RUSSIA WANTS STREAMLINED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001329 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS STREAMLINED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WITH EU REF: MOSCOW 1122 (AND PREVIOUS) Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Russia is interested in expanding its ties with the European Union, including within the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),as well as on trade and security issues. However, MFA officials stress that there are "huge differences" between Russia and the EU on the approach to the negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA),the start of which is expected to be approved at the EU-Russia Summit in June. Russia prefers to have a new, "short and substance-oriented roadmap," which highlights areas for cooperation and allows the flexibility to add new areas as they arise, but does not go into extensive detail or cover primarily bilateral issues. Russia is also interested in expanding U.S.-EU-Russia trilateral cooperation, particularly in areas of foreign policy and new threats and challenges, including terrorism, non-proliferation, and external security. EU diplomats in Russia believe a deal will be struck in June, but caution that negotiations on the PCA will likely take several years to conclude. End Summary. MFA Positive on New PCA, But Sees Obstacles -------------- ¶2. (C) Head of the MFA European Union section Nikolai Korchunov told us May 13 that Russia viewed press reports May 12 that Lithuania had lifted its objections to pursuing a new PCA with Russia as positive, but stressed that the MFA had not yet received formal notification from the EU Commission. He made it clear that while Russia was interested in strengthening Russia-EU cooperation through a new PCA, the GOR had not been particularly concerned about whether an agreement would be reached to move ahead. The reports of Lithuania lifting its hold merely showed that the EU had managed to overcome its internal disagreements and was now "mature and ready to deal with us," he said. He hoped that the May 26 GAERC would approve the mandate, which would then be confirmed during Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko's meeting with political directors in Brussels on May 28. ¶3. (C) Stressing that 53 percent of Russia's trade was with the EU, Korchunov noted that President Medvedev had named "investing in Europe" as a high priority in his March interview with the Financial Times. "It was impossible to embrace all issues," Korchunov said, so Russia would prefer a short, substance-oriented "roadmap," which would demonstrate a new level of cooperation between Russia and the EU. Russia wanted the document to reflect the objectives, targets and means of cooperation, as well as issues such as the format and frequency of meetings, and areas and process for joint decision-making. However, while Russia was willing to identify general areas of cooperation, such as energy supply and security, trade and investment policy, transport and visa issues, and space, scientific and high technology cooperation, it did not want to get into extensive detail, allowing the flexibility to add new areas as they occurred. Korchunov also said that Russia was opposed to dealing with "individual, political" issues, such as the Druzhba pipeline, which had been one of Lithuania's hold-ups, in the text of the forthcoming agreement. ¶4. (C) Korchunov added that Europe would probably want to include in the PCA more energy-specific issues such as access to pipelines and diversification of vertically integrated energy companies, which Russia would have to study carefully. He noted that Russia was already in consultation with the EU on a visa-free regime, as well as topics such as illegal immigration, registration of immigrants, trafficking in persons, organized crime, travel document security/biometrics, and abuse of the visa system. ¶5. (C) Russia also saw increased cooperation on ESDP matters becoming more important, Korchunov said, referencing discussions with the EU on sending helicopters to help in Darfur. Russia was not satisfied with modalities that required the EU to make a decision first, followed by solicitation of third country (such as Russia) participation. Russia would like to consider modalities enabling Russia to participate in the decision-making process, or to take the lead occasionally, with the EU following. U.S.-EU-Russia Trilateral Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (C) Korchunov expressed interest in reinvigorating U.S.-EU-Russia trilateral cooperation, particularly on foreign policy and new threats and challenges, such as MOSCOW 00001329 002 OF 002 counterterrorism, infrastructure protection, and non-proliferation. He pointed to Central Asia as one area where such trilateral cooperation could expand, noting increasing interest from other countries in the region's natural resources and transport corridors. He added that French colleagues had expressed interest to him in exploring the possibilities for expansion of such cooperation during the French Presidency of the EU. European Commission and Missions Respond -------------- ¶7. (C) Representatives from the European Commission, and Polish, Lithuanian and West European Embassies expressed satisfaction that the PCA seemed to be back on track, although all noted they had not gotten reports from their capitals yet on the meetings in Vilnius. Previously, the Lithuanian representative had shared with us some draft statements and non-papers the Lithuanian government had prepared for its EU partners, outlining the issues that were holding up its agreement on the PCA mandate. These included the Energy Charter Treaty and the Druzhba pipeline; repatriation and compensation issues for persons deported by the USSR from the Baltic states; Russian cooperation in pending EU criminal cases, particularly concerning the persons suspected of involvement in the killing and wounding of civilians in Vilnius and Medininkai in 1991 and the disappearance of a Lithuanian businessman in Kaliningrad; and Russia's actions with respect to the frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. ¶8. (C) A Polish diplomat confirmed that Poland had withdrawn all its objections to concluding the PCA with Russia and would not raise any additional issues prior to the start of negotiations. The issue of the poultry and meat embargo with Russia had been resolved, and Poland's concerns about energy issues were fully covered in the annex to the mandate. Poland believed it was important to begin a new dialogue with Russia. The diplomat noted that negotiations could take one to two years, given the complexity of the issues, and the differences of approach by the EU and by Russia. ¶9. (C) Western European diplomats expect the negotiations to be lengthy and difficult. They noted that Russia was not in a great hurry to conclude a PCA with the EU since it was currently able to cut energy deals bilaterally, which were probably more advantageous to Russia than one comprehensive deal with the EU as a whole would be. They noted, however, that a PCA would facilitate Russia's downstream investment, and that, at bottom, Russia wanted "to belong to Europe." ¶10. (C) Comment. Russia is in no hurry to negotiate the PCA given its ability to deal with energy matters bilaterally, and its separate tracks on visa, transport, illegal immigration, and other such issues. Russia can be expected to demand more concessions from the EU, especially on energy issues, given its belief that it is now operating from a position of greater power and strength, and will not be willing to play the "lesser partner" role. Both Russian and European officials expect the negotiation over the new PCA to be protracted, complex, and contentious, but all believe Russia is too important to ignore. RUSSELL