RUSSIA "LOSES" BUCHAREST

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001090

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA "LOSES" BUCHAREST

REF: MOSCOW 806

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. There is broad agreement in the Russian
expert community that Russia suffered a foreign policy blow
at Bucharest due to the future promise of membership for
Ukraine and Georgia and Alliance solidarity on missile
defense, with several arguing for a necessary change in tone
with the Medvedev administration. Stressing that Putin had
said Russia would continue to cooperate with NATO, despite
the differences, the MFA nevertheless believes the
NATO-Russia relationship is at a critical stage. In the wake
of the NRC, the MFA requests a U.S. signal of support for
Russian training of Afghan police at the Domodedovo Center.
End summary.

NATO-Russia Council Summit: Fairly Positive
--------------


2. (C) Andrey Rudenko, head of the NATO division at the MFA
told us that an intergovernmental group was still reviewing
the results of the NATO (and NATO-Russia Council) Summit and
the consequences for Russia. Putin had wanted to give a
positive signal that Russia was ready to cooperate "in a
constructive way" with the Alliance. Russia was generally
satisfied by the outcome of the NRC Summit; the transit
agreement for Afghanistan showed that Russia and NATO could
cooperate on important issues, despite our differences, and
Russia was pleased by the decision to continue training of
Afghan police at the Domodedovo Center in Moscow. Rudenko
said he had heard the U.S. was considering shifting the
counternarcotics training for Afghan police from Moscow to
facilities in-country and asked for confirmation. While
recognizing that eventually it would make sense to do such
training in-country, Russia hoped the report was not true, as
Russia placed a lot of importance on the cooperation at
Domodedovo. Russia would like a U.S. signal of support for
the Center.

NAC Summit: Not So Positive
--------------


3. (C) Rudenko said initially Russia had been pleased that
Ukraine and Georgia had not received a Membership Action Plan
at Bucharest, but after reviewing paragraph 23 of the NAC
Communique, which said Ukraine and Georgia would become
members of NATO, together with the language in paragraph 37
on missile defense, it was clear now that the U.S. "had
gotten everything it wanted" at the Summit. Rudenko
reiterated Russia's argument that the will of the Ukrainian
people was being circumvented since the majority did not want
to join NATO, and expressed the view that NATO had put the
cart before the horse, undermining the Alliance's previous
insistence on standards and criteria for membership.


4. (C) Rudenko also noted that the idea that NATO's missile
defense system could be integrated into the U.S.'s system in
eastern Europe "does not make us happier." He said if this
were to happen, Russia would have to reconsider its role in
the NRC TMD effort.

What Next?
--------------


5. (C) Stressing that the NATO-Russia relationship was "at a
critical stage," Rudenko said that following the
intergovernmental's review, the GOR would have to decide what
to do both in its relations with NATO, as well as with
Georgia and Ukraine. Putin had made clear that Russia saw no
alternative to cooperation with the Alliance and would
develop it, despite the differences. But, the level and
scope of this cooperation would depend on the readiness of
NATO partners to address Russia's concerns, he said.

Experts on Turning Point in NATO-Russia Relations
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Defense experts shared the MFA's concern over the
Alliance's commitment to admit Ukraine and Georgia. Most
believed the Alliance would offer the two countries a MAP in
December, and argued that it would have serious consequences
for the NATO-Russia relationship. But, some experts argued,
Russia also wanted to lower the level of confrontation and
realized that it would need to deal with the reality of the
Alliance's transformation.


7. (C) Deputy Director for Council for Foreign and Defense
Policy Aleksandr Belkin told us that during his
organization's April 12-13 annual conference for GOR
officials and prominent analysts on the accomplishments of
Russian foreign policy, the discussion focused "almost
exclusively on the disappointing results in Bucharest."
Belkin said the participants unanimously agreed that NATO's
"promise" to take in Georgia and Ukraine was a stunning blow
to Russian foreign policy. While acknowledging German and
French reluctance to accept Georgia and Ukraine, Belkin
explained that such a firm and clear commitment to aspiring
members was unprecedented, and thus it was "only a matter of
time" before MAP was offered, a view that Izvestia military
correspondent Dmitriy Litovkin shared. Belkin repeated
familiar arguments that eastward expansion of NATO was
clearly directed against Russia, for it served no strategic
purpose. He said Putin felt "betrayed and offended" by
NATO's last-minute decision to include a MAP commitment, and
despite the deliverables on Afghanistan, Belkin predicted
that Russia would proceed cautiously on further engagement
with NATO.


8. (C) When asked for his reaction to arguments from other
Russian analysts that Russia's strong rhetoric toward Ukraine
and Georgia only strengthened these countries, resolve to
join NATO, Belkin agreed, but argued that Russia was left
with no other choice. The vast majority of Ukrainians don't
want to "spoil" their relationship with Russia at the expense
of NATO membership, given the historical, cultural,
economical, and social links. Georgia is admittedly a
different story, but Belkin claimed that Russia could not be
blamed for its "understandable emotional reaction" to
Georgia's flat rejection of its ties with Russia.


9. (C) Independent defense expert Pavel Felgenhauer told us
the Russian leadership saw the failure of NATO to extend a
MAP offer to Ukraine and Georgia as a temporary victory.
Many in the Kremlin felt it would be very difficult to stop
a MAP offer again, and were preparing themselves for this
eventuality come December. He suggested that a "sort of
dtente" was possible after the Bucharest summit. After a
year of bellicose rhetoric, he argued, Medvedev would like to
decrease the level of confrontation with the West. According
to Felgenhauer, it was important that Putin started the
process during President Bush's visit to Sochi. This would
make it easier for Medvedev to take a less confrontational
approach to relations with the West, as he could plausibly
argue such a course would be a continuation of Putin's
policies. Above all else, he said, the Kremlin did not want
an arms race with the West because this would prove
disastrous to Russia's economic recovery as well as a
potential threat to peace.


10. (C) Project Director of the Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy and former Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey
Federov told us the Bucharest summit was a turning point in
the NATO-Russia relationship. Despite disagreements over MAP
offers to Ukraine and Georgia, the fact that the Alliance
issued a statement that declared these countries would join
NATO eventually was a sign of solidarity among the member
states. It was now clear to the GOR, Federov stated, that
Russia would not succeed in its attempts to divide NATO. It
was also clear that Russia no longer had satellite states and
could not prevent NATO from expanding. The best Russia could
hope for was to slow the pace of expansion.


11. (C) NATO support for the establishment of missile defense
(MD) systems in the Czech Republic and Poland was another
sign that the Alliance had become a "global security
organization," Federov posited. NATO's willingness to back
an expensive system that addressed potential threats from
"far-off places like Iran," combined with its "out-of-area"
operations in places like Afghanistan, demonstrated the
now-global reach of the Alliance. After Bucharest, Federov
stated, Russia must learn to deal with this reality. Federov
also suggested that Russia needed to "retune" its propaganda
message. The "enemy at the gates" line was no longer
working, and so Russia instead should take a more upfront
approach, clearly stating its red lines (such as Ukrainian
membership in NATO) and identifying possible areas of
cooperation, such as Afghan reconstruction.


12. (C) Comment: While many Russian officials and experts
appear increasingly resigned to further movement on MAP for
Ukraine and Georgia, as early as December, they continue to
be unequivocal about the consequences. From Lavrov's "Russia
will do everything to prevent Ukraine and Georgia from
joining the Alliance," to Chief of Defense General
Baluyevskiy's threat to resort to "military measures" if
Ukraine joins NATO, the GOR is intent on reinforcing its dire
views on further enlargement on its borders.
BURNS