RUSSIA CONTINUES TO OVERPLAY HAND WITH GEORGIA:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001285

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONTINUES TO OVERPLAY HAND WITH GEORGIA:
WARNS OF DANGERS OF WAR

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In the May 6 wake of FM Lavrov's "extreme
concern" over Georgian military intentions, Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin warned the Ambassador that Saakashvili was
unstable; while Russia did not seek conflict, if Georgia was
intent on provoking hostilities, Russia would respond.
Russian foreign policy experts joined official condemnation
of Georgian military rhetoric, with Russia's NATO Ambassador
Rogozin blaming NATO for Georgia's plans to retake Abkhazia
by force. While Lavrov denied receiving an Abkhaz proposal
for extending Russian military protection to Abkhazia, saber
rattling continued, with a senior Russian military official
charging that Russia would not permit any further Georgian
overflights, including UAVs. Painting the current escalation
as a direct result of NATO MAP deliberations, Russian
analysts charge that military defeat may nevertheless be a
domestic electoral boon for Saakashvili, who they believe
overestimates U.S. support for Georgian military adventurism.
While some analysts recognize that Russia has fallen back
into the role of international bad guy, there is broad
support for Russia's expanded engagement with Abkhazia and
interest in provoking a Georgian overreaction that might doom
its MAP bid. End Summary

GOR: Saakashvili Causes Concern
--------------


2. (C) Russian officials have stepped up warnings over the
alleged unpredictability of the Georgian leadership and,
returning to a favorite theme, the "emotional instability" of
Saakashvili. On May 6, Foreign Minister Lavrov reacted to
Georgian public statements by noting his "extreme concern"
over Georgia's predisposition to forcing a confrontation,
pointing to "more and more worrisome facts" suggesting
Georgia's intent to settle the conflict with Abkhazia by
force. Lavrov called upon those countries "who still have
some influence on the Georgian leadership" to dissuade
Georgia from its military path. On the evening of May 6, the
Ambassador warned Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin against
letting events spin out of control and urged Russia to
moderate its rhetoric. In response, Karasin accused
Saakashvili of being unstable and warned that the Georgian
President should be careful. While Russia was not interested
in an armed conflict, and had taken discrete steps to improve
the bilateral relationship, if Georgia was determined to
precipitate hostilities, Russia would respond. The common
theme among leading Russian analysts with whom we spoke on
May 6 was that Saakashvili believed he could "get away with
war," given sustained U.S. support for Georgia's "aggressive"
policy towards Russia; a potentially fatal miscalculation, in
the eyes of the Russian analysts.


3. (SBU) The drumbeat of anti-Saakashvili rhetoric
continues from other official quarters. Russia's Ambassador
to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin lashed out against Georgian
Integration Minister Yakobashvili's comment that Georgia was
close to war, putting the blame on Georgia for the heightened
tensions. Rogozin charged Georgia with implementing a
cynical plan "approved by several sponsors" to blame Russia
for increased tensions in the zone of conflict, relying upon
a "massive propaganda barrage" to justify its actions.
Rogozin accused Georgia of seeking to seize Sukhumi by force,
with Georgian special forces "trained by NATO instructors,"
with the potential to produce "serious bloodletting." Other
Russian experts have joined Rogozin in blaming NATO for
Georgian adventurism, with the head of the European
Institute's European Security Department Dmitriy Danilov
maintaining that Georgia was the first step on the path
towards NATO's domination of the Caucasus.


4. (SBU) In less inflammatory language, Duma International
Relations Chairman Konstantin Kosachev blamed the absence of
a viable political process in resolving the frozen conflicts
on Georgia, but reiterated that Russia had to avoid being an
aggressor. Dismissing Georgian accusations of the annexation
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Kosachev stressed that Russia
was operating within international law and remained focused
on separating the parties and creating the basis for a
political resolution of the conflict.

Military Saber Rattling
--------------


5. (SBU) While Lavrov moved quickly to deny receiving any
proposal from Abkhaz Foreign Minister Shamba to put Abkhaz
territory under the military control of the Russian Ministry
of Defense, in a May 7 "Kommersant" interview Major General
Vladimir Shamanov added fuel to the fire by stating that
Russia would no longer permit Georgian military aircraft from
flying over the zone of conflict, even if unmanned. Labeling

MOSCOW 00001285 002 OF 003


the UAVs a "naked provocation," Shamanov underscored that
they were a violation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement.
Describing the zone of conflict as being "in the field of
vision" of the Ministry of Defense, Shamanov asserted that
all measures were being taken to secure the territory. The
article goes on to detail the range of forces and equipment
(including 400 airborne troops),quoting an anonymous source
in the Ministry that "our boys are not going there to
sunbathe and swim in the sea. They have a clear task: to
respond instantly to any act of aggression from the Georgian
forces, to give an adequate and firm response to any attempt
to use force against Russian peacekeepers and Russian
citizens located in Abkhazia."

