RUSSIA: NOT SEEKING CONFLICT WITH GEORGIA, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001270

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: NOT SEEKING CONFLICT WITH GEORGIA, BUT
WILL DEFEND INTERESTS


Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) In a May 6 farewell call with the Ambassador, Chief
of General Staff General Yuri Baluyevskiy said that Russia
was concerned by the danger of a military conflict in the
Caucasus. Citing Russian intelligence, Baluyevskiy warned
that Georgia could "go to the extreme," which could lead to
conflict. While Russia was not seeking a fight with Georgia,
it would protect its interests in the region. The Ambassador
underscored that the U.S. appreciated the seriousness of the
Georgia-Abkhaz conflict and had counseled restraint to all
parties. There was no military solution to the situation,
and the Ambassador urged Russia to show restraint. The
Ambassador noted U.S. strong concern over recent GOR actions
that had served to undercut Georgian territorial integrity.
Baluyevskiy repeated that Russia was not interested in a
conflict. Recalling his experience as a military commander
in the first Russian peacekeeping battalion in Abkhazia
during the 1994 period of hostilities, Baluyevskiy noted the
significant loss of life and said "we cannot allow this to
occur again." Russia was not fear-mongering, he said, but
wanted the U.S. to understand this was an issue that "should
only be tabled at the negotiating table."


2. (C) In a separate conversation on May 6, Chief of the
MOD International Agreements Department General Buzhinskiy
argued to us that the possibility of a NATO MAP offer had
escalated tensions in the region, and asked "do you really
want a proxy war with Russia?" In response to the U.S. call
for restraint, Buzhinskiy accused Saakashvili of seeking a
military confrontation and argued that, buoyed by the
assumption of U.S. support, the Georgian leadership could
miscalculate. Buzhinskiy commented that the increase in
Russian peacekeepers was in line with the 1994 Moscow Treaty
limits, but was prompted by the Georgian military buildup,
with Russia clearly signaling to Tbilisi that it would thwart
a Georgian military invasion of the separatist territory.
Buzhinskiy charged Georgia with seeking to force a solution
to Abkhazia, in the face of deep historical, cultural, and
political divisions.


3. (C) Also on May 6, the Ambassador used a farewell
luncheon hosted by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak to
underscore the danger that the military buildup and
counter-accusations could easily get out of hand. Kislyak
had no substantive response, but Duma International Relations
Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev interjected that
neither the U.S. nor Georgia should underestimate how dug-in
Russia was over the prospect of a Georgian MAP.


4. (C) Comment: While recognizing the danger of
miscalculation, many in the political and military leadership
welcome Georgian warnings of war as a useful reminder to NATO
of the risks in proceeding with MAP at the December NATO
Ministerial.
BURNS