GOR TRANSNISTRIA NEGOTIATOR SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001195 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: GOR TRANSNISTRIA NEGOTIATOR SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) In an April 28 meeting, Russian Special Negotiator for Transnistria Nesterushkin reviewed the results of his "positive" April 21-22 consultations in Chisinau and Tiraspol, stressing that talks between Moldova and Transnistria appeared to be moving in the right direction. Nesterushkin's meetings with Moldovan and Transnistrian officials, which followed up on the recent meeting between Presidents Voronin and Smirnov and the "5 2" meetings in Odessa, reassured Russia that Chisinau and Tiraspol remained focused on the four recently formed working groups. However, Nesterushkin expressed concern that the "unchanged" negotiating positions of each side, Moldova's "rush" to complete an agreement in the next several weeks, and the strong opposition to Voronin's integration proposals in the Moldovan parliament threatened to undermine the progress. Nesterushkin stressed that the five mediating and observer countries needed to maintain the pressure on Chisinau and Tiraspol to adopt more pragmatic positions, particularly in the working groups, and praised the U.S. decision to engage with Smirnov. End Summary. We've Made Progress... -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 28, Russian Special Negotiator for Transnistria Valeriy Nesterushkin told us that his April 21-22 visit to Chisinau and Tiraspol were very "useful and revealing." Moldovan Reintegration Minister Sova and Transnistrian "FM" Litskai told Nesterushkin in separate meetings that the April 11 meeting between Presidents Voronin and Smirnov was a "pivotal moment" in the settlement talks. Nesterushkin said that as a result of the presidential meeting, both Sova and Litskai had a "clear mandate" to open official lines of communication (as opposed to the "unofficial" talks in the past) and reach a "mutually acceptable agreement." Nesterushkin commented that the increased commitment on both sides to find a solution was reflected in the "constructive and positive" April 14-15 5 2 meetings (in the context of an OSCE seminar) in Odessa. ¶3. (C) Nesterushkin cited the launching of the working groups as another key indicator of the momentum generated by the Voronin-Smirnov meeting. While cautioning that the four working groups (on transportation, health care, railroad connection, and the environment) were mainly confidence-building measures and not the commencement of formal settlement negotiations, Nesterushkin said that his recent trip to Moldova underscored the extent to which Chisinau and Tiraspol were committed to making progress in concrete areas of cooperation. ...But There Is Still Room for Concern -------------- ¶4. (C) Nesterushkin stressed that his optimism was tempered by the "principally unchanged" negotiating positions of Chisinau and Tiraspol. While Sova and Litskai made clear to Nesterushkin that each side genuinely wanted to reach a settlement, neither party has shown a willingness to address the fundamental concerns of the other. Sova gave Nesteruskhin the strong impression that Chisinau was only interested in securing Tiraspol's immediate acceptance of Voronin's earlier proposals for greater autonomy and representation for Transnistria in a unified Moldova -- ideally, prior to the Moldovan parliamentary elections in May. Litskai, on the other hand, dwelled almost exclusively on the need for Chisinau to recognize Tiraspol as an "equal negotiating" partner, and thus integration measures had to be developed on a joint basis. ¶5. (C) Nesterushkin also identified domestic constraints in Chisinau as another serious roadblock to a final settlement. Moldovan opposition leaders told Nesterushkin in unambiguous terms that Voronin's proposals to allow Transnistrians to occupy seats in parliament and positions in the Moldovan government would be met with stiff resistance if and when they were submitted for parliamentary approval. Nesterushkin explained that Voronin's proposals would necessarily entail the repeal of the 2005 law determining Transnistria's status, and such a step would require the backing of an unsympathetic opposition. ¶6. (C) When pressed, Nesterushkin also acknowledged that the tensions between Smirnov and Transnistrian parliamentary leader Shevchuk were "real," and thus Smirnov could not count on "automatic" approval from his legislature. However, he downplayed the likelihood that Transnistrian parliament would stand in the way of a settlement deal. 5 2 Plays Integral Role, But Russia is "Unique" MOSCOW 00001195 002 OF 002 -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Nesterushkin reaffirmed Russia's commitment to the 5 2 negotiating format and stated that the official mediators had to keep the momentum generated by the presidential meeting and Odessa talks. He cautioned that despite recent expressions of political will, the "devil is in the details," and Chisinau and Tiraspol must demonstrate greater "flexibility and maturity" in the working groups and in their bilateral discussions on Voronin's proposals. ¶8. (C) Nesterushkin did not miss the opportunity to underscore Russia's "unique and helpful" contribution to the settlement talks. He noted that Russia was the only member of the 5 2 that was able to break the impasse on high-level contact between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Nesterushkin praised Ambassador Kirby's decision to meet with Smirnov, noting that such direct engagement was necessary to overcome Transnistrian concerns about the "impartiality" of U.S. mediation efforts. RUSSELL