NATO is the Audience
--------------


6. (C) Russian analysts underscore the centrality of NATO
MAP to the current spate of tensions. Both Carnegie's Deputy
Director Aleksey Arbatov and political-military analyst
Vladimir Dvorkin stressed to us that Russian actions in
Georgia were designed to demonstrate clearly for a German and
French audience all the problems NATO would inherit if it
were to shelter Georgia. According to "Russia in Global
Affairs" Editor Fyodor Lukyanov, the possibility of
miscalculation is high. Lukyanov argued that Saakashvili
recognized that the opportunity to reestablish Georgian
control over the separatist regions had slipped away, and may
have determined that provoking a war with Russia "even if it
meant defeat" could yield sufficient political benefit at
home. In the event of a military conflict, Lukyanov
maintained, Saakashvili would be able to tell his domestic
constituency that he did all he could to prevent Russian
annexation of the separatist regions. Unless Georgia could
be convinced that it must choose between territorial
integrity and NATO membership, Lukyanov concluded that the
possibility for armed conflict was real. Director of the U.S.
Institute Sergey Rogov echoed the widely shared opinion of
Russian officials that Saakashvili overestimated U.S. support
in the event of Georgian-initiated hostilities.


7. (C) Also linking the current tension to NATO MAP and the
Georgian electoral calendar, MGIMO's Vladimir Degoyev argued
that Saakashvili's career depended upon defending Georgia's
territorial integrity, despite the fact that Abkhazia was
"long gone," with both separatist territories having crossed
"the point of no return." Because Saakashvili was concerned
about other "unhappy" ethnic groups in Georgia that could
start agitating once Abkhazia formally broke away, the
Georgian President sought NATO membership "at any price" as
the binding force for Georgia. With the May 21 parliamentary
elections fast approaching, Degoyev and other Russian
analysts argue that Saakashvili would use the anti-Russia
card again to unite the public behind him. Since Russia would
do everything to stop NATO "encroachment," while Georgia
would do everything not to formally lose Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Degoyev concluded that it was "anyone's guess" where
the conflict would end.

Overplaying Its Hand
--------------


8. (C) A few experts are willing to acknowledge that Russia
is overplaying its hand, with potentially dangerous
consequences. Sergey Markedonov of the Institute for
Political and Military Analysis criticized the GOR for
succumbing to Georgia's "game" and for allowing Saakashvili
to succeed in making Georgia's internal dispute a
Russian-Georgian affair or -- worse -- a dispute between
Russia and the West. Russia easily fell into the role of
"bad guy," Markedonov told us, and had "hastily" adopted
"unnecessary" measures, such as the removal of the 1996 CIS
sanctions against Abkhazia, which had been defunct in
practice since 2000. The official announcement of the
pullout only solidified an anti-Russia group among the
Western countries, he said. Markedonov, who visited Georgia
in early April, argued that more balanced policies by Russia
could have complicated Saakashvili's political standing,
given the emergence of a real Georgian opposition and the
perceptible weakening of Saakashvili's support base in
Tbilisi and Batumi. While questioning how realistic a MAP
bid was in December, particularly with Russia's friend,
Berlusconi, back on the world political stage, Markedonov
predicted that Russia would intensify its efforts to
"legitimize" the Abkhazian regime.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) While engendering international criticism, the
series of Russian steps to expand engagement with the frozen

MOSCOW 00001285 003 OF 003


conflict territories, to increase peacekeeping forces, and to
saber rattle are well received domestically. While Russian
officials maintain that Russia is not looking for a fight,
the volatility they attribute to Saakashvili is matched here
with at least a verbal readiness to rise to any challenge.
While preoccupied with a domestic political transition, with
today's inauguration of President Medvedev launching an
untested power "tandem," the Russian leadership remains
singularly focused on denying Saakashvili a NATO MAP. The
more tensions escalate over Abkhazia, the greater the
potential they see for Saakashvili's reactions to scare off
European support for Georgian NATO membership.
BURNS