination is particularly felicitous, as it will allow Surkov to compensate Naryshkin's relative "lack of experience in political work" during the initial transition. Naryshkin's good relationship with Sechin should also ease the transition. Dvorkovich was an increasingly prominent player in the Putin Presidential Administration, and his move to Presidential Aide for Medvedev should allow him greater room for maneuver than he had as Chief of the Expert Directorate in his previous incarnation. Press Secretary Natalya Timakova, according to Russian Newsweek's Mikhail Fishman and Profil magazine Editor Svetlana Babayeva, worked tirelessly for Medvedev when it appeared that he had been eclipsed in the presidential sweepstakes last year, and acquitted herself well during Medvedev's presidential campaign. Timakova is completely trusted by the President, while Sergey Prikhodko will bring his accumulated experience to bear in an area where Medvedev is weaker: foreign policy. The President -------------- ¶4. (C) Medvedev is in a new role made more complicated by the reflexive comparisons to Putin, now housed just upriver. In addition, declarations of the intentions of Medvedev and Putin to govern as a tandem and the little time that has passed since the inauguration have complicated the adjustment of official circles to the new arrangement. The Moscow BBC's Konstantin Eggert told us that Medvedev would grow into the role, and that the bureaucracy would respond accordingly. Eggert suggested that the amount of discussion devoted to Medvedev's initiatives would be one index of elite acceptance. He was heartened by the positive media play Medvedev's efforts to improve conditions for small business had received during the week of May 12. Ex-Minister of Health and Social Development Zurabov, now a member of the Presidential Administration, had told Eggert the week of May 5 that he was convinced Putin would not run for President in ¶2012. Putin, Zurabov said, was riding herd over the siloviki until Medvedev was better entrenched. Babayeva also guessed that Putin would leave and was "busy with his own financial affairs." Both Eggert and Babayeva pointed to Medvedev's handling of foreign policy and his treatment at the hands of Russian official media as moments to watch in gauging the new President's progress. ¶5. (C) By that standard, the week of May 12 saw a small, but perceptible change in Medvedev's treatment on the evening news. If, at the beginning of the week, coverage of Medvedev was buried in news of Putin's visit to the Northwest, by May 15, the 2100 (local) Channel One news showed the President describing twice his reaction to the victory for St. Petersburg's Zenit soccer club, an extended clip of a visit to a military installation in Ivanovo, and a visit to a Kostroma monastery before Putin appeared on the screen. The coverage continued over the weekend, when Medvedev presided over a champagne reception for members of Zenit, and the team presented the President with a t-shirt. Although the sports event was wholly ceremonial, Zenit's victory has struck a chord with the man-on-the-street here. Friends and taxi drivers over the weekend noted to us that "the President" had rolled out the red carpet for the team. ¶6. (C) Medvedev continued to dominate the news May 19, with the formation of his long-promised Anti-Corruption MOSCOW 00001403 003 OF 003 Commission, which he will head, and a promise to follow that May 20 with the beginning of his long-promised initiative on judicial reform. Kremlin-close commentator Gleb Pavlovskiy, in a New Times magazine exchange with the commentator Stanislav Belkovskiy, predicted a Medvedev on the march. "(Medvedev) will create a maximally broad coalition, in which the siloviki will play a role." Belkovskiy described Medvedev as a "sufficiently experienced and clever apparatchik...One of the reasons he became (Putin's) successor." The Director of the Center for Political Research's Aleksey Mukhin saw the potential for power to shift Medvedev's way, while the Center for Political Technologies Aleksey Makarkin noted that the PA was becoming a "serious center for the adoption of decisions, and not the technical structure it had been under the two previous prime ministers." Dmitriy Badovskiy, while more careful than other commentators, noted that the new PA meant that "for any decision, the agreement of the Kremlin and the government will now be necessary." A New Face: Konovalov -------------- ¶7. (C) With continuity the watchword, most of PA and White House habitues are known quantities. One less well-known figure is Minister of Justice Aleksandr Konovalov. At age 39, Konovalov is the youngest member of the new cabinet and one of Medvedev's former students at the Leningrad State University Law Faculty. (Government contacts have told us that legal reform is the area where Medvedev plans to engage personally, which is consistent with this appointment.) Although the Public Chamber's Aleksandr Brod has praised Konovalov to us as professional and "modern" in outlook, Pentecostal Bishop and Public Chamber member Sergey Ryakhovskiy worried to us on the week of May 12 that Konovalov might be "too Russian Orthodox" to be even-handed in his treatment of Protestant denominations. Ryakhovskiy's concerns were voiced following news that the Justice Ministry would assume duties formally performed by the Federal Registration Service, including monitoring NGOs and religious organizations. ¶8. (C) In a September 2006 interview with the Russian Orthodox journal "Foma," Konovalov's religiosity was on prominent display. Konovalov, who at the time was Polpred for the Volga Federal Region told the "Foma" Chief Editor that "every normal Russian should be a baptized Russian Orthodox." At other points in the interview, however, he was careful to note that "in the majority of situations, it is possible to reach a level of internal harmony, where religious convictions are not in conflict with one's civic responsibility." Later in the same interview, Konovalov was more categorical, noting that "it is necessary to ensure balance and mutual respect for traditional religions. Understanding that Russia is a multinational and multi-confessional state, we have to be very careful. . .so that none of the normal, balanced, patriotically inclined people feel themselves mistreated or degraded. That is a very important task." Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) It is of course, too early to say with certainty which of the scenarios --Putin up, Medvedev down; Medvedev up, Putin down, tandemharmony-- will emerge, but a number of commentators continue to believe that, in a country where institutions are often in short supply, the one institution that endures, the presidency, will give Medvedev the edge as the summer progresses. RUSSELL