RUSSIA TO GEORGIA: SABER RATTLING STOPS SHORT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001304

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA TO GEORGIA: SABER RATTLING STOPS SHORT OF
CONFLICT

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Russell:
Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: On May 8, the Russian Ministry of Defense
announced that measures by Georgia to deploy more forces in
the zone of conflict could lead to an additional deployment
of 500 Russian peacekeepers -- up to the 3000 limit in the
1994 Moscow Agreement. MFA Director Kelin told us there were
"no immediate plans" to increase troop levels, reiterated
concern over Georgian military movements, flagged claims of
another two Georgian UAVs shot down, and questioned why
Georgia's Foreign Minister had yet to travel to Moscow. The
Europeans have reinforced our message of restraint: FM Lavrov
told French FM Kouchner this was a Georgia-Abkhazia issue and
pointed to Georgian military moves; First DFM Denisov
reiterated to the EU that Russia did not seek a military
conflict. Experts here remain convinced that Russia welcomes
brinkmanship but not bloodshed, with the political elite
focused on Russia's unfolding political succession. Next
week's visit of FM Steinmeier and possible visit of FM
Kouchner provide high-level windows to reinforce
international concern over the escalating tensions. End
Summary

Russian Military Deployments; Georgian Moves
--------------


2. (C) On May 8, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced
that the number of its peacekeepers in Abkhazia, which had
risen from 1997 to 2542, could increase to the full 3000
permitted under the 1994 Moscow Agreement in the event of a
"further worsening of the situation" on the ground. Further
steps by the Georgian security services to deploy more forces
in the conflict zone would lead to "necessary and adequate"
responses by the Russian side to bolster the peacekeepers'
ranks. The Ministry of Defense statement noted that Russia
"recently" had informed UNOMIG of the numbers, disposition,
and tasks of the peacekeepers and cited Major General
Khattak's assessment that the activities of the Russian
forces did not contradict the basic agreements regulating the
peacekeepers' presence. The Ministry of Defense rejected
Georgian calls for the withdrawal of the additional
peacekeeping forces and concluded that Russia would adhere to
its obligations and not permit the situation in the region to
destabilize. Press reports also quoted senior Russian
military officials, who reinforced that the deployment was to
prevent bloodletting in the Caucasus.


3. (C) In the wake of the May 8 announcement, MFA 4th CIS
Director Andrey Kelin told us that the Defense Ministry
statement simply reasserted the option that Russia retained
under the 1994 Moscow Agreement to raise its peacekeeper
levels by another 500 troops; as of yesterday, he maintained,
the Ministry of Defense had "no immediate plans" to raise its
force levels. Kelin also underscored that UNOMIG was fully
apprised of the Russian peacekeeping presence, and rejected
the need to coordinate in advance with the Georgian
government. Stressing that Russian steps were designed to
defend Abkhazia from the Georgian use of military force,
Kelin insisted that Tbilisi had embarked on a destabilizing
military course. Citing intelligence, Kelin said that
Georgia was introducing new capabilities along the
Georgia-Abkhaz border and that he had just learned of the
shooting down of another two Georgian UAVs. In a typical
Kelin swipe, he noted similarities between the President's
and Saakashvili's letter to Putin; while Putin had responded
to Saakashvili, Kelin castigated Georgia for failing to send
its Foreign Minister to Moscow, as agreed upon in January,
"although he and his successor have visited every other
foreign capital."

Europeans Call for Restraint
--------------


4. (C) Our European colleagues have reinforced our message
of restraint to the Russians, with the French Embassy
reporting that Georgia-Abkhazia featured prominently in the
May 7 call by Foreign Minister Kouchner to FM Lavrov. In
response to Kouchner's message to show restraint and roll
back provocative GOR measures towards Abkhazia, Lavrov argued
that Georgia's fight was with Abkhazia, not Russia, and
highlighted recent GOR efforts to improve the bilateral
relationship. Lavrov apparently pointed to Georgia's
military buildup, including reports that up to twenty tanks
had been moved towards Abkhazia, and noted Putin had replied
to Saakashvili on May 6 urging restraint. (Note: The
Georgian Embassy was not aware of a recent communication
between Putin and Saakashvili.) In a May 7 meeting with
First Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov, the EU Mission also
urged Russia to repeal the presidential instructions and
roll-back its increase in peacekeepers. Denisov acknowledged

the seriousness of the situation, but reiterated that Russia
was not seeking to precipitate conflict and sought a
reduction in tensions. The Georgian Embassy reports that
this is the message it has received as well, while expressing
concern over the "larger issues" that are not in the MFA's
purview.

Experts: Brinkmanship, not Bloodshed
--------------


5. (C) In May 8 discussions with leading defense experts,
the consensus view remained that Russia did not want a
military conflict in Abkhazia. Aleksandr Golts, Deputy
Editor-In-Chief of the Weekly Journal, said Russia did not
want to invade Georgia, but was "playing on the nerves of the
West." A military conflict would end Russia,s efforts to
engage in "Putin-style diplomacy" with Georgia, where
brinkmanship, but not bloodshed, was the preferred tactic.
Golts shared our concern that escalation was possible, but
believed there was a minimal chance the situation would spin
out of control. Aleksandr Belkin, Deputy Director for
Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, argued that neither
Russia nor Georgia wanted a military conflict, but were using
the tensions for their own foreign policy agendas. While
Russia would not be an instigator to a conflict, Belkin
stressed that if Georgia miscalculated and attacked, Russia
would respond -- maybe not with troops, but certainly with
weapons and AIR support. Ivan Safranchuk, Director of the
World Security Institute, added that Russian leaders were
concerned Saakashvili could overreact and provoke a clash.
He linked the Defense Ministry's comments on potentially
increasing the peacekeepers to Russian fears that Georgia
would start "a small firefight" as a warning. Safranchuk
argued that the Defense Ministry statement sought to
underscore the consequences of escalation.

Comment: Russia's Preoccupation is Domestic
--------------


6. (C) The conflict over Abkhazia is currently a side-show
to Russia's political succession. Yesterday's inauguration
of Medvedev and today's ascension of Putin as Prime Minister
have monopolized the political space, with both leaders
focused on messages of domestic reform. Foreign policy was
not mentioned in Putin's hour-long address to the Duma, with
Medvedev likewise focused on land reform and housing for
veterans. To the extent that military maneuvers factor into
the public consciousness, it is limited to the reemergence of
military hardware in tomorrow's May 9 Victory Day
celebrations in Red Square. The potential visits next week
of both the German and French Foreign Ministers will refocus
attention on foreign policy, and provide an opportunity to
reinforce again with the Russian leadership the dangers of
brinkmanship in the Caucasus.
BURNS